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Abstract 
This thesis examines the effects of biases on investment decisions and risky asset prices 
using laboratory asset markets. A bias is a systematic error in decision-making and can 
be caused by many factors. In contrast to unsystematic errors, biases affect investor 
behaviour directionally and do not cancel each other out. Hence, a bias can cause asset 
prices to deviate from fundamental values, with potentially detrimental effects for 
investors and economies. 
This thesis examines three possible sources for biased decision-making, that is, it 
considers bias caused: 
• by option-like compensation: tournament behaviour 
• by probability judgement error: the gambler’s fallacy 
• when feelings affect information processing: mood misattribution 
Throughout the study, we increase the signal-to-noise ratio in our data. We use an 
established experimental design combined with extensive training to create ‘expert’ 
experimental subjects. 
The first study investigates the ways in which relative performance-based compensation, 
tournament incentives, affect portfolio choice and market prices. Unlike most 
experimental studies on this topic, we use a design with two risky assets that can be traded 
simultaneously. We draw on previous findings on price behaviour in two risky asset 
markets that exchange rates remain close to theoretical values even if individual prices 
deviate from risk-neutral fundamental values. We report that exchange rates between 
‘tournament markets’ and markets with linear compensation do not differ significantly; 
however, individuals change portfolio risk in line with the main prediction of tournament 
theory that midcompetition underperformers take excess risks. 
The second study examines the effects of the gambler’s fallacy on asset prices and 
portfolio choice. The gambler’s fallacy is the belief that that small samples should have 
the same distribution mean as their population. Investors sharing this belief would 
overpay for assets that have recently performed worse than expected and underpay for 
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assets after better-than-expected recent performance. Individual portfolios would be 
biased towards assets with unexpectedly bad performance. 
Existing models link the gambler’s fallacy to the disposition effect, the phenomenon that 
investors sell winning, but hold losing, investments, as well as medium-term momentum 
and long-term reversal in stock prices. To our best knowledge, our experimental study is 
the first to examine the gambler’s fallacy in a double-auction market setting. We 
deliberately trigger the gambler’s fallacy in treatment markets by paying a series of 
higher-than-expected dividends. We find that subjects benefitting the most from the high 
dividends become net sellers in the latter part of the experiment, while those not 
benefitting become net buyers. We report that market prices during the first half of phase 
two treatments are lower than those of phase two controls. Under these circumstances, 
buying the asset is a rational decision. 
The third study combines data from both experiments with surveys on subject mood to 
test for effects of mood misattribution. Mood misattribution is a bias suspected to alter 
the way investors search for, and evaluate, information on risks and returns based on their 
current mood. The cognitive psychology literature is divided in two competing 
hypotheses with opposite predictions for risk-taking and asset valuation. We find that 
subjects in a negative mood select higher-risk portfolios. Market prices are significantly 
positively correlated with the relative number of such subjects in the market; that is, the 
more the subjects in a market reporting a negative mood, the higher the prices for risky 
assets. Our findings stand in contrast to several empirical studies that use the weather as 
a proxy for investor mood. We question the validity of such a proxy based on published 
work in cognitive psychology and the working hours of employees in financial 
institutions. 
Key words 
Behavioural Finance, Experimental Finance, Risk-Taking, Tournament Behaviour, 
Gamblers Fallacy, Mood Misattribution, Cognitive Bias 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Rational choice is a defining paradigm of modern financial theory. Rational individuals 
make choices to maximise their personal benefit. By doing so, homo economicus, so 
named by Adam Smith (2000), will serve the interests of the entire society. Bernoulli 
(1954) and von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) define the personal benefit that is 
maximised as expected utility. This definition allows for individuals to be risk-averse. 
Rational investors consider all available information on return, risk and covariance to 
form portfolios of risky assets that maximise the trade-off between benefits and risks 
(Markowitz, 1952). They then decide the proportion of wealth to invest in this portfolio 
to maximise their individual utility. Sharpe’s (1964), Treynor’s (1961) and Lintner’s 
(1965) general equilibrium models of the pricing of capital assets are based on the theory 
of Markowitz. The theory of rational choice allows us to infer from individual decisions 
to explain financial market functioning and asset pricing. Markets do not always ‘behave’ 
as they should if all investors are rational. Anomalies, such as price momentum, are 
difficult to explain if all investors are rational. 
Momentum and reversal have been well documented in financial markets. Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) document that over an intermediate horizon of three to one years, past 
winning stocks outperform past losers. De Bondt and Thaler (1987) report that stocks that 
have lost value in the past outperform stocks that have gained in the past within three to 
five years. Momentum and reversal allow investors to predict the direction of future stock 
price movements from past prices and their existence violates the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH). The EMH states that stock prices will reflect fundamental values and 
that new information will be priced swiftly and accurately since rational investors update 
their beliefs on risk and future cash flows using Bayes’ law and make choices consistent 
with expected utility maximisation. 
Market efficiency does not require all participants to be rational. According to Friedman 
(1966), irrational traders, called noise traders, can cause prices to deviate from 
fundamental values. This deviation; however, is short-lived because rational traders, who 
are arbitrageurs, act on the mispricing. Through arbitrage, prices will return to 
fundamental values. In the strict sense, arbitrage is a riskless form of investing that does 
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not require equity. An arbitrageur finding an under-priced asset will buy this asset and 
finance the position by short-selling a substitute asset. 
In practice, arbitrage positions are not riskless. Perfect substitute assets do not exist, and 
mispricing may not correct, but worsen, in the short term because of noise trader activity. 
This noise trader risk can cause large losses to arbitrageurs. When arbitrageurs perceive 
the noise trader risk to be large, they may not act as Friedman predicts and mispricing can 
persist (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, & Waldmann, 1990). Froot and Dabora (1999) 
show in their analysis of Twin-Shares, two companies that are merged but remain separate 
entities, that mispricing caused by noise traders can be large and persistent even if perfect 
substitutes exist and implementation costs are small. Behavioural Finance argues that 
noise traders are, at least to some extent, predictable because biased preferences and 
beliefs drive their irrational behaviour. To understand the effects of bias on individual 
choice and market prices, researchers must incorporate cognitive psychology into 
financial modelling. 
This study examines three sources of bias under controlled conditions in the laboratory. 
We test the effects of bias that arises when portfolio owners and portfolio managers do 
not equally share risk and return. If mutual fund managers are paid large bonuses for 
outstanding performance but are not punished in a similar way when performance is poor, 
taking large risks will maximise their own expected payoff because investors bear most 
of the risk. Since mutual funds hold a substantial proportion of exchange-traded assets, 
this behaviour could lead to inefficient market prices. 
The second bias we test arises from the common misbelief that small samples from large 
populations should be representative of the population. An investor holding this belief 
who observes a series of returns that are higher than expected, that is, higher than the 
long-term average, will expect the subsequent returns to be lower than expected or vice 
versa. This belief, called the gambler’s fallacy, could explain why many investors sell 
stocks after prices rise but retain stocks after prices fall (Shefrin & Statman, 1985). The 
belief may have investors underreact to good news, since the next news should be bad. 
Prices would then not fully and accurately reflect this good news but instead rise more 
slowly until the (falsely) anticipated bad news does not arrive (Rabin & Vayanos, 2010). 
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The third bias we test arises when feelings interfere with investment decisions. Being in 
a good or bad mood may lead to bias when investors search for information or when they 
evaluate the utility of an investment based on risk and return. Investors in a good mood 
may overweight positive information and therefore pay higher prices or take higher risks 
(Forgas, 1995). In contrast, an investor in a good mood may be concerned about losing 
the positive feeling when a risky investment generates losses and therefore take lower 
risks (Isen & Patrick, 1983). Thus, our study would contribute to a better understanding 
of the effects of bias on risk-taking and market prices. 
1.1 Experimental Design and Procedures 
Experimental Finance is a relatively young but steadily growing discipline within the 
science of Finance. Researchers use laboratory asset markets to answer research questions 
primarily for the following reasons. 
Empirical data are incomplete. The analysis of data from empirical observations has the 
great advantage to be readily available at no, or low, cost; however, datasets do not 
typically include information on individual investors. Therefore, empirical data are 
mostly unable to answer research questions requiring controlling for differences between 
individuals. In the laboratory, the required information can simply be collected and the 
environment can be controlled. 
The fundamental value of assets is unknown. Many research questions in the Finance 
field evolve around market efficiency, the concept that asset prices are equal to, or at least 
close to, their fundamental values. Fundamental values have to be estimated using 
models, and researchers face the joint-hypothesis dilemma (Fama, 1998). Researchers can 
never say with certainty whether the market is inefficient or their model is wrong. 
Laboratory markets have the advantage that the theoretical fundamental value is known 
at all times. Therefore, asset price deviations from fundamental value can be identified 
with certainty. 
The most widely used design in laboratory asset markets is that of V. L. Smith, Suchanek 
and Williams (1988). First published in 1988, the design has since evolved as the standard 
for Experimental Finance research. One most valuable feature of the design is its 
replicability. Studies show that asset prices develop in a near-identical way, 
independently of sample size or sample population differences. Typically, prices display 
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a bubble-crash pattern, a steep increase in prices above the known fundamental values 
followed by a rapid decline in later periods. The result changes on repeating the study—
as subjects become experienced, the typical price pattern disappears. This observation has 
led many researchers, including Vernon Smith himself, to believe that the bubble-crash 
pattern is caused predominantly by confused subjects who do not fully understand the 
concept of fundamental value (V. L. Smith, 2010). Chapter 2 of this dissertation describes 
the general features of the experimental design and explains how we reduce confusion 
throughout all of our experiments. 
1.2 Tournaments 
In the wake of the global financial crisis, incentive plans for finance professionals attract 
increased scrutiny. Of particular concern is the possibility that relative performance 
incentives, sometimes called tournament incentives, encourages portfolio managers to 
take on excessive risk in the hope of outperforming peers and earning a bonus. By 
analysing cash flows of mutual funds, Sirri and Tufano (1992) show that funds with high 
year-end returns receive the highest cash inflows, while cash outflows for low-performing 
funds are relatively flat. Many actively managed funds obtain a large portion of their 
profits from fees based on assets under management (AUM) and portfolio managers may 
be remunerated accordingly. In this case, investor behaviour creates an asymmetric 
incentive that rewards high relative performance and punishes low performance mildly. 
The mutual fund industry witnesses an annual competition for the top positions in 
rankings by Morningstar, The Wall Street Journal and others. Managers focused on 
maximising their end-of-year rank may alter portfolio risk to achieve this goal. Fund 
managers ranked behind the competition during the tournament can increase the 
possibility of overtaking the competition by increasing portfolio risk. When ranked ahead 
of the competition during the tournament, they can secure the position by reducing 
portfolio risk. Risk shifting in response to rank will maximise a manager’s expected 
bonus—however, for investors, such behaviour can result in higher transaction costs, 
higher risks or lower returns. 
Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) are the first researchers to investigate the change of 
portfolio risk of US mutual funds with regard to their position relative to competitors. 
They find that interim underperformers increase the risk of their portfolios. Chevalier and 
Ellison (1997) report that younger funds increase risk when they are ahead and mirror an 
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index when they underperform. Busse (2001) finds no risk shifting relatable to rank when 
using daily, rather than monthly, portfolio data and concludes that findings could be based 
on autocorrelation bias in portfolio risk measures. Empirical studies group funds based 
on certain characteristics, such as fund age, fund size and investment objective (i.e., 
growth and value). Funds within these categories may compensate managers differently 
or grant their managers different levels of decision-making authority. Individual manager 
compensation and decision-making authority are not generally known and can therefore 
not be controlled for in empirical research. 
In laboratory asset markets, the effects of rank-dependent compensation can be studied in 
a controlled environment and improved conclusions can be drawn on the impact of 
tournament behaviour on portfolio selection and market prices. Thus far, experimental 
studies on tournaments have largely focused on their impact on asset price deviation from 
risk-neutral fundamental value, often called bubbles. We show that under tournament 
incentives, interim losers will increase risk by buying the higher-risk asset. Further, we 
find that tournament behaviour does not affect market prices when participants have 
received high levels of training. The latter finding is in contrast to that of the related 
literature, which suggests that asymmetric, rank-dependent compensation causes price 
disturbances. 
1.3 Probability Misjudgements in Experimental Asset Markets: The 
Gambler’s Fallacy 
The gambler’s fallacy is the belief that random events are negatively autocorrelated and 
therefore are not at all random. People subject to the gambler’s fallacy expect even small 
samples from a theoretically infinite population to be representative of the population. If 
the belief in the population distribution—the base rate—is strong, these people expect 
mean reversion on observing a sample with higher-than-expected or lower-than-expected 
outcomes. In the Finance field, the gambler’s fallacy is used to explain the disposition 
effect, the tendency of investors to sell assets after gains but retain assets after losses. On 
a price level, it can explain short-term underreaction and medium-term overreaction to 
new information resulting in the much-documented phenomenon of short-term 
momentum and medium- to long-term reversals observed in markets. 
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Our experimental study is, to our best knowledge, the first to examine the gambler’s 
fallacy in a double-auction market setting. We report that subjects benefitting the most 
from the high dividends become sellers in the second market, while those not benefitting 
become buyers. This finding is in line with that of Xu and Harvey (2014) who observed 
similar behaviour in a sports betting environment. Xu and Harvey report that punters 
reduce the odds of their bets after strings of wins and increase the odds after strings of 
losses. We report that market prices during the first half of phase two treatments are 
suppressed. Under these circumstances, buying the asset is a rational decision. Bossaerts 
and Plott (2004) report similar price distortions. In an experimental, study testing asset 
pricing models, they report anomalies in two of their markets caused by a series of ex-
ante unexpected payouts. 
This study advances the knowledge in the fields of Behavioural Finance as well as 
Psychology. Our results confirm those of Xu and Harvey (2014), who are the first to link 
gambler’s fallacy with the experience of gains and losses. Further, we show that these 
findings extend to simple financial assets and a double-auction setting. On an asset price 
level, our results are in line with the model of Rabin (2002). The belief in the law of small 
numbers will cause a short-term underreaction with prices below theoretical fundamental 
values, and medium- to long-term overreaction with prices above fundamental values 
after strings of better-than-expected earnings. 
1.4 Mood Misattribution Bias 
Our emotional state affects our attitude towards risk and therefore our evaluation of risky 
assets. Although psychologists and economists agree that mood affects individual risk-
taking and can affect financial markets, the behavioural and market implications are still 
debated. When linking mood to risk-taking, psychological research is divided into two 
competing hypotheses: the mood maintenance hypothesis (MMH) and the affect infusion 
model (AIM). While the MMH asserts that a positive mood reduces risk tolerance, the 
AIM maintains that a positive mood increases it. 
Empirical research in the Finance field uses mood proxies, such as the weather, air 
pollution, results of recent sporting events, the length of the trading day or the imminence 
of public holidays. Most studies in a financial context report higher abnormal returns for 
positive mood proxies, such as sunshine (Hirshleifer & Shumway, 2003), and lower 
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abnormal returns for negative mood proxies, such as cloudiness (Goetzmann, Kim, 
Kumar, & Wang, 2015). These findings are in line with the AIM predictions since 
increased (reduced) risk tolerance will result in lower (higher) required returns and higher 
(lower) stock prices. To date, Kliger and Levy (2003) are the only researchers to 
empirically report a negative correlation between mood, proxied by weather, and risk 
tolerance in line with the MMH. Participants in financial markets are confronted with a 
greater number of possible outcomes and no fixed probabilities; hence, mood-induced 
bias in probability judgements is more likely and can overshadow subjective utility 
effects. Empirical studies must rely on mood proxies, such as the weather, to estimate 
investor mood. However, the effects of, for example, weather on mood are still debated 
in the Psychology literature. Therefore, the question regarding the ways by which mood 
influences investor behaviour is not yet answered beyond reasonable doubt. 
Both the MMH and the AIM have distinct, testable implications for portfolio selection 
and asset pricing. We contribute to the literature on asset pricing and cognitive 
psychology by testing the implications of self-reported mood on portfolio selection, 
trading and asset prices in a market setup with fixed probabilities. We analyse 866 survey 
responses on portfolio risk-taking and asset prices from 77 markets collected over two 
years. We conclude that mood has implications on individual risk-taking because survey 
responses do determine portfolio choice predicted by MMH. Subjects with a positive 
mood experience greater mood ‘losses’ than subjects with negative mood, a prediction of 
Isen, Nygren and Ashby (1988), when decisions are made on the basis of utility 
preservation. A higher proportion of subjects with negative mood leads to higher market 
prices. This result is in line with the expectations of the MMH. Although the effects of 
mood on stock prices and volatility are reported to be in line with the AIM in some 
empirical data, the potentially counteracting effects of mood on subjective utility cannot 
be studied in a market setting. Our experimental data show that most of the predictions 
of the MMH are correct in a setting in which subjective probabilities play a lesser role. 
Our findings help to explain why empirical studies fail to deliver consistent results. 
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1.5 Structure 
This dissertation presents three studies on determinants of risk-taking in experimental 
asset markets. These studies are presented in Chapters 3–5; each chapter contains an 
introduction, literature review, results and conclusion. The experimental design and 
procedures are explained in Chapter 2 in detail. All remaining chapters include a brief 
description of the experimental design and procedures. 
Chapter 2 introduces the experimental designs, procedures and instruments used 
throughout this study. We discuss established features of our experimental design and 
explain how we approach issues regarding signal-to-noise ratios. Chapter 3 is a study on 
the effects of tournament incentives on portfolio choice and market prices in an 
experiment with two risky assets. We examine how compensation based on relative 
performance affects risk-taking and markets compared with compensation based on 
absolute performance. 
Chapter 4 discusses a study on the effects of the belief in the law of small numbers on 
risk-taking and risky asset prices. In both two-asset and one-asset markets, we examine 
if subjects treat random events as negatively autocorrelated after a series of outcomes 
does not conform to the expected mean. Chapter 5 describes the effects of mood and 
portfolio choice and asset prices. We combine the data collected for the studies on 
tournaments and gambler’s fallacy with self-reported mood and answer the question on 
how our feelings can change the way we treat risky prospects. Chapter 6 concludes this 
dissertation with a summary of our main findings and a discussion of the limitations and 
implications of each study. We also include a section on the limitations of our method in 
general and avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Experimental Design and Procedures 
This chapter provides an overview of the design of our experimental asset markets, the 
experimental procedure and the survey instruments we use. First, we introduce important 
characteristics and known problems of the design. We then explain how our procedures 
address these problems in subject training and in the setup of instructions and markets. 
Next, we discuss the exact procedures of training and experiments and introduce the 
survey instruments. Lastly, we describe the setup of Treatment and Control markets in 
our tournament and gambler’s fallacy studies. 
2.1 The Smith–Suchanek–Williams Design 
In 1988, V. L. Smith, Suchanek and Williams (hereafter SSW) published the first paper 
on experimental asset markets, which used a double-auction market as well as a risky 
asset with known risk-neutral fundamental value to all subjects. Their results show that 
prices are not informationally efficient, but instead, exhibit bubble-crash patterns (V. L. 
Smith et al., 1988). A bubble-crash pattern occurs when prices rise above risk-neutral 
expected values followed by a steep decline back to, or below, such values (see Figure 
2.1). The SSW design is now the standard design in Experimental Finance. The bubble-
crash pattern has been replicated by multiple studies and is robust to many variations with 
inexperienced participants. The pattern disappears gradually when subjects are allowed 
to repeat the experiment. 
Figure 2.1 shows a typical price pattern for SSW-type markets with inexperienced 
participants; prices in the first few periods are below the expected, risk-neutral value and 
then rise and remain above it for several periods to then steeply decline towards, or below, 
the expected value. Figure 2.1 represents aggregate median prices from seven markets 
that we conducted for training purposes. The prices we observe with inexperienced 
subjects in these training markets are consistent with multiple studies using inexperienced 
subjects. The typical price path (bubble-crash) disappears when they have received 
training. 
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Figure 2.1: Typical Price Pattern with Inexperienced Subjects 
A typical bubble-crash pattern in markets with inexperienced subjects. This figure represents the median 
of the median transaction prices of seven markets conducted for training purposes. The results are very 
similar to those of other studies using inexperienced subjects (i.e., Palan, 2013; V. L. Smith et al., 1988). 
In the SSW design, a group of subjects trade a risky asset over a finite number of periods. 
The asset pays a dividend at the end of each period; all possible payouts and probabilities 
are known to all of them. Owing to the finite number of periods, the sum of expected 
future dividends, the fundamental value of the asset, declines by the amount of the 
expected dividend after each period. For example, with five periods remaining, the 
expected value equals five times the expected dividend per period. After a dividend is 
paid, the expected value of the asset declines to four times the expected dividend. 
Bubble-crash patterns are robust to variations in sample size and sample population. 
Experimental asset markets are usually populated with between 6 (Lei & Vesely, 2009) 
and 15 (Van Boening, Williams, & LaMaster, 1993) student subjects. V. L. Smith et al. 
(1988) and V. L. Smith, King, Williams and Van Boening (1993) report that prices are 
similar for samples consisting of professionals and business people as well as corporate 
executives. Williams and Walker (1993) and Williams (2008) report that bubbles persist 
in markets with between 244 and 310 subjects. 
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2.1.1 Variations reducing bubble size 
The following section introduces variations in the experimental procedure that reduce the 
size and occurrence of bubbles in SSW markets. 
Studies identify three significant factors that reduce bubble size: the introduction of 
experienced subjects, improvements in experimental procedures and variations of the 
cash-to-asset ratio in the market. V. L. Smith et al. (1988) conduct markets mixing 
inexperienced with twice-experienced subjects and report that bubble size reduces as the 
number of the latter in the market increases. Van Boening et al. (1993) report similar 
results in mixed-experience markets. 
V. L. Smith et al. (1993) report that bubbles disappear almost entirely once all subjects 
are thrice experienced. Haruvy and Noussair (2006) explain the experience effect as a 
result of myopic adaption of expectations. Experienced subjects expect prices to develop 
in a similar way as in the previous market. They anticipate the initial price increase and 
the subsequent crash. Hence, prices start at a higher level and the bubble-crash pattern is 
accelerated. This process results in the gradual disappearance of bubbles and crashes. 
More experienced subjects produce smaller bubbles. To create a better understanding of 
the experimental design, several studies alter the way subjects are introduced to the 
experimental asset before data collection. 
V. L. Smith (2010) notes that the declining fundamental value of the design leads to 
confusion among subjects. Since they are asked to trade a dividend-paying asset, they are 
likely to frame this asset as a share. When trading a share and receiving dividend 
payments, one normally assumes a constant or increasing value (Oechssler, 2010). 
Alterations of the experiment instructions help reduce subject confusion. Kirchler, Huber 
and Stöckl (2012) implement a variation in their experimental instructions, which helps 
subjects better understand the declining fundamental value pattern. They describe the 
experimental asset as stocks of a depletable gold mine as opposed to just ‘stocks’ and find 
that this slight variation helps to significantly reduce mispricing and overvaluation since 
it makes the unintuitive pattern of declining fundamental values more feasible. In another 
experiment, Huber and Kirchler (2012) introduce a graph showing subjects the decreasing 
fundamental value. Previous authors use tables to show subjects the expected value for 
each period. Huber and Kirchler (2012) find that using a graph as opposed to a table 
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contributes significantly to reducing mispricing and overvaluation. They also find that 
asking subjects for a fundamental value estimate at the beginning of the trading period 
significantly reduces bubbles. Confusion is not the only problem caused by the declining 
fundamental value. 
The declining theoretical values of the assets combined with an increasing amount of 
liquidity because of the dividend payments are suspected to increase mispricing in 
experiments. Caginalp, Porter and Smith (1998) show that increasing the initial cash-to-
asset ratio will significantly increase mean asset prices. However, even if the initial cash-
to-asset ratio in the market is ideal, it will inevitably increase as the experiment proceeds. 
The risky asset declines in value from period to period, while the cash balance of subjects 
is expected to increase owing to dividend payments. 
Kirchler et al. (2012) solve this problem by using an asset design with constant 
fundamental value. The constant fundamental value design, first tested by V. L. Smith et 
al. (1988), only pays one risky dividend at the conclusion of the market instead of multiple 
dividends over multiple periods. The ratio of cash to assets hence remains constant from 
the start to the end of the market. 
A disadvantage of a one-dividend design is that subjects have only one observation of 
cash flows from the asset per market. They can only observe risk of assets and risk 
differences between assets once per market when there is only one dividend per asset. As 
a result, they cannot learn about the risk of the asset through dividend variability. The 
analysis of data in markets with one risky asset allows only for comparison between risk-
neutral values and prices on a market level. When subjects can trade multiple risky assets, 
we can examine the exchange rates between asset prices. Recent experimental studies 
report interesting results on exchange rates in markets with two risky assets. 
2.1.2 Two-asset design characteristics 
When subjects can trade two risky assets simultaneously, bubbles persist; however, when 
assets differ only in risk, the exchange rate between prices remains constant (Fisher & 
Kelly, 2000). Thus far, only a few researchers have conducted experiments in which two 
risky assets are traded for cash, but their interesting findings form the basis for this study. 
The existing two-asset literature focuses on prices of the assets relative to each other 
rather than to expected values to draw conclusions on foreign exchange markets. Fisher 
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and Kelly (2000) are the first to conduct an experiment in which two assets with identical 
fundamental value but differences in standard deviation are traded simultaneously. 
Although they observe bubbles in both asset markets, they find that the cross-exchange 
rate, the relative price of one asset in terms of the other, remains near its theoretical value. 
A riskier asset should have a higher return and therefore a lower price than a less risky 
asset with identical expected cash flows. Subjects price risky assets more accurately 
relative to each other than to risk-neutral expected values. Childs and Mestelman (2006) 
conduct similar experiments to investigate rate-of-return parity. They find that the 
introduction of risk without changing expected dividends does not appreciably influence 
the realisation of rate-of-return parity in their experiments. Rate-of-return parity states 
that two identical assets traded in different currencies should be trading at identical prices 
when adjusted for the differences in exchange rates. Childs and Mestelman (2006) use an 
exchange rate of one, and hence, their observations confirm the findings of Fisher and 
Kelly (2000).1 
The two-asset setup allows researchers to evaluate trading behaviour in an environment 
that is not dependent on the fundamental value path of one asset. In a two-asset 
environment, a change in the cross-exchange rate can be used as a dependent variable for 
measuring the market impact of treatments. For example, two assets with similar expected 
value but a different standard deviation should trade at identical prices if traders are risk-
neutral. When traders are risk-averse/risk-seeking the less/more risky asset should trade 
at a premium relative to the other risky asset. Hence, an observed change in the premia, 
or exchange rate, between the two risky assets would imply a change in the risk-taking 
behaviour. 
2.2 Measures Taken to Reduce Bubble Size 
The aforementioned findings on experience effects and confusion cause a dilemma for 
researchers using the SSW design. If a treatment makes the task harder to understand for 
subjects, then any difference between treatment and control data may be owing to 
confusion. Whenever the research question is not related to experience or confusion, the 
conclusions of a study may be questioned. 
                                            
1 The relevant treatment categories in both articles use relatively small variance differences between the 
two assets (Fisher 0.5 × 50/0, 0.5 × 20/30; Childs 0.5 × 10/20, 0.5 × 5/25) 
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We aim to reduce confusion and increase subject experience in our markets through 
increased training, clear instructions and an easy-to-follow market layout. 
2.2.1 Training and instructions 
Prior to the actual experiments, we conduct several two-hour training sessions. All 
subjects are required to complete a two-hour training session prior to participating in an 
experiment. These training sessions are designed to mitigate the effects of inexperience 
that many previous studies reveal (e.g., V. L. Smith et al., 1988). During the training, they 
are asked to trade in six different markets that gradually increase in complexity. The first 
market is designed to teach them only the handling of the software interface. The second 
market introduces simple asset valuation where dividends are certain. Next, they are 
introduced to trading and valuing one asset with risky cash flows. 
In the fourth training market, subjects are introduced to trading two risky assets 
simultaneously, and such trading is repeated in markets five and six, varying the possible 
dividend payoff and risk. Training subjects this extensively is unprecedented in the 
experimental asset market literature. The different markets are designed to gradually 
enable them to understand the software, declining value paths, valuation and expected 
values with risky dividends and finally the trading and valuing of two assets 
simultaneously. All subjects in our study have over 60 minutes of trading experience from 
the training. The remaining time of the training is used for instructions, ethics protocols 
and surveys. The subject instructions for the training sessions are presented in Appendix 
1.1. 
2.2.2 Instructions and questions between periods 
The instructions for the tournament study are in Appendix 1.1.1 and 1.1.2; the instructions 
for the gambler’s fallacy study, in which the difference between treatment and control is 
not known to subjects, is in Appendix 1.1.3. A colour-printed hard copy of all instructions 
is handed to them before starting each experiment. To ensure consistency, the 
experimenter reads out all instructions to the participants. They are asked to read along 
with the experimenter and encouraged to ask questions if anything is unclear. 
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2.2.2.1 Asset framing 
We frame all risky assets in training and experiment instructions as ‘stock of a depletable 
gold mine’. The instructions explain that, independently of the amount of previous cash 
flows, the mine is considered depleted after the last trading period dividend draw. Kirchler 
et al. (2012) test this instruction variation and find that it significantly reduces price 
bubbles in markets with inexperienced participants. This variation helps subjects 
understand the otherwise unintuitive value path of assets in SSW markets. Without the 
variation, they are likely to frame the asset as a stock because it pays risky cash flows that 
may be called ‘dividends’ by the instructor. Owing to its theoretically infinite maturity, 
the value of a stock typically does not decline to zero. If they associate the experimental 
asset with a typical stock, they may be inclined to value future cash flows that occur after 
the experiment and therefore trade at prices above expected values. 
2.2.2.2 Graphs, tables and questionnaires 
Huber and Kirchler (2012) study the effects of variations in instructions and procedures 
on the size of bubbles in SSW markets. In previous experiments, subjects are informed 
of the declining expected values through a table. The table states the exact risk-neutral 
expected value of the asset(s) for each trading period. Huber and Kirchler report that 
mispricing, measured by bubble size, reduces significantly when subjects can view a 
graph of the expected values in addition to the table. They also find that asking subjects 
for a fundamental value estimate in the beginning of the trading period significantly 
reduces bubbles. Our experimental design and instructions adapt the findings of Huber 
and Kirchler (2012). All subject instructions display the expected value path of the 
asset(s) through a graph and a table. Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1 show example value paths 
from the instructions. In between each period, we ask participants to state their estimate 
of the assets’ value. 
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Figure 2.2: Expected Value Path of a Risky Asset 
Figure 2.2 displays the declining fundamental value path of an asset with an expected dividend of 20 
FRANCS per period over 12 trading periods. This graph is available to all subjects in the instructions 
booklet. 
Table 2.1: Expected Value of a Risky Asset 
During Period Expected Holding Values per Asset (X 
or Y) in FRANCS 
1 240 
2 220 
3 200 
4 180 
5 160 
6 140 
7 120 
8 100 
9 80 
10 60 
11 40 
12 20 
End of market 0 
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Table 2.1 shows the declining fundamental value path of a risky asset with an expected dividend of 20 
FRANCS per period in each of the 12 trading periods. This table is available to all subjects in the 
instructions booklet. 
2.2.3 Cash-to-asset ratio 
The declining theoretical values of the assets combined with an increasing amount of 
liquidity because of the dividend payments are suspected to increase mispricing in 
experiments. The cash-to-asset ratio is the ratio of asset values over cash in the market. 
Caginalp et al. (1998) show that increasing the initial cash-to-asset ratio will significantly 
increase mean asset prices. The cash-to-asset ratio will inevitably increase as the 
experiment proceeds since the risky asset declines in value from period to period, while 
the cash balance of subjects is expected to increase owing to dividend payments. 
Kirchler et al. (2012) solve this problem by using an asset design with constant 
fundamental value. As explained earlier, a constant fundamental value design is not useful 
for our hypotheses. We take excess liquidity off the market by introducing a risk-free, 
noninterest paying account into which all dividends are paid. Accumulated dividends are 
not available for trading. This way, the expected increase in the value of the deposit 
account mirrors the decrease in fundamental value of the assets. Combined, the expected 
value of the assets and deposit accounts remains constant over all periods at the assets’ 
expected value in period one (240 FRANCS). Realised dividends, and therefore realised 
cash-to-asset ratios, may differ from the expected. Making dividends unavailable for 
trading can hence only mitigate, but not solve, the potential implications of a changing 
cash-to-asset ratio. 
2.2.4 Two risky assets 
We utilise the findings of Fisher and Kelly (2000) and Childs and Mestelman (2006) on 
relative asset prices in markets in which two risky assets are traded simultaneously. Both 
studies find that even if asset prices exhibit a bubble-crash pattern, the exchange rate 
between assets stays constant. In other words, the prices of both assets maintain the same 
relative distance. 
The two-asset setup allows researchers to evaluate trading behaviour in an environment 
that is not dependent on the fundamental value path of one asset. In a two-asset 
environment, changes in the cross-exchange rate can be used as a dependent variable for 
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measuring the market impact of treatments. Two assets with similar expected value but a 
different standard deviation should trade at identical prices if traders are risk-neutral. 
When traders are risk-averse/risk-seeking the less/more risky asset should trade at a 
premium relative to the other risky asset. Hence, an observed change in the premia, or 
exchange rate, between the two risky assets would imply a change in the risk-taking 
behaviour. 
We conduct all markets for the tournament study using a two-asset design to observe 
changes in the exchange rate between assets when subjects alter portfolio risk based on 
rank. The two-asset design allows them to perform more nuanced alterations to portfolio 
risk. For the gambler’s fallacy study, we test our hypotheses using markets with one and 
two risky assets to examine whether the availability of a second, less speculative, asset 
influences risk-taking behaviour. 
2.3 Procedure 
The following section outlines the subject recruitment process and the general procedure 
of the experiment. 
2.3.1 Recruitment 
All our experimental subjects are students at Bond University, and we recruit on campus 
only. We inform students with on-campus posters, short presentations during selected 
lectures and online announcements on subject websites. Both presentations and 
announcements contain information similar to the poster in Appendix 1.2. 
All subjects need to register their interest in participation online on a website created with 
Eventbrite.com.au, a free event management tool. We invite registered subjects to 
trainings sessions; only trained subjects later receive invitations to register for 
experiments. To motivate interest in our experiment, we advertise an average hourly 
compensation of $20/hour for training and experiments. The compensation is fixed for 
the training but depends on performance during all experiments. 
2.3.2 Software, location and currency 
All our markets, training and survey interfaces are programmed using GIMS—Graz-
Innsbruck Market System (Palan, 2015)—and are conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
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2007). The computerised double-auction market allows subjects to trade assets with each 
other in real time. They can post bids and asks or act as price takers by accepting bids or 
asks posted by others. We conducted all experiments in computer laboratories at Bond 
University. During all experiments, prices are quoted in the experimental currency, 
FRANCS. We convert FRANCS into Australian dollars at the conclusion of the 
experiment. The applicable exchange rate from FRANCS to Australian Dollars is 
explained to all subjects at the beginning of each experiment. 
2.3.3 Training and experiments 
2.3.3.1 Training 
The following describes the procedure for all training sessions. The experimenter 
welcomes all participants individually and hands out an instruction booklet (Appendix 
1.1) with each subject’s unique trader ID. We use the three-digit trader ID to track them 
over multiple markets and to link survey data with market data without the need to store 
personal information. After all subjects are seated, the experimenter reads out the first 
page of the instructions followed by the explanatory statement and informed consent 
forms (Appendix 1.6.). 
Next, the experimenter explains the market interface and starts the first training 
simulation. Subjects can ask questions during and after each market. The next training 
market introduces them to asset valuation and the declining fundamental value pattern of 
the experimental asset with a fixed dividend payment. 
We introduce subjects to risky dividends in the subsequent market and explain carefully 
how risk changes the interpretation of fundamental values. After another market with one 
risky asset, we introduce them to a market with two simultaneously traded assets. Lastly, 
all of them answer a 20-question financial risk-tolerance assessment survey by Grable 
and Lytton (1999) and a self-designed financial literacy test2. In exchange for a signed 
receipt, all subjects receive AU$20 in cash and a promissory note3 for another AU$20 
paid immediately when they return to the first experiment. 
                                            
2 See Section 2.5 on survey instruments as well as Appendix 2 
3 See Appendix 2 
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2.3.3.2 Experiments 
We now describe the general procedure of market sessions. The experimenter welcomes 
all subjects individually and hands out the instruction booklet for the day’s experiment. 
Subjects returning to an experiment for the first time since their training session receive 
AU$20 cash in exchange for their promissory note immediately after entering the 
laboratory. Once all subjects are seated, the experimenter reads out the instructions. We 
explain the compensation and exchange rate and start the warm-up market. During warm-
up, all subjects can trade two risky assets for four minutes. The warm-up is intended to 
remind them of the market interface. Immediately after the warm-up, they answer a four-
question mood survey4 before we introduce the experimental asset(s) and market features, 
such as summary screens. All assets are introduced as stock of depletable gold mines; the 
risk-neutral expected values are displayed as graphs and tables in all instructions. 
All markets have a length of 12 periods; each period lasts 180 seconds. After each period, 
we ask subjects to answer some valuation questions to remind them of the asset values. 
After the survey, we determine the dividends. In the tournament study, we determine all 
dividends by rolling a 10-sided die twice, once for each asset. The instruction booklets 
explain to them the numbers that trigger dividends. We project the die roll via a document 
camera on the laboratory wall. In the gambler’s fallacy study, we inform them that the 
dividend is drawn by a random number generator. In fact, the dividends are preselected 
from a simulation. After the dividend determination, and before the next period starts, 
subjects see a summary screen that displays their individual asset holdings, the most 
recent dividend, cash balance, rank and the sum of received dividends. 
We pay all dividends into a separate account, which subjects cannot access during trading; 
that is, accumulated dividends are not available for trading. This way, the expected 
increase in the value of the deposit account mirrors the decrease in fundamental value of 
the assets and the markets’ cash-to-asset ratio stays constant in expectation. After the final 
period’s dividend draw we display the final period summary screen. It displays the sum 
of accumulated dividends and the cash balance. All risky assets are worth zero after the 
market concludes. We display the final rank to subjects as well as their earnings from the 
market in Australian dollars. 
                                            
4 See Section 2.5 
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After each market, we ask subjects to complete another mood survey as well as a short 
questionnaire in which they can state unintentional mistakes. We consult the data from 
this questionnaire to explain and remove unusual observations. All experiments consist 
of two identical, independent markets. After each market, endowments are reset to the 
initial values. After the second market, we collect additional information on 
demographics and feedback. All subjects are then paid the Australian dollar equivalent of 
their market earnings from both markets. 
2.4 Survey Instruments 
2.4.1 Financial risk attitude 
To assess risk attitude, we use a survey instrument developed by Grable and Lytton 
(1999). While there is no shortage of risk attitude surveys, surprisingly few are generally 
recognised, scientifically developed and tested. Most instruments for assessing risk 
attitude are developed in-house by companies and are not necessarily tested. A standard 
instrument for the assessment of risk attitudes does not exist (Roszkowski, Snelbecker, & 
Leimberg, 1993). 
We choose the risk attitude survey by Grable and Lytton (1999) owing to its methodically 
robust development and focus on financial risk attitudes. The survey measures risk 
attitudes on three dimensions: investment risk, risk comfort and experience, and 
speculative risk. Owing to the short-term nature and the relatively low stakes in our 
experiments, we consider it likely that subjects see the experiment as a speculative task 
as opposed to an investment. Our data analysis shows that only the dimension of 
speculative risk explains portfolio selection in our experiments. The full survey is 
presented in Appendix 2.1. After initial tests of all dimensions, combined and separately, 
we only use items 2, 16 and 17 of the survey. 
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2.4.2 Mood 
We ask subjects to answer the following survey three times during our two-hour data 
collection. 
Currently, I feel as though I am: 
In a bad mood −4 −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 In a good mood  (Q1) 
Angry   −4 −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 Cheerful  (Q2) 
Sleepy  −4 −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 Wide awake (Q3) 
Calm   −4 −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 Excited  (Q4) 
The instrument measures mood on the four levels of affect recommended by Watson and 
Tellegen (1985). In two dimensions (high and low), we measure Positive Affect (Q1), 
Pleasantness (Q2), Engagement (Q3) and Negative Affect (Q4). Self-reported data, such 
as ours, can be biased. In our case, subjects may wish to present themselves to the 
experimenter as happier, more enthusiastic people than they are really. One way to reduce 
the chance of biased responses is to employ larger, more complex surveys that obscure 
the intent of the researcher. Watson and Tellegen (1985) compare short surveys, such as 
ours, with longer, more complex surveys and find no evidence for a difference in biased 
responses. Subjects answer the first survey (M1) immediately before they start trading in 
the first of two asset markets. The second survey (M2) is conducted after the first but 
before the second market; the third survey (M3), after the second market. The 
arrangement allows us to measure the effects of mood on prices and portfolio choice as 
well as those of gains and losses on mood. 
2.4.3 Other instruments 
2.4.3.1 Valuation questions between trading periods 
Between trading periods, but before the dividend draw, we ask subjects to answer the 
following questions: 
a. Have you traded (asset X/Y) during the most recent period? Y/N 
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b. Considering the prices (asset X/Y) you observed during the most recent period, 
please characterise the asset as 
i. undervalued 
ii. overvalued 
iii. valued correctly 
c. Please state in FRANCS the price above which you would have sold, and below 
which you would have bought, asset (X/Y). 
The purpose of these questions is to motivate subjects to think about the values of our 
experimental assets after each period. The reflection on prices and the reminder on values 
are intended to reduce mispricing and particularly the escalation of mispricing over 
multiple periods (bubbles). Kirchler et al. (2012) show that valuation questions between 
periods can significantly reduce bubble size. We originally intended to use question (c) 
to compare aggregate subjective values with market prices; however, most subjects stated 
the exact risk-neutral expected value of the asset as their answer. 
2.4.3.2 Financial literacy quiz used in training markets 
After the training sessions, all subjects answer a financial literacy quiz designed by the 
experimenter. The 10-question multiple choice quiz tests their understanding of expected 
dividends and the declining values of the experimental assets. The instrument is presented 
in Appendix 2.2. We encourage them to ask for help should they face difficulties with 
any of the questions. We do not use this instrument for data analysis; it is intended only 
to remind them of concepts they learn during the training and to ask questions when they 
do not fully understand something. 
2.5 Design of the Tournament Study 
2.5.1 Control markets 
For each experiment, we recruit up to 12 subjects5 from the pool of trained students. At 
the end of each of the 12 trading periods, each asset pays a risky dividend to subjects who 
                                            
5 The number of subjects in computerised asset market experiments generally lies between 6 and 12 for 
each session. We chose to use 12 subjects because in a two-asset market, not every subject is expected to 
be active in both markets simultaneously (or active at all), and without an active market in both assets 
during all trading periods, the observable behaviours may be limited. 
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held the asset. The dividend payments for both assets are uncorrelated; the probabilities 
and possible payouts are known to subjects. Each trading period lasts for four minutes. 
This approach allows us to conduct two markets with the same subjects within the two-
hour experiment. 
The properties of the experimental assets are designed as follows: 
Table 2.2: Experimental Design—Tournaments 
Parameters Control Treatment 
Periodic dividend asset Y 
(LOW_RISK) 
Probability (%) 
Expected dividend per period 
 
10, 30 
50, 50 
20 
 
10, 30 
50, 50 
20 
Periodic dividend asset X 
(HIGH_RISK) 
Probability (%) 
Expected dividend per period 
 
0, 100 
80, 20 
20 
 
0, 100 
80, 20 
20 
Rank visible between periods 
Rank bonus 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
If subject rank < all 
subjects/2 
Payment Market earnings 1.5 market earnings for 
bonus ranks 
Market earnings 
otherwise 
Exchange rate 
Fixed payment (AU$) 
Expected payout of hold strategy 
(AU$) 
260 FRANCS = 1AU$ 
2.50 
18.50 
320 FRANCS = 1AU$ 
2.50 
15, 22.5 
Initial Endowment 
Initial endowment asset Y 
(LOW_RISK) 
Initial endowment asset X 
(HIGH_RISK) 
Equal 
5 per subject 
 
5 per subject 
Equal 
5 per subject 
 
5 per subject 
Initial endowment CASH 
Periods 
2400 
12 
2400 
12 
Table 2.2 summarises the experimental design of the tournament markets 
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Both assets have the same expected dividend but clearly differ in the distribution of 
possible payouts. Both Fisher and Kelly (2000) and Childs and Mestelman (2006) find 
that relative asset prices between two risky assets stay relatively constant when the assets 
have the same expected dividends but differ in risk. The theoretical value of the assets 
declines stepwise from 240 FRANCS per asset in period one to 20 FRANCS at the end 
of the last trading period. V. L. Smith et al. (1988) first introduced this asset design, and 
it has since been used as a standard procedure in asset market experiments. In our control 
experiment, subjects are not exposed to a tournament incentive. Instead, the compensation 
is a function of the individual cash balance at the end of the experiment plus a show-up 
fee. 
2.5.2 Treatment markets 
Subjects are compensated by a linear payment plus a bonus based on their end-of-
experiment earnings relative to the average market earnings and rewarded for above-
average performance. The average/expected earnings per subject are 20 AU$/hour and 
are determined by the exchange rate from FRANCS to AU$. 
Linear compensation means that subjects will receive their end-of-experiment cash 
balance, including dividends, exchanged from FRANCS to AU$. Subjects displaying 
above-average performance will receive a bonus payment. The benchmark E × (market 
average) is in this case endogenous as well as exogenous simultaneously, because 
subjects form the market. Thus, payment relative to market performance is equal to 
payment relative to group performance. By showing subjects only their position in the 
competition but not the average market performance, we frame this benchmark as 
endogenous. We inform them their rank in the competition after each trading period. 
2.6 Design of the Gambler’s Fallacy Study 
For each experiment, up to 12 subjects are recruited from a pool of students who have 
been trained in a first experimental session dedicated to generating experience and 
completing the risk attitude survey. At the end of each of the 12 trading periods, each 
asset pays a risky dividend to subjects who held the asset. The dividend payments for 
both assets are uncorrelated, and the probabilities and possible payouts are communicated 
to them. 
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Table 2.3: Communicated Asset Properties in the Gambler’s Fallacy Study 
Asset Dividend per Period 
(FRANCS) 
Expected Dividend per 
Period (FRANCS) 
Asset X 100, 0 (p = 0.2) 20 
Asset Y 30, 10 (p = 0.5) 20 
Subjects are led to believe that the dividends for both assets follow the distribution 
illustrated in Table 2.3. However, to test our hypothesis, we preselected the cash flows 
from a Monte Carlo-type simulation. We conduct two markets with the same subjects 
within the two-hour experiment. In Treatment sessions, the dividends for the first market 
are chosen from a simulation with expected value FRANCS 480, much higher than the 
FRANCS 240 that we describe to subjects. For the second market in the Treatment 
session, the expected value of the dividends is either FRANCS 100, or 200, that is, lower 
than described. The dividends for the conservative asset Y are selected to equal the 
expectation of FRANCS 240. In Control markets one and two, we select the dividends 
for both assets to be close to their expected means in both markets. 
Both assets are described to have the same expected dividend but clearly differ in the 
distribution of possible payouts. Both Fisher and Kelly (2000) and Childs and Mestelman 
(2006) find that relative asset prices between two risky assets stay relatively constant 
when the assets have the same expected dividends but differ in risk. The risk-neutral 
expected values of the assets will decline stepwise from 240 FRANCS per asset in period 
one to 20 FRANCS at the end of the last trading period. V. L. Smith et al. (1988) first 
introduced this asset design, and it has since been used as a standard procedure in asset 
market experiments. 
In a second trial, we repeat the procedure without the conservative asset Y. While the 
presence of a second, lower-risk asset has the advantage that we can use exchange rate 
parity for hypothesis testing, subjects investing heavily in asset Y may not pay close 
attention to the dividends of asset X. Therefore, we cannot conclude whether these 
subjects do not act on their gambler’s fallacy belief or whether they simply do not pay 
attention to the dividends of asset X. 
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2.7 The Sample 
We collect all our data in 2014 and 2015. Unlike most Australian universities, Bond 
University offers students three teaching terms per year. This structure is an advantage 
for us since we can recruit new students for our experiments at the beginning of each 
term. Overall, we train 218 individual students in 12 training markets. Approximately 
85% of our subjects are enrolled with the Bond School of Business, and the remainder 
are from other schools, such as Medicine, Law and Architecture. Our sample consists of 
60% undergraduate students. All subjects are over 18 years of age; the median age in our 
sample is 22. Our subjects include 116 international students (~53%) predominantly from 
Europe, China, India and North America (the US and Canada). Subjects are ~60% male 
and ~40% female. We run 41 experiment sessions with two markets per session.6 We 
conduct a total of 28 markets for the tournament study and 52 markets for the gambler’s 
fallacy study. We use all market and subject data for the mood study. 
                                            
6 The data of one market during a tournament session were not saved owing to a network issue. 
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Chapter 3: Tournaments 
3.1 Abstract 
We study risk-taking behaviour under tournament incentives in a laboratory two-asset 
double-auction market. To increase the signal-to-noise ratio in our data, we use an 
established experimental design combined with extensive training to create ‘expert’ 
experimental subjects. We find that subjects increase portfolio risk when they are 
competing for a rank-dependent bonus and their midmarket rank is below average. 
Consistent with previous studies, we find that the tournament incentives do not affect 
asset prices. These findings are important for the design of compensation incentives for 
fund managers. 
3.2 Introduction 
In the wake of the global financial crisis, incentive plans for finance professionals have 
come under increased scrutiny. Of particular concern is the possibility that relative 
performance incentives, sometimes called tournament incentives, may encourage 
portfolio managers to take on excessive risk in the hope of outperforming peers and 
earning a bonus. By analysing cash flows of mutual funds, Sirri and Tufano (1992) show 
that funds with high year-end returns receive the highest cash inflows while cash outflows 
for low-performing funds are relatively flat. Many actively managed funds obtain a large 
portion of their profits from fees based on AUM, and portfolio managers may be 
remunerated accordingly. In this case, investor behaviour creates an asymmetric incentive 
that rewards high relative performance and punishes low performance mildly. 
The mutual fund industry witnesses an annual competition for the top positions in 
rankings by Morningstar, The Wall Street Journal and others. Managers focused on 
maximising their end-of-year rank, may alter portfolio risk to achieve this goal. Fund 
managers ranked behind the competition during the tournament can increase the 
possibility of overtaking their peers by increasing portfolio risk. When ranked ahead of 
the competition during the tournament, they can secure the position by reducing portfolio 
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risk. Risk shifting in response to rank will maximise a manager’s expected bonus—
however, for investors such behaviour can result in higher transaction costs, higher risks 
or lower returns. 
Brown et al. (1996) are the first to investigate the change of portfolio risk of US mutual 
funds with regard to their position relative to competitors. They find that interim 
underperformers increase the risk of their portfolios. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) report 
that younger funds increase risk when they are ahead and mirror an index when they 
underperform. Busse (2001) finds no risk shifting relatable to rank when using daily, 
rather than monthly, portfolio data and concludes that findings could be based on 
autocorrelation bias in portfolio risk measures. 
The comparability of mutual funds is limited owing to a wide variety of different 
investments policies, benchmarks and investment objectives. Researchers typically 
choose these investment objectives to classify funds for data analysis. However, a fund 
manager may not necessarily compare own performance with that of a full set of 
competitors, that is, those that are US mutual funds growth oriented, but only to that of a 
much smaller subset of this group—one that is US mutual funds growth oriented and 
offered by the same distribution partner. The data rely on the assumption that fund 
manager remuneration is tied to AUM. Since manager compensation arrangements are 
not made public, different incentive schemes cannot be excluded from the sample and 
have the potential to change the results. 
In laboratory asset markets, the effects of rank-dependent compensation can be studied in 
a controlled environment and improved conclusions can be drawn on the impact of 
tournament behaviour. Thus far, experimental studies on tournaments have largely 
focused on their impact on asset price deviation from risk-neutral fundamental value, 
often called bubbles. James and Isaac (2000) and Isaac and James (2003) examine such 
bubbles and find that in markets with tournament incentives, bubbles do not disappear 
with increasing subject experience. 
According to Cheung and Coleman (2012), this disturbance can be mitigated with a 
simpler, constant fundamental value design. This design pays subjects one, usually risky, 
cash flow at the end of an experimental market. Therefore, the risk-neutral expected value 
of the experimental asset remains unchanged throughout the market. V. L. Smith, van 
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Boening and Wellford (2000) compare asset price bubbles in declining as well as constant 
value designs and find that the latter design reduces bubble-crash patterns, particularly 
with more experienced subjects. In a declining value design, subjects are asked to value 
a series of risky prospects as opposed to only one in a constant value design and 
experience the consequences of their decisions throughout the experiment. In a constant 
value design, the outcome of the risky prospect concludes the market. Therefore, the 
design makes the evaluation of interim performance, rank, highly ambiguous.7 Our 
hypotheses all rely on subjects periodically re-evaluating their performance. This can 
happen only if the performance indicator, the subject rank, is perceived to be reliable. 
V. L. Smith et al. (1988) first researched the effect of subject experience on price bubbles. 
Later, V. L. Smith (2010) concludes that bubbles are largely a product of confusion 
among subjects. Thus far, individual subjects’ reactions under tournament incentives has 
not been studied. The question is of high relevance to innumerable investors who entrust 
their savings to professional managers. 
Subjects in our study trade two different risky assets for cash, enabling us to observe more 
subtle changes in portfolio risk as well as to analyse cross-exchange rates. We work 
within the established design framework of V. L. Smith et al. (1988) but implement 
features that minimise noise at an unprecedented scale. We train all subjects for two hours 
and use tested innovations to minimise noise. In this paper, we contribute to the literature 
by investigating how tournament incentives induce risk-shifting behaviour by individuals 
and measure market impact independent of bubble formation using relative asset prices. 
We show that, under tournament incentives, interim losers will increase risk by buying 
the higher-risk asset. Further, we find that tournament behaviour does not affect market 
prices when participants have received high levels of training. The latter finding is 
consistent with those of related studies, which suggest that asymmetric, rank-dependent 
compensation does not cause price disturbances. 
                                            
7 The ‘rank’ display in our declining fundamental value design assumes that the sum of future dividend 
payouts is equal to the sum of expected dividend payouts and is therefore still somewhat ambiguous; 
however, it is less so as the market matures. The calculation of the rank display is explained to subjects 
during the instructions and the display is called ‘Rank Indicator’. 
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3.3 Literature Review 
3.3.1 Empirical findings 
Several well-known academic studies examine the risk-taking behaviour of mutual fund 
managers in response to the relative performance of their funds. In an environment in 
which compensation is linked to relative, as opposed to absolute, performance, a 
tournament develops in which subjects will adapt their behaviour depending on their 
relative position in the competition. More specifically, they will increase effort and risk 
during the second half of the tournament to win if they have underperformed relative to 
their peers in the first half. By contrast, subjects likely to be winners after the first half 
have an incentive to reduce effort and risk to ‘lock in’ their current position (Brown et al., 
1996). 
In the mutual fund industry, portfolio risk should be determined by the managers’ 
expertise and the shareholders’ risk attitudes rather than by the position of the fund 
relative to the competition. Therefore, tournament behaviour could cause a conflict of 
interest (agency conflict) between shareholders of the fund (principals) and fund 
managers (agents). For most mutual funds, revenues are generated by charging 
shareholders a fixed percentage of AUM, which appears to be an absolute, rather than a 
relative measure of compensation. However, several factors contribute to this fee 
structure converting into a relative form of compensation from a manager’s viewpoint, 
which originates in investor behaviour and the individual managers’ compensation. 
Capon, Fitzsimons and Prince (1996) survey households that made mutual fund 
investments in the recent past and find that past performance of funds is a major criterion 
in deciding upon an individual fund within a group of similar funds (i.e., growth-oriented 
and value-oriented funds). Sirri and Tuffano (1992) find similar evidence on measuring 
new cash inflows into mutual funds. Mutual funds with the highest returns also receive 
the largest new cash inflows. They also find that AUM are sticky, which means that 
poorly performing funds do not experience equivalent cash outflows. Goetzmann and 
Peles (1997) argue that investors hesitate to withdraw their money from underperforming 
funds owing to a combination of transaction costs and cognitive dissonance. This means 
that once investors make the decision to invest and then the fund performs poorly, they 
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will hesitate to withdraw their funds because that would mean admitting they made a 
mistake. 
If the fund manager is paid a fixed salary plus a variable component dependent on the 
funds change in AUM, the above findings imply an asymmetric, option-like 
compensation with limited downside and great upside potential that depends on the funds’ 
relative position in the competition or tournament. The requirements to classify the 
mutual fund industry as a tournament (compensation relative to a funds’ rank in a 
competition owing to asymmetric incentives) seem to be fulfilled. However, empirical 
evidence is mixed. 
Brown et al. (1996) use a sample of 334 growth-oriented US mutual funds between 1980 
and 1991 and find that managers underperforming relative to their peers by midyear tend 
to increase portfolio risk more than relative midyear over performers. That is, portfolio 
managers underperforming in the first half of the year are trying to catch up with their 
peers by increasing the risk of their portfolios. 
In their observations, the ‘winning’ funds do not, as the tournament theory predicts, 
decrease their risk relative to the first period of the tournament. However, the increase in 
risk is significantly lower than among ‘losing’ funds. Brown et al. (1996) conclude that 
the observed increase in risk-taking of interim ‘losers’ and the significantly different risk-
taking behaviour among interim ‘winners’ are sufficient to classify the mutual fund 
industry as an economic tournament. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) report related results on fund managers’ risk-taking. By 
treating the new funds’ flow–performance relationship as an incentive scheme for fund 
managers, they find that managers alter the riskiness of their funds particularly between 
September and December. In contrast to Brown et al. (1996), they find that young 
investment funds have a strong incentive to increase the risk of their portfolios when they 
are ahead of the market and an incentive to mirror the index if they severely underperform 
during the first part of the year. Fund rankings have a particularly high importance for 
younger funds as a marketing tool, since these smaller funds may have smaller marketing 
budgets and fewer distribution channels. The potentially higher risk of job loss or fund 
closure in case of severe underperformance could explain why a manager in this category 
is tempted to mirror an index rather than increase portfolio risk in this situation. 
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Aragon and Nanda (2012) report that liquidation and employment risk are factors that 
influence risk-taking in hedge funds. Busse (2001) finds that the tournament hypothesis 
is mostly based on autocorrelation-biased data analysis. He analyses daily return data as 
against the monthly data used by Brown et al. (1996) and finds no evidence that managers 
actively influence risk. He finds some evidence that is consistent with the findings of 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997)—above-average performing funds increase their risk more 
than below-average performing funds. 
Taylor (2003) investigates tournament behaviour in the context of exogenous (i.e., market 
index) and endogenous (i.e., median fund performance) benchmarks. His theoretical 
model finds that when an exogenous benchmark is used, losing managers at the end of an 
interim assessment period increase the risk of the fund in the following period, while 
winning managers reduce their risk. Interestingly, when using an endogenous benchmark, 
his model predicts that winning managers will take on more risk and losing managers will 
reduce risk. Taylor describes a scenario of two competing managers: Here, individual 
risk-taking is dependent on the expectations about the most likely actions of the ‘rival’ 
manager. In this context, a manager above the benchmark may increase portfolio risk 
since she expects her opponent, who is below the benchmark, to do the same. At the same 
time, the losing manager reduces risk since she expects that her opponent will increase 
risk and hopes that she may fail. 
Hallahan and Faff (2009) produce results in line with the predictions of Taylor (2003) in 
their analysis of Australian superannuation funds. They investigate the tournament 
induced risk-shifting behaviour of Australian ‘multisector growth funds’ from 1989–2001 
against an endogenous and an exogenous benchmark, concluding that tournament effects 
may vary depending on the benchmark applied. The aforementioned authors and analyses 
are all concerned with the most common form of fee structure found in mutual funds: the 
compensation based on AUM. 
Performance-based compensation, which is a bonus in addition to the AUM-based fee in 
case the funds’ returns exceed a predefined benchmark, is most common outside the 
mutual fund industry. In the hedge fund industry, the ‘two and twenty’ rule is a widely 
used method of compensation. It means that the fund charges a 2% fee on AUM plus an 
additional 20% fee on the funds’ returns above a predefined benchmark. Although this is 
still not common in the mutual fund industry, the number of funds using performance-
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based compensation and AUM is on the rise. Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003) find that, in 
1999, only 108 out of a total 6,716 U.S. based bond and stock mutual funds used incentive 
fees. Interestingly, this relatively small portion of funds controls 10% of total AUM and 
their AUM grows faster than that of nonincentive fee funds between 1990 and 1999. 
Performance-based compensation, in theory, has many advantages, which help explain 
its growing popularity. From an agency theory point of view, the performance fee should 
align the shareholders’ (fund investors’) interest with the managers’ interest, because it 
creates a direct benefit for both parties when performance is above average.8 For the same 
reason, a performance-fee fund should attract highly motivated managers since extra 
effort is rewarded more highly than in traditional funds. 
A less-motivated manager who just tracks a benchmark will earn more in a fund with an 
AUM-based fee structure.9 Further, the overall costs to the investor of funds with 
incentive fees are lower than for traditional funds (Elton et al., 2003). In contrast to other 
fund categories charging incentive fees, such as hedge funds or private equity funds, the 
incentive fee in the mutual fund industry is much lower; however, given the size of the 
AUM, it is of real importance to the firm. Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) criticise that the 
choice of the correct benchmark is not possible. In light of unknown stock picking ability 
and unknown personal risk preferences of the fund manager, the evaluation of 
performance simply by comparing the fund’s returns with a benchmark’s returns will give 
a manager too much room to invest the fund’s assets outside the index. This is likely to 
introduce higher risks to investors when assets are chosen that have higher expected 
returns than the index and hence not in the interest of investors. 
In their theoretical analysis, assuming privately informed portfolio managers, Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1997) show that commonly used benchmarks result in suboptimal risk-sharing 
between managers and investors. However, it is not clear whether the model reflects all 
possible adjustments to the risk-sharing process, which could be made by management or 
investors. Elton et al. (2003) point in the same direction: Although incentive fee funds 
outperform nonincentive fee funds on average, most of them underperform in relation to 
their benchmark and show higher tracking error around the benchmark than traditional 
                                            
8 In addition to the existing benefit for the manager: the attraction of new funds. 
9 Superior performance and increase of incentive fee funds may not be a result of the motivation supplied 
by the incentive fee, but rather, a result of skilled managers adopting incentive fees to advertise their skills 
to the public (Elton, Gruber, & Blake, 2003). 
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funds. Importantly, they find evidence that managers increase the risk after periods of 
poor performance and decrease risk after a period of good performance; an observation 
that seems to be related to the tournament hypothesis. 
The comparison of management behaviour between traditional and incentive fee funds 
based on empirical data presents researchers with various difficulties. Differences in 
benchmarks, the funds restrictions and corporate guidelines, the managers’ individual risk 
attitude or the job-loss possibility on a fund level (Kempf, Ruenzi, & Thiele, 2009) could 
influence the data or make comparison difficult. Elton et al. (2003) also note that even if 
a fund charges a flat fee from its investors, it may still pay an incentive fee to its individual 
portfolio managers. It is an important assumption in all aforementioned empirical studies 
that manager compensation is directly related to the fee structure of the fund. However, 
it is not unlikely that performance-fee funds and AUM-funds pay their portfolio managers 
in very similar ways. The most likely compensation will be a fixed salary plus a bonus 
payment related to the fund’s profits. The only difference for an individual manager 
would then be the origin of these profits, that is, whether generated by outperforming a 
market index or by outperforming the direct competitors. Since employee compensation 
is generally not reported, this is another factor that will possibly dilute any otherwise 
significant results of an empirical study. 
3.3.2 Experimental studies 
An experimental study on the tournament hypothesis in which the aforementioned factors 
can be controlled is an appropriate way to study the effects of tournaments on behaviour. 
James and Isaac (2000) are the first to use the experimental approach in the study of 
tournament behaviour. Using a double-auction asset market experiment developed by V. 
L. Smith et al. (1988), James and Isaac (2000) introduce a monetary tournament incentive 
as a bonus for above-average performance and flat payment for below-average 
performance. They find that with tournament incentives, prices do not converge to 
fundamental values with increasing subject experience. This observation is interesting, 
since V. L. Smith et al. (1988) find that with increasing experience the market price does 
converge to fundamental value quickly in the second half of the experiment. James and 
Isaac (2000) conclude that subjects fail to backward induct and show risk-loving 
behaviour. They also demonstrate that with a tournament incentive in place, there may be 
a theoretical rationale for the deviation from fundamental value in an n-period 
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experiment. In a numerical example, they show how mutually beneficial trades could 
occur between three traders of one asset above or below fundamental value. In a later 
study, Isaac and James (2003) repeat this experiment, introducing a more severe 
punishment for extreme underperformance as well as a mixed number of subjects who 
are paid the tournament rate within sessions. The introduction of a more severe 
punishment for underperformance does not change the previously reported tournament 
effects. However, the tournament effects fade when only half the traders in the experiment 
are paid the treatment conditions and the rest are simply paid the cash balance at the end 
of the experiment. 
In a recent working paper, Cheung and Coleman (2012) create a tournament incentive by 
introducing a bonus of extra shares and cash for subjects with above-average performance 
at the end of each trading period. The intention is to replicate the original theory of Brown 
et al. (1996) that overperforming managers attract new investors. In addition to the SSW 
design (V. L. Smith et al., 1988) of decreasing fundamental value over time, they use an 
experimental setup with constant fundamental value. Since this design is less prone to 
creating price bubbles than the SSW design, Cheung and Coleman (2012) find that effects 
of the tournament treatment are less severe with these markets. In their declining 
fundamental value design, Cheung and Coleman find results similar to those of James 
and Isaac (2000) and Isaac and James (2003). 
The three aforementioned studies all use asymmetric tournament incentives in their 
treatments. All three studies show that tournament incentives disturb expected price 
patterns. According to Cheung and Coleman (2012), this disturbance can be mitigated 
with a simpler, constant fundamental value design. The authors of all three studies do not 
claim to examine the influence of tournaments on individual behaviour but on the market. 
In fact, in an experimental setup in which the treatment can only be measured in one 
asset’s deviation from a theoretical value, the observations of Brown et al. (1996), 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) or Taylor (2003) are not replicable in the laboratory. Since 
it is the aggregated behaviours of individuals that ultimately form the market, the 
observation of these behavioural patterns and their aggregated influence on market prices 
is both of academic as well as practical relevance. 
Kleinlercher Huber and Kirchler (2014) study the effects of various incentive schemes 
(bonus, bonus-cap, linear and penalty) by examining price differences in experimental 
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markets with two risky assets. They use a constant fundamental value design by which 
assets differ in the standard deviation of dividends but not in expected dividends and 
compare asset prices in the last trading period. They find that the price for the riskier asset 
is significantly above the price for the less risky asset when subjects face asymmetric 
compensation. When underperformance is penalised, the difference in prices is much 
smaller. In an additional experiment called hybrid, the study shows that prices develop 
similarly to an all-linear treatment when a market is conducted with an equal part of 
subjects paid in the categories bonus, linear and penalty. 
Kleinlercher et al. (2014) measure risk attitudes of subjects using a 16-item lottery choice 
survey based on Dohmen et al. (2011). They find no significant differences in risk 
attitudes among subject groups. Although compensation is not explicitly rank-dependent, 
the incentive scheme in treatment ‘bonus’ is of an asymmetric nature quite like the 
expected effects of a tournament. 
We opt to use the design with declining expected values introduced by V. L. Smith et al. 
(1988). Subjects are asked to trade one asset that is characterised by a risky dividend paid 
over a finite number of periods. This design leads to declining fundamental value and an 
asset that is worth zero at the end of the last trading period. The SSW design has been 
used by many researchers over the past decades. Bubble and crash patterns are commonly 
observed and disappear with increasing subject experience (V. L. Smith et al., 1988). 
Increased effort on instruction and explaining the fundamental value process to subjects 
is also shown to reduce mispricing and overvaluation. 
According to V. L. Smith (2010), ‘confused’ subjects fail to behave as economists would 
expect them to behave. Subjects are asked to trade a dividend-paying asset, and hence, 
they are likely to frame this asset as a share. When trading a share and receiving dividend 
payments, one normally assumes a constant or increasing value (Oechssler, 2010). 
Traditionally, experimenters using the SSW design evaluate treatment impacts based on 
price deviation from fundamental value. It is the nature of the design that prices will 
almost always deviate from fundamentals, that is, form a bubble, and quickly return to 
fundamental value during the last period(s) of the experiment (crash). However, it is 
unclear what exactly causes this behaviour in the first place. The design, with its 
decreasing fundamental value, is rather unintuitive and may confuse subjects (V. L. 
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Smith, 2010) who ‘know’, from newspapers and television, that value patterns of assets 
are generally increasing over time or at least rarely decline to zero. This thesis is 
supported by the fact that increased effort and changes during the instruction period of 
the experiment decrease the amount of mispricing (Huber & Kirchler, 2012). 
Kirchler et al. (2012) implement a variation in their experimental instruction, which helps 
subjects better understand the declining fundamental value pattern. They describe the 
experimental asset as stocks of a depletable gold mine as opposed to just ‘stocks’ and find 
that this slight variation helps significantly reduce mispricing and overvaluation since it 
makes the unintuitive pattern of declining fundamental values more feasible. 
In another experiment, Huber and Kirchler (2012) introduce a graph that showed subjects 
the decreasing fundamental value. Previous authors used tables to show subjects the 
expected value for each period. Huber and Kirchler (2012) find that using a graph as 
opposed to a table contributes significantly to reducing mispricing and overvaluation. 
They also find that asking subjects for a fundamental value estimate in the beginning of 
the trading period significantly reduces bubbles. The instructions used in our experiment 
adapt some of these ideas as well as create a high experience level among all subjects to 
ensure that confusion is reduced to a minimum. 
The lack of common knowledge of rationality is believed to contribute to speculation and 
hence price bubbles. When common knowledge of rationality is lost, a trader can 
rationalise to buy above fundamental value if she thinks that there is an irrational trader 
in the market who will buy the assets from her. Although the concept is appealing, Lei, 
Noussair and Plott (2001) argue that it cannot entirely explain the mispricing observed in 
the SSW design. If the lack of common knowledge of rationality is the cause for 
speculation and speculation is the cause for mispricing, then bubbles should disappear 
when speculation is not possible. In their experiment, subjects purchasing an asset have 
to hold it to maturity. Price bubbles are still observed. Thus, the causes for bubbles in 
experimental asset markets are not fully understood. 
Observing mispricing in a one-asset-market, similar to James and Isaac (2000), just 
enables us to observe possible market distortions caused by the treatment. To observe 
risk-taking behaviour, subjects need to be given the opportunity to trade two assets with 
different risk levels for cash. Thus far, only a few researchers have conducted experiments 
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in which two risky assets are traded for cash, but their interesting findings form the basis 
for this study. The existing two-asset literature focuses on relative asset prices rather than 
bubble measures to draw conclusions on foreign exchange markets. We utilise the 
findings of Fisher and Kelly (2000) and Childs and Mestelman (2006) on relative asset 
prices in markets in which two risky assets are traded simultaneously. Both studies find 
that even if asset prices exhibit a bubble-crash pattern, the exchange rate between assets 
stays constant. In other words, the prices of both assets maintain the same relative 
distance. 
The two-asset setup allows researchers to evaluate trading behaviour in an environment 
that is not dependent on the fundamental value path of one asset. In a two-asset 
environment, changes in the cross-exchange rate can be used as a dependent variable for 
measuring the market impact of treatments. For example, two assets with similar expected 
value but a different standard deviation should trade at identical prices if traders are risk-
neutral. When traders are risk-averse/risk-loving the less/more risky asset should trade at 
a premium relative to the other risky asset. Hence, an observed change in the premia, or 
exchange rate, between the two risky assets would imply a change in the risk-taking 
behaviour. 
In this study, we aim to answer the question whether tournament incentives will cause 
relative asset prices to shift. A shift in the cross-exchange rate would represent mispricing. 
Previous experimental studies focus on absolute asset prices and their deviation from risk-
neutral expected values. Whether changes in price deviations are caused by the 
tournament incentive or whether the tournament incentive adds to subjects’ confusion, 
which, in turn, influences prices, is unclear. 
Tournament effects, in the form of mispricing, would result in the inefficient allocation 
of capital in economies. Tournament behaviour by investors would result in inefficient 
allocation of capital in portfolios without necessarily influencing market prices. However, 
if portfolio managers exhibit such behaviour, its impact could result in the loss of wealth 
for many. Therefore, we consider it important to answer the question whether individual 
subjects will change portfolio risk under tournament incentives. 
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3.4 Experimental Design 
All our experiment, training and survey interfaces are programmed using GIMS—Graz-
Innsbruck Market System (Palan, 2015)—and are conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). The experiments were held in the Bond University Macquarie Trading Room. The 
computerised double-auction market allows subjects to trade assets with each other in real 
time. They can post bids and asks or act as price takers by accepting bids or asks posted 
by others. 
This part of our paper is divided into four sections: 
1. Design of the training session and implemented measures with the goal of 
improving data quality. 
2. General setup of our experiment without the tournament incentive. This forms our 
control experiment. 
3. Structure of the tournament incentive. 
4. Surveys. The first survey assesses subjects’ risk attitudes during the training 
session; the second survey is used to obtain price opinions from traders as well as 
nontraders in between trading periods. The second survey is intended to provide 
a deeper understanding on why subjects trade/decide not to trade. 
3.4.1 Improving data quality 
Prior to the actual experiments, we conduct several two-hour training sessions. All 
subjects are required to complete a two-hour training session prior to participating in an 
experiment. These training sessions are designed to mitigate the effects of inexperience 
that many previous studies reveal (e.g., V. L. Smith et al., 1988). Training subjects this 
extensively is unprecedented in the experimental asset market literature. The different 
markets are designed to gradually enable subjects to understand the software, declining 
value paths, valuation and expected values with risky dividends and finally the trading 
and valuing of two assets simultaneously. We introduce all risky assets as ‘stock of 
depletable mines’ to help them understand the unintuitive, declining fundamental value 
of all risky assets in our design. Huber and Kirchler (2012) show that this simple change 
in experimental instructions reduces mispricing. The second variation we adapt from 
Huber and Kirchler is a graph illustrating the value paths for the assets. This alternative 
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to displaying a table in the instructions is proven to further increase subjects’ 
understanding and reduces confusion (See Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1) 
The risky asset declines in value from period to period, while the cash balance of subjects 
is expected to increase owing to dividend payments. Kirchler et al. (2012) solve this 
problem by using an asset design with constant fundamental value. As explained earlier, 
a constant fundamental value design is not useful for our hypotheses. We take excess 
liquidity off the market by introducing a risk-free, noninterest paying account into which 
all dividends are paid. This way, the expected increase in the value of the deposit account 
mirrors the decrease in fundamental value of the assets. Combined, the assets and deposit 
accounts’ expected value remains constant over all periods at the assets’ expected value 
in period one (240 FRANCS). Realised dividends, and therefore realised cash-to-asset 
ratios, may differ from the expected. Making dividends unavailable for trading can hence 
only mitigate, but not solve, the potential implications of a changing cash-to-asset ratio. 
3.4.2 General setup: Control 
For each experiment, we recruit up to 12 subjects10 from a pool of trained students. At the 
end of each of the 12 trading periods, each asset pays a risky dividend to subjects who 
held the asset. The dividend payments for both assets are uncorrelated, and the 
probabilities and possible payouts are known to them. One trading period lasts for four 
minutes. This allows us to conduct two markets with the same subjects within the two-
hour experiment. 
  
                                            
10 The number of subjects in computerised asset market experiments is generally between 6 and 12 for each 
session. We choose to use 12 subjects since in a two-asset market, not every subject is expected to be active 
in both markets simultaneously (or active at all), and without an active market in both assets during all 
trading periods, the observable behaviours may be limited. 
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The properties of the experimental assets are as follows: 
Table 3.1: Experimental Design 
Parameters Control Treatment 
Periodic dividend asset Y 
(LOW_RISK) 
Probability (%) 
Expected dividend per period 
10, 30 
 
50, 50 
20 
10, 30 
 
50, 50 
20 
Periodic dividend asset X 
(HIGH_RISK) 
Probability (%) 
Expected dividend per period 
0, 100 
 
80, 20 
20 
0, 100 
 
80, 20 
20 
Rank visible between periods 
Rank bonus 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
If subject rank < all 
subjects/2 
Payment Market earnings 1.5 market earnings for 
bonus ranks 
Market earnings 
otherwise 
Exchange rate 
Fixed payment (AU$) 
Expected payout of hold strategy 
(AU$) 
260 FRANCS = 1AU$ 
2.50 
18.50 
320 FRANCS = 1AU$ 
2.50 
15, 22.5 
Initial endowment 
Initial endowment asset Y 
(LOW_RISK) 
Initial endowment asset X 
(HIGH_RISK) 
Equal 
5 per subject 
 
5 per subject 
Equal 
5 per subject 
 
5 per subject 
Initial endowment CASH 
Periods 
2400 
12 
2400 
12 
Both assets have the same expected dividend but clearly differ in the distribution of 
possible payouts. Fisher and Kelly (2000) and Childs and Mestelman (2006) find that 
relative asset prices between two risky assets stay relatively constant when the assets have 
the same expected dividends but differ in risk. The theoretical value of the assets will 
decline stepwise from 240 FRANCS per asset in period one to 20 FRANCS at the end of 
the last trading period. V. L. Smith et al. (1988) first introduced this asset design, and it 
has since been used as a standard procedure in asset market experiments. 
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In our control experiment, subjects are not exposed to a tournament incentive. Instead the 
compensation is a function of the individual cash balance at the end of the experiment 
plus a show-up fee. 
3.4.3 The tournament incentive 
Subjects are compensated by a linear payment plus a bonus based on their end-of-
experiment earnings relative to the average market earnings and rewarded for above-
average performance. The average/expected earnings per subject are 20 AU$/hour and 
are determined by the exchange rate from FRANCS to AU$. 
Linear compensation means that subjects will receive their end-of-experiment cash 
balance, including dividends, exchanged from FRANCS to AU$. Those with above-
average performance will receive a bonus payment. The benchmark E × (market average) 
is in this case endogenous as well as exogenous at the same time, because subjects form 
the market. Thus, payment relative to market performance is equal to payment relative to 
group performance. By showing subjects only their position in the competition but not 
the average market performance, we frame this benchmark as endogenous. We inform 
them of their rank in the competition after each trading period. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Graphical analysis 
 
Figure 3.1: Asset Prices in Tournament Control Markets 
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Figure 3.2: Asset Prices in Tournament Treatment Markets 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the deviation of aggregate prices for the speculative asset X (triangles) and 
the conservative asset Y (squares) from the identical, risk-neutral values. The displayed price deviations 
are the median of the median transaction price in each period of all Treatment and Control markets. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the aggregate average price path for Assets X and Y in Control 
and Treatment markets depicted as the absolute deviation from risk-neutral expected 
value. The price paths represent the arithmetic mean of the arithmetic mean transaction 
price of each period in each individual market minus the risk-neutral fundamental value 
that is identical for both assets. 
3.5.1.1 Prices relative to expected value 
Noticeable in both charts is that prices for asset Y start close to expected value, soon rise 
above and then gradually return closer to expected value in the last quarter of the market. 
This observation is closest to the often-observed bubble-crash patterns reported with this 
experimental design (V. L. Smith et al., 1988); however, the price path lacks the abrupt 
return to expected value. Relative to expected value, subjects show risk-seeking 
behaviour; however, relative to asset X, they act risk-averse for most markets. 
The average price for asset X begins below expected value and rises above during the 
second half. Prices appear to be close to expected value from the second to the third 
quarter of each market and then rise above expected value during the last quarter. This 
indicates that subjects value asset X relatively higher during the latter part of a market. 
Kleinlercher et al. (2014) observe similar patterns and explain that under restricting 
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assumptions,11 there exist mutually beneficial trading opportunities at prices above risk-
neutral value in the final period. Further deviations of prices are explained by preference-
based reasons, such as (1) asymmetric compensation (2) and the overweighting of low 
probabilities (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Kleinlercher et al. (2014) also refer to Miller 
(1977), who shows that asset prices could correspond with the beliefs of the most 
optimistic market subject under the assumptions of heterogeneous beliefs, limited short-
selling and a high cash-to-asset ratio. 
Dijk, Holmen and Kirchler (2014) find that rank can affect trading behaviour even if it is 
not directly related to compensation. In their study, an experimental portfolio selection 
task, subjects elicit tournament-like behaviour; they overweight a higher-risk asset not 
only in the later part of the experiment when they are ranked below average and when 
compensation is rank-dependent, but also when rank is only displayed but compensation 
is linear, owing to ‘social competition’. The relative price increase in asset X over time 
can be observed in both Treatment and Control markets; hence, rank-dependent 
compensation cannot be the sole driver of the change in relative asset values. 
From the visual analysis, we can conclude that our subjects are consenting on price levels, 
which implies risk aversion for large parts of both Treatment and Control markets. We 
observe the convergence of price levels during the last quarter of both markets with prices 
for the higher-risk asset (X) exceeding those of the lower-risk asset (Y) during the last 
period. The question whether tournament behaviour plays a role in this phenomenon is 
answered using statistical analysis. 
3.5.2 Statistical analysis 
The statistical analysis is divided into two major parts following our two major 
expectations: 
1. The market hypothesis: Tournament incentives affect market prices because 
midmarket losers drive up demand for the highest-risk asset (hypothesis 2a) by 
more than what is supplied by midmarket winners (2b), leading to an increase in 
the price of the highest-risk asset during the second half of Treatment markets. 
                                            
11 That is, the price of the low-risk asset is fixed, risk-neutral, one period 
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2.  The portfolio hypothesis: Tournament incentives affect individual portfolio as 
follows: 
a) Midperiod losers increase portfolio risk by increasing their holdings in the 
highest-risk asset under tournament incentives. 
b) Midperiod winners reduce portfolio risk by reducing their holdings in the 
highest-risk asset under tournament incentives. 
3.5.2.1 The market hypothesis 
By design, most experimental subjects do not receive a bonus after the market. In 
Treatment markets, we expect this majority of traders to increase the risk of their 
portfolios during the second half of the market by shifting funds from the lower-risk asset 
(Y) and cash to the high-risk asset (X). With no changes in supply for the high-risk asset 
(X) and in demand for the low-risk asset, this behaviour would lead to an increase in the 
price of asset X and a decline in that of asset Y. Of course, tournament theory also predicts 
that midperiod winners will reduce portfolio risk. Since this effect has been reported to 
be weaker than the midmarket underperformer effect (Brown et al., 1996), we believe the 
actions of midmarket underperformers should be influencing asset prices in our 
Treatment markets. 
Following Fisher and Kelly (2000) as well as Childs and Mestelman (2006), the analysis 
focuses on relative asset prices between the two risky assets. As mentioned previously, 
this analysis bears the advantage of being independent of the formation of price bubbles. 
Since both assets have the same expected dividends, their fundamental values are similar 
and the theoretical, risk-neutral exchange rate between the risky assets is fixed at a value 
of one.  
Both aforementioned studies use the average normalised exchange rate prediction error 
in their analyses: 
𝑢𝑡
𝑘 = (
1
𝑛𝑘
) ∑ (𝑒𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑒𝑖)/ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛𝑘
𝑖=1          (1) 
where 𝑒𝑡
𝑖 is the observed exchange rate in period t in session i and 𝑒𝑖 is the theoretical 
value of the exchange rate in design k. We expect the treatments to affect relative asset 
prices, and therefore, especially in the second half of the experiment, we expect the 
exchange rate prediction error to increase as 𝑒𝑡
𝑖 changes. As it is common in the analysis 
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of laboratory asset market data, we analyse the deviation of asset prices from their known 
fundamental values. Empirical using market data where fundamental values are unknown 
use covariance-based models to estimate abnormal asset returns. We avoid the joint-
hypothesis problem by using an experimental design where all subjects know the risk-
neutral fundamental values of both assets. 
Hypothesis: 
𝑢𝑡
𝑘𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1 − 6 = (
1
𝑛𝑘
) ∑ (𝑒𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑒𝑖)/ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛𝑘
𝑖=1  < 𝑢𝑡
𝑘𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 7 − 12 = (
1
𝑛𝑘
) ∑ (𝑒𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑒𝑖)/ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛𝑘
𝑖=1   (2) 
in the Treatment experiments and 
𝑢𝑡
𝑘𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1 − 6 = (
1
𝑛𝑘
) ∑ (𝑒𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑒𝑖)/ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛𝑘
𝑖=1 = 𝑢𝑡
𝑘𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 7 − 12 = (
1
𝑛𝑘
) ∑ (𝑒𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑒𝑖)/ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛𝑘
𝑖=1   (3) 
in the Control experiments. 
We test the market hypothesis using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in the form 
𝑦∆𝑇1−6 𝑎𝑛𝑑 7−12 = 𝛼+𝛽1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) + 𝜀        (4) 
where y is the change in the exchange rate prediction error from the first half to the second 
half of the market. Treatment is a dummy variable equal to one in markets that pay a 
bonus and zero otherwise. 
For the following regression, we use a sample of 38 individual markets collected on 19 
different dates. The price data from each of the 18 Control and 20 Treatment markets are 
divided into two observations each, one each for the first and second halves of the market. 
Then, we calculate the change 𝑦𝑢𝑡𝑘
 = 𝑢𝑡
𝑘
2𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑓
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠 𝑢𝑡
𝑘
1𝑠𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑓
. A positive 𝑦𝑢𝑡𝑘
 implies 
a decrease in the exchange rate prediction error from the first half of the market to the 
second half. 
Table 3.2: Tournaments—Regression Results for Market Hypothesis 1 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
Constant −.01285 0.0447 −2.8754 0.007 
Treatment 0.0637 0.0616 1.0336 0.3082 
Notes: 38 observations; R-squared = 0.029. Results of regression 𝑦∆𝑇1−6 𝑎𝑛𝑑 7−12= 𝛼+𝛽1(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)+𝜀 
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The regression outcome in Table 3.2 shows us a significant change in the exchange rate 
prediction error from the first half to the second half of the market not caused by the 
independent variable. The hypothesis that a change of −0.1285 is not different from zero 
must be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis that it is, in fact, different from 
zero (p = 0.007). The constant confirms our observations in the visual analysis: Prices of 
Assets X and Y converge during the second half of both markets. 
The coefficient Treatment (0.0637) implies that in Treatment markets, the asset prices 
would not move towards each other as much as in Control; however, the hypothesis that 
the Treatment coefficient is different from zero must be rejected (p = 0.3082). The 
regression analysis finds no tournament effects on market prices. 
3.5.2.2 The portfolio hypothesis 
We investigate our expectation that (1) midmarket losers will increase risk and (2) 
midmarket winners will decrease risk. Any trade our subjects make will alter portfolio 
risk; however, if they wish to drastically change the risk of their portfolio it appears 
easiest to alter holdings of asset X. We expect subjects in Treatment markets to alter their 
holdings of asset X, during the second half of the market, based on their rank at the end 
of the halfway point. To assess the changes in asset holdings, we first compute their 
relative holdings in asset X for every period. The relative asset holdings y for subject n in 
period t are computed as asset X held at the end of period i by subject n over the total 
number of asset X available in each market. 
𝑦𝑡𝑖
𝑛 =  
𝑋𝑛𝑖
∑ 𝑋𝑖
          (5) 
We then compute the average relative holdings of asset X per subject for the first and 
second halves of each market as follows: 
𝑥𝑦1−6
𝑛 =
1
6
∗ ∑ 𝑦𝑡𝑖
𝑛𝑛1−6
𝑖𝑛   & 𝑥𝑦7−12
𝑛 =
1
6
∗ ∑ 𝑦𝑡𝑖
𝑛𝑛7−12
𝑖𝑛      (6) & (7) 
We measure the change in asset holding as the difference between average holdings in 
the second half and average holdings in the first half: 
 𝛥𝑥𝑖
𝑛 =  𝑥𝑦7−12
𝑛 − 𝑥𝑦1−6
𝑛         (8) 
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and run the multivariate linear regression using (8) as the independent variable: 
𝑦𝛥𝑥𝑖
𝑛 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ (𝑋1) + 𝛽2 ∗ (𝐷1) + 𝛽3 ∗ (𝐷2) + 𝛽4 ∗ (𝐷3) + 𝜀    (9) 
Table 3.3: Variable Descriptions for Tournaments 
Variable Description 
𝑿𝟏 Risk aversion; continuous variable 
obtained from survey data 
𝑫𝟏 Treatment; dichotomous variable 
𝑫𝟐 Under; dichotomous variable; traders are 
classified as ‘Under’ when 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 6 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 >
𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠
2
 
𝑫𝟑 (𝐷1 ∗ 𝐷2); interaction variable capturing 
the behaviour of midmarket losers in 
Treatments 
Since all but one independent variable in our model are dichotomous, equation (9) 
captures the following scenarios (a), (b) and (c): 
a. 𝐷1 = 1; 𝐷2 = 0, in (9) results in the prediction for 𝑦𝛥𝑥𝑖
𝑛 
𝑦𝛥𝑥𝑖?̂? = (?̂? + 𝛽2̂) + 𝛽1̂ ∗ 𝑋1̂ 
Coefficient 𝛽2 would, if nonzero, change intercept 𝛼. Scenario (a) describes the 
expected behaviour of subjects in Treatment markets ranked average and better 
after period six. Coefficient 𝛽2 being significantly different from zero and 
negative would confirm our hypothesis (2b); midmarket winners reduce portfolio 
risk when compensation is rank-dependent. 
b. 𝐷1 = 0; 𝐷2 = 1, in (9) results in the prediction for 𝑦𝛥𝑥𝑖
𝑛 
𝑦𝛥𝑥𝑖?̂? = (?̂? + 𝛽3̂) + 𝛽1̂ ∗ 𝑋1̂ 
Coefficient 𝛽3 would, if nonzero, change intercept 𝛼. Scenario (b) describes the 
expected behaviour of subjects in Control markets ranked below average after 
period six. Coefficient 𝛽3, if significantly different from zero, would imply that 
traders react to rank even if they are not compensated based on rank. In other 
words, we would observe a form of a social tournament in which status measured 
as rank represents a form of compensation. 
c. 𝐷1 = 1; 𝐷2 = 1, consequently 𝐷3 = 1 in (9) results in the prediction for 𝑦𝛥𝑥𝑖
𝑛 
𝑦𝛥𝑥𝑖?̂? = (?̂? + 𝛽2̂ + 𝛽3̂ + 𝛽4̂) + 𝛽1̂ ∗ 𝑋1̂ 
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Coefficient 𝛽4 of interaction variable 𝐷3 is designed to capture tournament 
behaviour that we expect to be strongest: midmarket losers increasing their 
holdings in the highest-risk asset. Coefficient 𝛽4, if significantly different from 
zero, would imply that neither 𝐷1 nor 𝐷2 should be used separately to predict 
changes in 𝑦𝛥𝑥𝑖
𝑛. 
For the following analysis, we sampled 220 observations in Treatment markets and 192 
in Control markets. Two separate regressions are shown: The first one analyses the entire 
dataset. For the second regression, we separated the dataset and analysed only 
observations with midmarket rank in the highest or lowest three of the respective market 
to investigate if tournament effects would be more pronounced within this subsample. 
The observations from both regressions are, in principle, identical. 
Table 3.4: Tournament Effects on Portfolio Selection; Full Dataset 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
𝜶 −.075 .0180 −4.159 .000 
𝑿𝟏 .063 .0157 4.018 .000 
𝑫𝟏 −.010 .010 −1.038 .300 
𝑫𝟐 −.003 .008 −.411 .682 
𝑫𝟑 .026 .012 2.232 .026 
Notes: 412 observations; R-squared =.066; Adjusted R-squared =.056 
Table 3.5: Tournament Effects on Portfolio Selection; Limited Dataset 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
𝜶 −.106 .023 −4.645 .000 
𝑿𝟏 .081 .020 4.047 .000 
𝑫𝟏 .001 .011 .096 .924 
𝑫𝟐 .007 .010 .659 .511 
𝑫𝟑 .024 .014 1.668 0.097 
Notes: 316 observations; R-squared =.118; Adjusted R-squared =.102 
The following discussion focuses on the results for the complete dataset (Table 3.5). The 
regression shows that subjects, on average, decrease holdings in asset X when all other 
variables are equal to zero. The hypothesis that Alpha (−.075) is equal to zero can be 
rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis that it is, in fact, different from zero 
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(p = 0.000). The coefficient of the continuous variable 𝑋1 (risk aversion) is positive and 
significantly different from zero; the higher 𝑋1, the less risk-averse the subject. In our 
sample, 𝑋1 is between 0.6 (min) and 1.6 (max) with a mean of 1.09. We conclude that 
subjects, regardless of compensation or rank, alter their relative holdings in asset X. We 
expect highly risk-averse subjects to reduce holdings in asset X since 𝛽1 ∗ (𝑋1) < 𝛼 and 
less risk-averse subjects to increase holdings in asset X because for them 𝛽1 ∗ (𝑋1) > 𝛼. 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients for variables 𝐷1 or 𝐷2 are different 
from zero (p(𝐷1) =.3 and p(𝐷2) =.682). We observe no significant differences between 
Treatment and Control markets with respect to changes in relative holdings of asset X as 
well as no behavioural differences between midperiod winners and losers. This 
observation does not mean that the variables 𝐷1 and 𝐷2 have no influence on asset 
holdings. It is only when the two variables interact that we can observe an effect. The 
coefficient of the interaction variable 𝐷3 is positive and significantly different from zero 
(p =.026). 
We find that risk aversion is the main driver of subjects’ asset allocation decisions 
independent of relative position in the market and the presence of a bonus. Only when 
they find themselves underperforming their peers in a Treatment market is their asset 
allocation decision influenced by rank. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Our study examines risk-taking behaviour under tournament incentives and its effect on 
individual portfolios as well as market prices. While subjects in Control markets are 
compensated linearly to their market earnings, we pay a bonus to subjects ranked ahead 
of their competitors in Treatment markets. On 38 market- and 412 subject-observations, 
we examine the hypothesis that in Treatment markets, subjects trailing the competition 
increase portfolio risk to maximise the probability of earning a bonus, while subjects 
ahead of the competition reduce portfolio risk to secure their position. We further test the 
hypothesis that aggregate behaviour of individuals in treatments leads to a shift in market 
prices. To improve the signal-to-noise ratio, we implement an extensive subject training 
routine, which is unprecedented in the field. In addition to the training, we use 
instructions, framing and design alterations, which are shown to reduce subject confusion 
by Huber and Kirchler (2012). In a design with two risky assets, we can examine 
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exchange rates instead of asset prices as a measure of treatment impact. Asset prices in 
experimental markets are prone to follow a bubble-crash pattern first observed by V. L. 
Smith et al. (1988). Since price bubbles may be caused by confused subjects (V. L. Smith, 
2010), while exchange rates remain constant even if bubbles form (2000), we examine 
the price impact of tournament behaviour on changes in the exchange rate. 
Our findings confirm one of two predictions of the tournament theory: When 
compensation is rank-dependent, midyear underperformers will increase portfolio risk, 
by more than their risk aversion predicts, to increase the likelihood of receiving the bonus 
(Brown et al., 1996). We do not find evidence for the second prediction that midyear 
outperformers will reduce risk to secure their position. When analysing the impact of 
tournaments on asset prices, we find no differences between Treatment and Control 
markets. The shifts in asset allocation we observe for individuals in treatments do not 
influence prices. Asset allocation shifts do not necessarily result in an absolute increase 
in a subject’s holdings of the high-risk asset. Our model predicts that subjects with high 
risk-aversion (low 𝑋1) will sell the high-risk asset during the second half of the market 
regardless of their rank or the bonus incentive. When these subjects fall behind in rank in 
a Treatment market, they will sell fewer high-risk assets than they would otherwise. 
Subjects with low risk-aversion (high 𝑋1) will buy the high-risk asset regardless of 
position and treatment but purchase more assets when they are behind in markets that pay 
a rank-dependent bonus. The result is a decrease in supply and/or an increase in demand 
for the high-risk asset during the second half of Treatment markets. An explanation for 
the absence of a price impact could be that other subjects in the market will adjust their 
behaviour and act as market makers by offering to buy or sell the high-risk asset 
depending on the situation. 
Our findings provide support for Brown et al.’s (1996) hypothesis that tournament 
incentives lead to risk-shifting behaviour among midyear underperforming fund 
managers. However, we do not seek to generalise our experimental results to any 
population different from our sample of student subjects. Risk aversion plays a dominant 
role in our findings. To our best knowledge, thus far, no link between manager risk 
aversion and the risk of managed portfolios has been found. Menkhoff, Schmidt and 
Brozynski (2006) find evidence that risk aversion influences the type of funds young 
managers chose to work for—however, this is not related to changes in portfolio risk. 
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Tournament behaviour represents a form of principal–agent conflict in which the 
appointed manager (agent) will choose to maximise her own expected payoff to the 
potential detriment of her clients. In our study, as in all experimental market studies we 
are aware of, subjects make decisions on their own behalf. The expected payoff in our 
treatment experiments mirrors that of a portfolio manager with limited downside risk and 
steep upside earnings potential. Owing to this call option-like payoff, increasing portfolio 
risk to win the tournament is a rational decision. Since the punishment for portfolio losses 
is much smaller than the reward for a bonus rank, tournament behaviour maximises the 
expected wealth of the subjects in our experiments. Real fund managers make investment 
decisions on behalf of their clients. Fund managers would face the decision to increase 
their expected bonus but let the clients bear most of the risks. It is unclear whether ethical 
concerns, that is, a feeling of responsibility for their clients, would mitigate tournament 
behaviour. Further, whether risk-shifting behaviour, by underperforming subjects under 
tournament incentives, is reduced or increased in scenarios in which individual risk 
aversion is not the driving force of asset allocation decisions is a question we leave for 
future research. 
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Chapter 4: Probability Misjudgement in Experimental Asset 
Markets—the Gambler’s Fallacy 
4.1 Abstract 
We examine the effects of the gambler’s fallacy on portfolio risk-taking and market prices 
in a laboratory double-auction market. Our experiments are divided into two phases: 
During the first phase, dividend payments are twice as high as communicated to subjects; 
during the second phase, the payments match the communicated probabilities. We find 
that those holding riskier assets in phase one reduce portfolio risk in phase two and those 
holding fewer risky assets in phase one increase risk. We compare market prices with 
control experiments in which dividends are close to expected values in both phases. We 
report that market prices during the first half of phase two markets are significantly lower 
in treatments. Our findings contribute to our understanding of the gambler’s fallacy and 
its effect on portfolios and asset prices. 
4.2 Introduction 
Investors face random events on a regular basis. When new company, or economic, data 
are released, it is equally likely to be better or worse than expected. Empirical and 
experimental evidence suggests that individuals as well as groups systematically 
misinterpret random events. Their behaviour indicates that they believe in mean reversion 
or in trends. Investors who believe in mean reversion sell assets after better-than-expected 
returns and hold assets after worse than expected returns (Shefrin & Statman, 1985). The 
belief in trends or reversion is the rationale for technical analysis, the attempt to find and 
predict patterns in stock prices. 
Technical analysis is very popular among private and professional investors. Menkhoff 
(2010) reports that most mutual fund managers use technical analysis12 and that it is the 
preferred instrument for short-term forecasts. The widespread use of technical analysis 
implies a strong belief in patterns in stock prices. This belief is at odds with many 
academic studies. Kendall and Hill (1953) find that changes in security prices behave 
nearly as if they are generated by a roulette wheel for which each outcome is statistically 
                                            
12 In a survey of 692 fund managers from 5 countries, 87% report using technical analysis. 
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independent and relative outcomes are reasonably stable through time. This means that 
knowing past outcomes is only helpful for assessing the distribution of possible future 
outcomes, that is, to estimate how many numbers there are on the roulette wheel and how 
many are black and red. Knowledge of past outcomes is not useful for predicting future 
outcomes, it is only useful for predicting the distribution of outcomes since the roulette 
wheel ‘has no memory’. According to Kendall, changes in security prices follow a 
random walk and are therefore not predictable. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find that stock returns 
have predictable momentum and reversal patterns. That is, stock prices are more likely to 
rise in the short term following recent increases and then decrease in the medium term to 
long term. These findings disagree with the random walk hypothesis and make technical 
analysis worthwhile; however, investment strategies trying to profit from momentum 
often underperform the market on a risk-adjusted basis after transaction costs (Cheng & 
Wu, 2010). 
Whether price patterns are a result of a random sequence (Kendall & Hill, 1953) or have 
the power to predict future price movements (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993) may depend on 
how investors interpret them. If investors believe in trends, they adjust their return 
expectations on an asset upward after a series of higher-than-expected returns and pay 
higher prices. When expectations are high, investors are more likely to be disappointed 
by future returns and see the trend as broken. In other words, investors’ belief in trends 
and reversals may generate trends and reversals in asset prices. 
A possible explanation for trends and reversals lies in the way investors interpret small, 
observed samples from a population. Whether investors expect trends to continue or to 
reverse could depend on the way they interpret recent events, such as price changes or 
earnings, in the context of a larger population: When investors believe that recent events 
have the power to change the population mean, they expect trends to continue. Investors 
who believe that recent events should conform to the population mean expect reversals 
after better than, or worse than, expected events. Trend believers infer that the population 
is similar to the observed sample; reversal believers infer that the sample should be similar 
to the population. When events are truly random, both trend and reversal believers make 
biased decisions based on their belief. 
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Tversky and Kahneman (1971) call this belief the law of small numbers. The law of small 
numbers is the belief that a small observed sample will have a composition similar to the 
population it is part of, or that the population must be similar to an observed sample. 
Believers in the law of small numbers may be subject to the gambler’s fallacy, that is, the 
belief that a sample mean is identical or close to the population mean, and/or to 
overinference, also called hot-hand fallacy. Overinference is the belief that the population 
mean is identical or close to an observed sample mean. 
Gambler’s fallacy and overinference are possible explanations for an array of investor 
behaviours. The gambler’s fallacy leads an investor to believe that a string of better-than-
expected returns is followed by a string of worse than expected returns and vice versa. 
Consequently, the investor sells shares performing well and retains shares performing 
badly—a phenomenon better known as the disposition effect (Shefrin & Statman, 1985). 
On a market level, the gambler’s fallacy is used to explain anomalies, such as short-term 
momentum and medium-term reversal effects (Rabin, 2002). 
Overinfering investors overestimate the informational value of recent performance in 
their decision-making and project this performance to continue. This misconception could 
explain why mutual fund managers who have performed well in the recent past receive 
most of the new funds’ cash flows (Sirri & Tufano, 1992). Investors interpret recent fund 
performance as an indicator for future performance and chose to invest in funds with 
recent returns above the competition. The gambler’s fallacy as an explanation for market 
anomalies and apparently irrational behaviour of market participants has thus far been the 
subject of relatively few academic publications in the Finance field. Irrational behaviour 
is difficult to identify in empirical data because investors may have different information. 
The bulk of the published research in the area is found in the Psychology literature. While 
some empirical evidence exists from gambling and sports data, most researchers use 
experiments to explore their hypotheses. The dominant experimental designs are 
sequence recognition and sequence production tasks. In a sequence recognition 
experiment, subjects are shown sets of random sequences framed as, for example, 
outcomes of coin flips. They are then asked to judge the most, and/or least, random of 
these sequences. Production tasks follow a similar setup with the difference that subjects 
are asked to produce sequences of, for example, coin flips. Both designs test if the subjects 
understand the nature of randomness. 
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While most studies agree that subjects are systematically biased in judgement and 
production of random sequences, the origins of the bias and the extent to which it is 
prevalent in daily decision-making are still debated. In financial markets, individual 
investors do not produce (non) random sequences but recognise and attempt to predict 
them. From observing a sequence of events, they attempt to forecast what will happen 
next. Evidence from laboratory prediction tasks supports the existence of the gambler’s 
fallacy—however, less strongly than do judgement and production tasks. In prediction 
task experiments, subjects forecast the next event in a random sequence. Tests determine 
if they alter their behaviour based on previous outcomes of the random sequence. 
A small number of asset market experiments examine the gambler’s fallacy in financial 
context. While these find evidence for behaviour consistent with gambler’s fallacy 
beliefs, they lack the ability to examine price effects owing to their single-auction design 
in which subjects do not trade risky assets with each other. This study aims to fill this 
void by implementing a double-auction market design. By paying high dividends to 
subjects and, at the same time, communicating the base rate (the distribution of dividends) 
to create a strong base rate opinion, we deliberately trigger the gambler’s fallacy and 
study its effects on portfolio choice and asset prices in a second, lower earnings market. 
If subjects believe in mean reversion, they expect dividends in the second half of the 
experiment to be lower. This expectation should lead to lower prices. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the relevant literature and establishes our rationales for the study. Section 3 outlines our 
experimental design, procedures and our expectations. Section 4 shows our hypothesis 
tests and data. Section 5 discusses the data and concludes this chapter. 
4.3 Literature Review 
Studies in Psychology produce the first evidence about errors in probability perception. 
Their findings from surveys and experiments form the basis of later descriptive models 
and experimental studies in a financial market setting. Tversky and Kahneman (1971) 
analyse the results of a survey sent to psychologists. They ask the respondents how likely 
they would judge the probability of confirming a study result in a repetition study with a 
smaller sample size. Most respondents overestimate the probability of replicating the 
results owing to their belief that two samples taken from the same population should be 
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similar and representative of the population. The results of the survey are particularly 
significant because psychologists are expected to have received significantly more 
training in statistics than the average population. The findings reveal that such beliefs will 
have two main effects on decision-making: First, believing that any sample must be 
representative of the population leads to an overestimation of the fairness of a random 
process within the sample; that is, the belief that trends are rare and will cancel each other 
out. Second, the belief that an unknown population must be similar to a known sample 
leads to overconfidence in the projection of sample characteristics of the population. 
Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar (1991) conduct a critical survey of production and recognition 
task experiments in the Psychology literature. In a random sequence production 
experiment, subjects are asked to produce a series of outcomes from a random process, 
that is, coin flips or draws from a deck of cards with replacement. Results from production 
task experiments show that human-produced random sequences exhibit a negative 
recency effect and local representativeness effect. The negative recency effect means 
there are fewer occurrences of symmetries and long runs in human-produced sequences 
than expected. A local representativeness effect means there is too much outbalancing of 
events within short sequences. Both the negative recency effect and the local 
representativeness effect show that humans understand randomness as nonsymmetrical in 
longer observations and mean reverting within short observations. Studies on sequence 
production frequently differ in task framing and sequence length, which means their 
findings cannot be easily compared. 
Recognition task studies are easier to compare than production task studies and deliver 
strong aggregate findings. In a recognition task, subjects are presented with several 
different outcomes from random processes and asked to judge the one they perceive to be 
the most or least random. Using a combination of production and recognition tasks, 
Wagenaar (1972) finds that subjects asked to produce or judge a sequence of random coin 
tosses produce, or judge as more random, sequences with a 60/40 outcome distribution—
instead of the expected 50/50 outcome distribution. Gilovich, Vallone and Tversky (1985) 
study a recognition task in a real-world setting. Spectators and players in basketball games 
are asked to judge whether a player can successfully score points. After observing a string 
of successful throws, subjects adjust their beliefs and expect future successful throws. 
Gilovich et al. (1985) show that recent successful throws are not a reliable predictor for 
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the success of the next throw. This result is an example of the hot-hand fallacy that occurs 
when the underlying probability distribution is unknown. In such cases, subjects overinfer 
from the distribution of a small observed sample to the distribution of the population. 
Experimental studies in the Finance field focus on either individual risk-taking or asset 
prices. Huber, Kirchler and Stöckl (2010) conduct a sequence prediction task framed as 
a string of investment decisions. Tasked to predict the outcome of a coin toss, subjects 
are given the choice between predicting the next outcome themselves, appointing an 
‘expert’ or taking a risk-free payment. Experts in this experiment are random number 
generators that randomly pick heads or tails on behalf of subjects. Subjects choosing the 
outcomes themselves show behaviour consistent with the gambler’s fallacy belief, that is, 
they switch their bets to tails after observing a string of heads. The ‘experts’ become more 
popular with subjects after making a series of correct predictions, which is evidence for 
overinference. 
Using an identical experimental setup, Stöckl, Huber, Kirchler and Lindner (2015) test 
for differences in behaviour between genders as well as groups versus individuals. They 
find that groups are less likely to choose an ‘expert’ or the risk-free payment, while groups 
of females are more likely to choose the ‘expert’ than groups of males. Bias is not 
eliminated by group decision-making. In an experimental study to test the Arrow–Debreu 
(Debreu, 1959) and CAPM (Sharpe, 1964) models, Bossaerts and Plott (2004) find price 
distortions in two of the conducted markets. Subjects trade assets and the final buyout 
price is one of three, drawn from an urn with replacement (i.i.d) after each market. The 
authors note that when the draws result in a string of identical draws, equilibrium prices 
are disturbed and reflect a scenario in which buyouts are drawn from an urn without 
replacement. Subjects in the study observe a series of draws that is ex-ante unlikely high 
and conclude that future draws must be lower, so the observation as a whole conforms to 
their expectations. This study is, to the best of our knowledge, the only report of the 
gambler’s fallacy in a financial experiment setting on asset prices. It shows that a series 
of ex-ante unlikely outcomes in a random sequence can influence prices. Bossaerts and 
Plott (2004) report on prices relative to values predicted by the CAPM and Arrow–Debreu 
models. The study is not designed to test implications of the gambler’s fallacy on 
individual behaviour. Based on observations from two markets, it cannot be concluded 
that these results are reliable. When drawing from an urn without replacement, the 
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gambler’s fallacy would no longer be a fallacy, as noted by Ayton, Hunt and Wright 
(1989) who argue that the concept of true randomness relies on infinity and can therefore 
not be observed. Therefore, there are no right or wrong answers when a random sequence 
is judged, produced or predicted. 
Hahn and Warren (2010) use a related argument in the context of experimental findings 
from production and judgement tasks. Humans have a limited capacity to observe and 
memorise long sequences and therefore focus on streaks in shorter parts of long 
sequences. In these shorter parts, long streaks are mathematically less likely. Infinity is 
an unobservable concept and the human mind is limited in its capacity to process and 
memorise data, and hence, we must focus our attention on shorter sequences. Hahn and 
Warren illustrate this in an example of a coin flip: Consider two possible outcomes of 
flipping a fair coin: one, HHHT, and the other, HHHH. When judging which one of these 
two sequences is more likely to occur, it is important how many times the coin is flipped. 
Sequence two, HHHH, has a longer waiting time than sequence one meaning sequence 
two is less likely to occur within, for example, 20 coin flips. Both sequences are equally 
likely only if the coin is flipped four times or an infinite amount of times. As part of any 
other sequence, that is, 20 coin tosses, HHHT is more likely to occur. Yet, in a production 
or recognition task, the observation that subjects will prefer short, reversing patterns over 
long streaks is considered evidence for gambler’s fallacy belief. In an experiment, Farmer, 
Warren and Hahn (2017) show subjects either long sequences or many short sequences 
in a recognition task. The preference for short, reversing patterns reduces when the 
sequences are longer and when the number of short sequences is larger. They conclude 
that the gambler’s fallacy may not be as widespread in the population as previously 
suspected. The results of previous recognition studies as the sequences shown to subjects 
are mainly short and relatively less in quantity. 
Gambling environments, such as lotteries, casinos or sports betting, provide good data to 
test for biased probability estimates. In particular, in casino games and lotteries, the 
outcome distribution (probabilities and payoffs) are known, relatively stable over time 
and independent. Clotfelter and Cook (1993) and Terrell (1994) study how the results of 
previous draws in state lotteries affect the behaviour of players. Both studies find that 
players are less likely to pick numbers that have recently won. In the medium term, the 
likelihood of these numbers being played returns to the expected levels. These findings 
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imply that players act as if the lottery has a (short-term) memory. Croson and Sundali 
(2005) examine the behaviour of roulette players in a casino and find that players adjust 
their bets after series of similar draws in line with the gambler’s fallacy belief, that is, 
after a series of red, they change their bets to black. 
Xu and Harvey (2014) and (2015) study a large dataset of online sports bets. They find 
that after a streak of winning bets, players reduce the risk, measured by the odds of their 
bets. After streaks of losing, players increase the risk. The direct consequence of this 
behaviour is that winners increase their chances to continue winning, while losers increase 
the probability to continue losing. By believing in the gambler’s fallacy, the players create 
their own hot hands. The players generate a trend by believing in mean reversion. This 
observation implies that trends and reversals may not be, as previously suspected, the 
consequences of opposite beliefs but can be connected. Xu and Harvey also show the 
experience of gains and losses affects risk-taking implications of the gambler’s fallacy 
belief. Chen, Moskowitz, and Shue (2016) provide a rare insight in the effects of the 
gambler’s fallacy outside the realm of gambling. The study examines the decisions made 
by asylum judges, loan officers and baseball umpires. Chen et al. (2016) report significant 
bias in all three datasets in accordance with mean-reversion beliefs.  
Empirical studies show that the gambler’s fallacy influences decisions outside the 
laboratory. The implications for financial markets are not clear since gambling 
environments differ in many aspects from financial markets. Gambles in casinos or 
lotteries tend to incur a low, but almost certain, loss and have a low chance of a very high 
return. The expected return of casino games and lotteries is negative for the players. 
Financial assets are quite different from lotteries and such casino games.13 They have 
positive expected returns, and gains and losses are more equally distributed. 
Descriptive models use the gambler’s fallacy to explain investor behaviour and price 
patterns that normative theories fail to explain, such as momentum and reversal or the 
disposition effect. Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010) show in a decision-
making model the ways in which the gambler’s fallacy affects investors. In the model, a 
believer in the law of small numbers, called Freddy, is convinced that events in the recent 
past influence the near future. In the medium to long term, these past events lose their 
                                            
13 Potentially with the exception of far out-of-the-money options. 
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predictive power in Freddy’s mind. Freddy acts as if events are drawn from an urn without 
replacement; however, he thinks the urn itself is replaced periodically. Using this belief, 
Freddy’s decisions are not different from a Bayesian over very long time horizons but can 
dramatically differ when short time intervals are considered. When Freddy is uncertain 
about the base rate, the population distribution, he overinfers from small, observed 
samples. When his opinion about the population distribution is strong, he expects mean 
reversion after observing streaks. If all investors share Freddy’s belief but have differing 
opinions on when the urn will be replaced next, they will underreact to streaks of events 
in the short term and overreact in the medium to long term, possibly explaining the much-
documented phenomenon of short-term momentum and medium-term reversal by De 
Bondt (1993), De Bondt and Thaler (1987) and Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996). 
Experimental evidence for the gambler’s fallacy belief is largely from random sequence 
production and recognition tasks. Hahn and Warren (2010) and Farmer et al. (2017) 
demonstrate that these studies may overstate the importance of the belief owing to their, 
often, short sequence-oriented designs. Prediction tasks, such as of Huber et al. (2010) 
and Stoeckl et al. (2015), are more closely modelled to examine behaviour in financial 
markets but are not designed to study the effects on prices. Empirical studies focus on 
gambling environments, such as casinos, lotteries and sports betting. Bets in casinos and 
lottery tickets have different risk-return characteristics from financial assets. Particularly, 
the relatively low loss but very high possible returns of such gambles may promote 
irrational behaviour. Data from sports betting markets suggests that risk-taking behaviour 
is related to the experience of gains and losses (Xu & Harvey, 2014). Sports bets share 
some characteristics with financial assets, such as an unknown outcome distribution and 
variable prices (odds). Thus far, no study has been designed to examine the impact of the 
gambler’s fallacy on risk-taking and market prices. Our design allows us to answer the 
following questions: 
1) How will the gambler’s fallacy influence risk-taking in a double-auction market 
with public limit order books? 
Individuals betting on sports increase risk after they lose and decrease it after they win 
(Xu & Harvey, 2014). Similar attitudes in our markets would mean that subjects 
experiencing large gains reduce portfolio risk, while those experiencing large losses 
increase portfolio risk. We generate a market environment in which all subjects observe 
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and/or participate in much stronger than expected earnings in phase one of our 
experiment. Subjects with gambler’s fallacy beliefs are expected to sell their assets in 
phase two. Our experiment can only work if some, but not all, subjects believe in mean 
reversion. Without other subjects to buy their assets, the gambler’s fallacy believers could 
not sell. Those who buy assets during phase two are not necessarily rational. They are 
rational only if asset prices during phase two are below the expected value, and this brings 
us to the second question: 
2) Can market prices of assets traded in such a market be influenced by the gambler’s 
fallacy belief? 
The experimental results of Bossaerts and Plott (2004) suggest that unexpected strings of 
events result in asset prices that can be explained by treating the events as draws without 
replacement. To our knowledge, the study offers the only experimental evidence that the 
gambler’s fallacy can influence prices in a double-auction market. Bossaerts and Plott 
conduct multiple one-period markets with stage-dependent (risky) buyout values. As a 
result, subjects trade a new asset in each period. In our design, subjects trade one asset 
over 12 periods. Thus, we more closely replicate a scenario in which investors face the 
task to update their expectations of risk and return on the same asset based on a known 
outcome distribution and recent events. 
4.4 Experimental Design 
All our experiments, training and survey interfaces are programmed using GIMS—Graz-
Innsbruck Market System (Palan, 2015)—and are conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). The experiments were held in the Bond University Macquarie Trading Room. We 
use a two-asset design with declining risk neutral expected asset values. The 
computerised double-auction market allows subjects to trade assets with each other in real 
time. They can post bids and asks or act as price takers by accepting bids or asks posted 
by others. 
Prior to the actual experiments, we conduct two-hour training sessions. All subjects are 
required to complete one two-hour training session prior to participating in an experiment. 
These training sessions are designed to mitigate the effects of inexperience many previous 
studies reveal (e.g., V. L. Smith et al., 1988). 
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During the training, subjects are asked to trade in six different markets that gradually 
increase in complexity. The first market is designed to teach them only the handling of 
the software interface. The second market introduces simple asset valuation where 
dividends are certain. Next, they are introduced to trading and valuing one asset with risky 
cash flows. In the fourth training market, they are introduced to trading two risky assets 
simultaneously. The two-asset design is repeated in markets five and six with variations 
in the possible dividend payoff and risk. 
Training subjects this extensively is unprecedented in the experimental asset market 
literature. The different markets are designed to gradually enable them to understand the 
software as well as declining value paths, valuation and expected values with risky 
dividends and finally the trading and valuing of two assets simultaneously. All subjects 
participating in our study have over 60 minutes of trading experience from the training. 
The remaining time of the training session is used for instructions, ethics protocols and 
surveys. 
We introduce all risky assets as ‘stock of depletable mines’ to help subjects’ 
understanding of the unintuitive, declining fundamental value of all risky assets in our 
design. Huber and Kirchler (2012) show that this simple change in experimental 
instructions reduces mispricing. The second variation we adapt from Huber and Kirchler 
(2012) is a graph illustrating the value paths for the assets. This alternative to displaying 
a table in the instructions is proven to further increase subjects’ understanding and reduces 
confusion. 
The declining theoretical values of the assets combined with an increasing amount of 
liquidity owing to the dividend payments are suspected to increase mispricing in 
experiments. Caginald et al. (1998) show that increasing the initial cash-to-asset ratio will 
significantly increase mean asset prices. However, even if the initial cash-to-asset ratio in 
the market is ideal, it will inevitably increase as the experiment proceeds. The risky asset 
declines in value from period to period, while the cash balance of subjects is expected to 
increase owing to dividend payments. Kirchler et al. (2012) solve this problem by using 
an asset design with constant fundamental value. A constant fundamental value design is 
not useful for our hypotheses. We take excess liquidity off the market by introducing a 
risk-free, noninterest paying account into which all dividends are paid. Accumulated 
dividends are not available for trading. This way, the expected increase in the value of 
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the deposit account mirrors the decrease in fundamental value of the assets. Combined, 
the assets and deposit accounts’ expected value remains constant over all periods at the 
assets’ expected value in period one (240 FRANCS). Realised dividends, and therefore 
realised cash-to-asset ratios, may differ from the expected. Making dividends unavailable 
for trading can hence only mitigate, but not solve, the potential implications of a changing 
cash-to-asset ratio. 
For each experiment, we recruit up to 12 subjects from a pool of trained students. At the 
end of each of the 12 trading periods, each asset pays a risky dividend to those who held 
the asset. The dividend payments for both assets are uncorrelated, and the probabilities 
and possible payouts are communicated to subjects. 
Table 4.1: Communicated Asset Properties in the Gambler’s Fallacy Study 
Asset Dividend per Period 
(FRANCS) 
Expected Dividend per 
Period (FRANCS) 
Asset X 100, 0 (p = 0.2) 20 
Asset Y 30, 10 (p = 0.5) 20 
Subjects are led to believe that the dividends for both assets follow the distribution 
illustrated in Table 2.3. However, to test our hypothesis, we preselected the cash flows 
from a Monte Carlo-type simulation. We conduct two markets with the same subjects 
within the two-hour experiment. In Treatment sessions, the dividends for the first market 
are chosen from a simulation with expected value FRANCS 480, much higher than the 
FRANCS 240 that we describe to subjects. For the second market in the Treatment 
session, the expected value of the dividends is either FRANCS 200 or 300, that is, close 
to the expected value of FRANCS 240. The dividends for the conservative asset Y are 
selected to equal the expectation of FRANCS 240. In Control markets one and two, we 
select the dividends for both assets to be close to their expected means in both markets. 
Both assets are described to have the same expected dividend but clearly differ in the 
distribution of possible payouts. Both Fisher and Kelly (2000) and Childs and Mestelman 
(2006) find that relative asset prices between two risky assets stay relatively constant 
when the assets have the same expected dividends but differ in risk. The risk-neutral 
expected values of the assets will decline stepwise from 240 FRANCS per asset in period 
one to 20 FRANCS at the end of the last trading period. V. L. Smith et al. (1988) first 
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introduced this asset design, and it has since been used as a standard procedure in asset 
market experiments. 
In a second trial, we repeat the procedure without the conservative asset Y. While the 
presence of a second, lower-risk asset has the advantage that we can use exchange rate 
parity for hypothesis testing, subjects investing heavily in asset Y may not pay close 
attention to the dividends of asset X. Therefore, we cannot conclude whether these 
subjects do not act on their gambler’s fallacy belief or whether they simply do not pay 
attention to the dividends of asset X. 
We conduct another series of trials with only one asset. During the first market in 
treatments (T1), all subjects observe the much higher-than-expected cash flows for the 
speculative asset X. Some will accumulate asset X during this market, that is, become net 
buyers, while, necessarily, others will reduce their holdings in the speculative asset. 
4.5 Hypotheses and Tests 
4.5.1 Subject hypotheses 
Our expectation is that in line with the findings of Xu and Harvey (2014), subject 
behaviour differs between those with above average earnings and those with below 
average earnings in Treatment markets. Net buyers of the speculative asset X in T1 
markets will outperform net sellers owing to the manipulation of dividend payments. 
However, the previous statement does not hold if prices of asset X are higher than or 
equal to the dividends. For example, if a subject purchases an asset for FRANCS 490 she 
still incurs a loss of FRANCS 10 if the asset pays FRANCS 480 in the holding period. 
We anticipate risk-taking behaviour similar to that Xu and Harvey (2014) find in sports 
betting markets and expect that T1 winners will take lower risks in T2 by becoming net 
sellers, while T1 losers will take higher risks in T2 and become net buyers of asset X. 
We formulate our first testable hypothesis (H1): 
Winners in phase one Treatment markets will reduce their holdings in the riskier asset 
(H1a) 
Losers in phase one markets will increase their holdings in the riskier asset (H1b). 
68 
We test against the null hypothesis (H0-1) that treatments have no effect on risk-taking 
activity. 
When the dividend manipulation in Treatment markets has no effect on portfolio risk-
taking, then subjects should only vary portfolio risk based on their individual risk 
preferences. After adjustments for individual risk preferences, we would not expect a 
difference between first and second markets and between treatment and control 
experiments. To assess the changes in asset holdings, we first compute the subjects’ 
relative holdings of asset X for every period in T1 and C1. The relative asset holdings y 
for subject n in period t are computed as asset X held at the end of period i by subject n 
divided by the total number of asset X available in each market. 
𝑦𝑡𝑖
𝑛 =  
𝑋𝑛𝑖
∑ 𝑋𝑖
          (1) 
We then compute the average relative holdings of asset X per subject for C2 and T2 of 
each session as follows: 
𝑥𝑦𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 2
𝑛 =
1
12
∗ ∑ 𝑦𝑡𝑖
𝑛𝑛1−12
𝑖𝑛               (2) 
We measure the change in asset holdings as the difference between average holdings in 
the second phase minus average holdings in the first phase: 
 𝛥𝑥𝑖
𝑛 =  𝑥𝑦𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 2
𝑛 − 𝑥𝑦𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 1
𝑛         (3) 
To adjust for the difference in starting endowments between one- and two-asset sessions, 
we divide 𝛥𝑥𝑖
𝑛 by 𝑥𝑖
0, the number of assets that subjects were endowed with, generating 
𝛥𝑥, the variable for relative change in asset holdings: 
𝛥𝑥 = 
𝛥𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑥𝑖
0             (4) 
and run the multivariate linear regression (5) using the variables in Table 4.2 as the 
independent variables: 
𝑦𝛥𝑥 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ (𝐷1) + 𝛽2 ∗ (𝐷2) + 𝛽3 ∗ (𝐷3) + 𝜀     (5) 
69 
Table 4.2: Variable Descriptions for Regression (5); Gambler’s Fallacy 
Variable Description 
𝑫𝟏 Winner in phase one; dichotomous 
variable determined by comparing subject 
earnings with average market earnings 
𝑫𝟐 Treatment; dichotomous variable 
𝑫𝟑 Winner × Treatment; dichotomous 
variable measuring the behaviour of 
winners in phase one of treatment markets 
Since all independent variables in our model are dichotomous, equation (5) will capture 
the following scenarios (a), (b) and (c): 
a. 𝐷1 = 1; 𝐷2 = 0, in equation (5) results in the prediction for 𝑦𝛥𝑥 
𝑦𝛥?̂? = (?̂? + 𝛽1̂) 
Coefficient 𝛽1 would, if nonzero, change intercept 𝛼. Scenario (a) describes the 
expected behaviour of winning subjects in Control markets. Coefficient 𝛽1 being 
significantly different from zero would suggest that risk-taking behaviour is partly 
determined by winning and losing, independently of dividend patterns. 
b. 𝐷1 = 0; 𝐷2 = 1, in (5) results in the prediction for 𝑦𝛥𝑥 
𝑦𝛥?̂? = (?̂? + 𝛽2̂) 
Coefficient 𝛽2 would, if nonzero, change intercept 𝛼. Scenario (b) describes the 
expected behaviour of subjects in Treatment markets who underperformed their 
peers during phase one. Coefficient 𝛽2, if significantly different from zero and 
positive, would confirm our hypothesis that observing, but not participating in, a 
string of earnings will result in increased risk-taking. 
c. 𝐷1 = 1; 𝐷2 = 1, consequently 𝐷3 = 1 in (5) results in the prediction for 𝑦𝛥𝑥 
𝑦𝛥?̂? = (?̂? + 𝛽1̂ + 𝛽2̂ + 𝛽3̂) 
Coefficient 𝛽3 of interaction variable 𝐷3 is designed to capture the behaviour of 
phase one winners in Treatment markets. We expect this coefficient to be 
significant and negative, indicating that participating in a string of better-than-
expected earnings will result in behaviour consistent with the gambler’s fallacy 
belief. 
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4.5.2 Subjects results 
For the following analysis, we sampled 315 observations. 
Table 4.3: Gambler’s Fallacy Regression (5) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
𝜶 .037 .059 .628 .530 
𝑫𝟏(Winner) −.108 .101 −1.071 .285 
𝑫𝟐(Treatment) .118 .076 1.557 .120 
𝑫𝟑(Winner × Treatment) −.378 .132 −2.864 .004 
Notes: 315 observations; R-squared =.098; Adjusted R-squared =.089. Results of Regression 𝑦𝛥𝑥 =  𝛼 +
𝛽1 ∗ (𝐷1) + 𝛽2 ∗ (𝐷2) + 𝛽3 ∗ (𝐷3) + 𝜀 
The regression shows that subjects underperforming in C1 markets do not alter portfolio 
risk. Such behaviour would be captured by the constant alpha. The hypothesis that Alpha 
(.037) is equal to zero cannot be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis that it is 
different from zero (p =.530). We cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients for 
variables 𝐷1 or 𝐷2 are different from zero (p(𝐷1) =.285 and p(𝐷2) =.120). Variables 𝐷1 
and 𝐷2 do not influence portfolio risk independently, but the interaction variable 𝐷3, 
which represents the behaviour of T1 winners, has a significant coefficient. The 
coefficient of the interaction variable 𝐷3 is negative and significantly different from zero 
(p =.004). We can say that T1 winners reduce their holdings of the speculative asset X 
during T2. This behaviour is consistent with our expectation based on the findings of Xu 
and Harvey (2014) that streaks of unexpectedly high gains lead to a reduction in risk-
taking. Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) suggests that subjects alter their 
behaviour after experiencing gains or losses. The prospect theory agent may shift her 
reference point depending on prior experiences and become more risk-seeking after 
experiencing losses and more risk-averse after gains. As gains and losses (relative to the 
group average) are more likely to be extreme in T1 markets, it is possible that a reference 
point shift explains the results of regression (5). Relative gains and losses are less extreme 
in Control markets than in Treatments; regression (5) may therefore not provide an 
adequate test for gambler’s fallacy behaviour. 
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Owing to the manipulated dividends in Treatments, the difference in earnings between 
winners and losers is higher, and so are average market earnings. Since we define winners 
and losers by the difference between individual and average earnings, earnings and losses 
in absolute terms are higher in Treatment, than in Control, markets.  
The results of regression (5) may be driven by the differing magnitude of absolute 
earnings and losses. To examine this possibility, we perform the following linear 
regression using absolute earnings as our independent variable: 
𝑦
∆𝑥 = 𝛼+𝛽1(
𝐸𝑖
100
) + 𝜀
         (6) 
where 𝐸𝑖 are the absolute earnings of subject i in phase one minus the average earnings 
of all subjects in phase one. We divide by 100 for ease of interpretation. We repeat 
regression (6) for the full dataset as well as for Treatment and Control markets separately. 
If the results of regression (5) are caused by a reference point shift rather than unexpected 
cash flows, we should see a significant coefficient in both Treatment and Control 
regressions. 
Table 4.4: Gambler’s Fallacy Regression (6) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
𝜶 (similar results in 
all sets) 
.000 .030 .000 1 
𝑬𝟏(Full dataset) −.017 .002 −7.012 .000 
𝑬𝟏(Treatment) −.019 .003 −7.155 .000 
𝑬𝟏(Control) −.004 .005 −.761 .448 
Full dataset: R-squared =.098; Adjusted R-squared =.089; Treatment: R-squared =.217; Adjusted R-squared 
=.213; Control: R-squared =.005; Adjusted R-squared = −.003 
Regression (6) shows that the risk-shifting behaviour we report in regression (5) cannot 
be explained by gains or losses alone but has its origins at least in part in the higher-than-
expected payoffs experienced during T1 markets. The results of (6) also suggest that in 
Treatment markets, T1 losers become T2 buyers of the risky asset X. This part of our 
hypothesis (H1b) had to be rejected narrowly in the previous regression (5). As a 
robustness check, we re-run regression (6) using only Treatment data and add the Winner 
dichotomous variable: 
72 
𝑦
∆𝑥 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(
𝐸𝑖
100
) + 𝐷𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟 + 𝜀 
        (6.1) 
Table 4.5: Gambler’s Fallacy Regression (6.1) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
𝜶  .001 .068 .144 .886 
𝑬𝟏(Earnings) −.019 .004 −4.569 .000 
𝑫𝟏(Winner) −.021 .121 −.178 .859 
Notes: R-squared =.217; Adjusted R-squared =.208 
The results of regression (6.1) show that the significant coefficient from the previous 
regression in Treatment markets is not driven by market winners alone. The negative 
coefficient for 𝐸1 in regression (6.1) suggests that T1 winners (E is positive) reduce risk 
while T1 losers (E is negative) increase risk. We reject the null hypothesis that 
unexpectedly high dividend payments have no impact in portfolio risk-taking and confirm 
our hypothesis (H1): Unexpectedly high earnings cause subjects benefitting from these in 
phase one to reduce portfolio risk in phase two, while those observing, but not benefitting 
from, these earnings will increase risk-taking. 
Our findings are similar to those of Xu and Harvey (2014), who find that winners in sports 
bets reduce risk-taking, while losers shift to more risky odds. It is important to note that 
losers in our experiment do not suffer a real financial loss. All our subjects leave the 
session with more money in their pockets than they had before the session. Contrary to 
the sports gamblers in Xu and Harvey’s study, our subjects merely experience a lost 
opportunity to earn more money on selling their assets in T1 markets. To induce risk-
shifting behaviour, in line with Xu and Harvey (2014) it is sufficient for losers to lose 
relative to their peers. Our findings may also extend the model of Rabin (2002) and Rabin 
and Vayanos (2010). We suggest that Freddy’s belief in the timing of an urn change is 
not random but determined by the utility gained from the draws out of the current urn. 
Utility gained when the bets on an urn draw a better-than-expected payoff delay the belief 
in an urn change. Since Freddy believes in draws without replacement, he will believe his 
good luck will run out and sell. Because the urn is still the same in his mind, there should 
not be any more earnings draws left. 
Utility lost from experiencing losses or opportunity losses causes subjects to believe the 
urn is going to change. Therefore, losers will revaluate their strategy and become buyers, 
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believing that the new urn would contain new earnings draws. Possibly, the utility from 
experienced draws influences subjects’ belief in the announced dividend distribution 
(base rate). This would mean that winning strengthens the belief in the communicated 
probabilities, while losing causes subjects to doubt the base rate. Craig, Martinez, 
Gainous and Kane (2006) find that supporters of losing parties in US elections tend to 
lose trust in the fairness of the election. However, our losing subjects also losing their 
trust in the announced base rate does not explain why they would necessarily become 
buyers. 
4.5.3 Market 
4.5.3.1 Hypotheses 
The gambler’s fallacy describes the belief that a series of better-than-expected events will 
be followed by worse than expected events to ‘even the odds’ and vice versa. Subjects 
observe and or receive higher earnings during phase one of Treatment markets. On the 
basis of Rabin (2002), we expect them to have strong beliefs in the base rate. Hence, they 
expect earnings to reverse in phase two of Treatment markets. For individuals, we find 
selling behaviour consistent with the gambler’s fallacy for phase one winners. Since 
phase one losers increase their holdings of the risky asset, there may not be an effect on 
market prices in our experiments. We test against the null hypothesis (H0-2): Treatments 
have no effect on market prices in phase two markets. Our alternative hypothesis (H2): 
Treatments influence market prices. Subjects with gambler’s fallacy belief will revaluate 
the probabilities of receiving earnings from holding the high-risk asset X and value the 
asset as if the probability of a payout was lower than the stated 20%. Hence, market prices 
should be lower in phase two Treatment markets. 
To test our hypotheses, we first compute the exchange rate prediction error for all two-
asset markets. This error is the deviation of the relative asset price from its theoretical 
value. 
𝑢𝑡
𝑘 = (
1
𝑛𝑘
) ∑ (𝑒𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑒𝑖)/ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛𝑘
𝑖=1          (1) 
where 𝑒𝑡
𝑖 is the observed exchange rate in period t in session i and 𝑒𝑖 is the theoretical 
value of the exchange rate in design k. We expect the treatments affect relative asset prices 
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in phase two markets, and therefore, we expect the exchange rate prediction error to 
increase as 𝑒𝑡
𝑖 changes owing to lower prices for asset X. 
Hypothesis: 
𝑢𝑡
𝑘𝑇2 = (
1
𝑛𝑘
) ∑ (𝑒𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑒𝑖)/ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛𝑘
𝑖=1  > 𝑢𝑡
𝑘𝐶2 = (
1
𝑛𝑘
) ∑ (𝑒𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑒𝑖)/ 𝑒𝑖
𝑛𝑘
𝑖=1     (2) 
Higher prediction error in T2 markets than in C2 markets. 
For all two-asset markets, we test our hypothesis using OLS regression 
𝑦𝑢𝑡𝑘
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ (𝐷1) + 𝛽2 ∗ (𝐷2) + 𝛽3 ∗ (𝐷3) + 𝜀     (3) 
Table 4.6: Variable Descriptions for Regression (3); Gambler’s Fallacy 
Variable Description 
𝑫𝟏 Treatment; dichotomous variable 
𝑫𝟐 Market Two; dichotomous variable 
𝑫𝟑 (𝐷1 ∗ 𝐷2); interaction variable capturing 
the exchange rate in phase two Treatment 
markets 
Since all variables in our model are dichotomous, equation (3) will capture the following 
scenarios (a), (b) and (c), and intercept α will indicate whether exchange rate prediction 
errors differ from zero independently of market phase and treatment. 
a. 𝐷1 = 1; 𝐷2 = 0, in (3) results in the prediction for 𝑦𝑢𝑡𝑘
 
𝑦𝑢𝑡?̂?
= (?̂? + 𝛽1̂) 
Coefficient 𝛽1 would, if nonzero, change intercept 𝛼. Scenario (a) describes the 
expected exchange rate in phase one Treatment markets. Coefficient 𝛽1 being 
significantly different from zero would indicate that higher-than-expected 
earnings in phase one Treatment markets change transaction prices. 
b. 𝐷1 = 0; 𝐷2 = 1, in (3) results in the prediction for 𝑦𝑢𝑡𝑘
 
𝑦𝑢𝑡?̂?
= (?̂? + 𝛽1̂ + 𝛽2̂) 
Coefficient 𝛽2 would, if nonzero, change intercept 𝛼. Scenario (b) describes the 
expected exchange rate prediction error in phase two markets. Coefficient 𝛽2, if 
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significantly different from zero, would imply that prices differ from phase one to 
phase two irrespective of earnings. 
c. 𝐷1 = 1; 𝐷2 = 1, consequently 𝐷3 = 1 in (3) results in the prediction for 𝑦𝑢𝑡𝑘
 
𝑦𝑢𝑡?̂?
= (?̂? + 𝛽1̂ + 𝛽2̂ + 𝛽3)̂ 
Coefficient 𝛽3 of interaction variable 𝐷3 is designed to capture the expected price 
impact of the gambler’s fallacy. Coefficient 𝛽3, if significantly different from zero 
and negative, would confirm our hypothesis (H2) that higher-than-expected 
earnings in phase one lead to lower prices for the speculative asset X, relative to 
the conservative asset Y. 
Table 4.7: Gambler’s Fallacy Market; Regression (3) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
𝜶 −.045 .032 −1.514 .131 
𝑫𝟏 −.073 .043 1.720 .087 
𝑫𝟐 −.067 .046 −1.435 .152 
𝑫𝟑 −.074 .060 −1.221 .223 
Notes: 288 observations; R-squared =.055; Adjusted R-squared =.045 
We repeat our analysis with regression (3) using the full dataset of two-asset and one-
asset markets. As the dependent variable, we use the exchange rate prediction error of 
median prices for asset X and its risk-neutral expected values in period 𝑃𝑛. 
𝑦𝑢𝑅𝑁𝑡𝑘
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ (𝐷1) + 𝛽2 ∗ (𝐷2) + 𝛽3 ∗ (𝐷3) + 𝜀    (3.1) 
Table 4.8: Gambler’s Fallacy Market; Regression (3.1) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
𝜶 .087 .033 2.636 .009 
𝑫𝟏 −.092 .043 −2.119 .034 
𝑫𝟐 −.016 .047 −.341 .733 
𝑫𝟑 .055 .061 −.902 .367 
Notes: 624 observations; R-squared =.009; Adjusted R-squared =.004 
The results of regressions (3) and (3.1) both show significance for variable 𝐷1(Treatment) 
with p <.1 and p <.05 respectively. The negative coefficients indicate that exchange rate 
prediction errors (3) and relative price deviations from risk-neutral values (3.1) are lower 
76 
in Treatment markets, meaning prices for the speculative asset X are higher relative to 
the conservative asset Y in two-asset markets and, on average, lower than in Control 
markets when two- and one-asset markets are analysed in combination. Intercept α shows 
that prices in Control markets are, on average, higher than risk-neutral expected values 
for asset X (p <.05). 
The model fit, measured as adjusted R-squared, is low for both analyses. If a gambler’s 
fallacy effect exists at market level, it may only influence parts of the phase two markets 
but not the entire 12 periods. To say it in the context of Rabin’s model (2002), market 
impact will depend on the point at which subjects decide that ‘the urn’ has been replaced. 
If this realisation occurs at the start of phase two markets, then, in the subjects’ view, 
phase two markets are unrelated to phase one earnings. We would not observe a 
Treatment effect. 
As the gambler’s fallacy implies that random events are treated as negatively correlated, 
the perceived urn replacement should not occur at all or should occur at a point in time 
during phase two markets. The analysis of individual behaviour (regression (2)) shows 
that at least some subjects believe in a connection between phase one and phase two 
markets. We create the dependent variable change in price deviation from risk-neutral 
expected value: 
𝛥𝑃𝑋
𝑛 =  𝑃𝑋1−6
𝑛 − 𝑃𝑋7−12
𝑛         (4) 
where 𝑃𝑋1−6
𝑛  represents the average deviation from risk-neutral value from periods 1 to 6 
and 𝑃𝑋7−12
𝑛  the average deviation from periods 7 to 12. We test for difference in price 
levels within markets using the following regression: 
𝛥𝑃𝑋
𝑛 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ (𝐷1) + 𝛽2 ∗ (𝐷2) + 𝛽3 ∗ (𝐷3) + 𝜀     (5) 
The independent variables are identical to those in regression (3). 
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Table 4.9: Gambler’s Fallacy Market; Regression (5) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
𝜶 −6.235 4.795 −1.300 .200 
𝑫𝟏 3.213 6.313 0.509 .613 
𝑫𝟐 1.779 6.781 0.262 .794 
𝑫𝟑 −18.877 8.928 −2.11 .039 
Notes: 52 observations; R-squared =.182; Adjusted R-squared =.131 
Based on regression (5), we assert that market prices for the speculative asset X differ 
from the first half to the second half of phase two Treatment markets and prices are higher 
during the second half of these markets (p <.05). 
 
Figure 4.1: Gambler’s Fallacy—Median Price Deviation for T2 and C2 Markets 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the very different prices for asset X in phase two Treatment and 
Control markets. The illustration confirms the observation from regression (5) that prices 
are suppressed during the first half of Treatment markets. Based on regression (5) and 
graph XX, we reject the null hypothesis (H0-2) that treatments have no effect on asset 
prices in phase two markets and favour the alternative hypothesis (H2) that the higher-
than-expected earnings during phase one Treatment markets will reduce prices for asset 
X in phase two markets. We note that the observed price distortion by the gambler’s 
fallacy does not persist throughout the entire phase two market but dissipates over time. 
  
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Median Price Deviation for Phase-Two Markets
Median X(T2) Median X (C2)
78 
4.6 Deception in Economics Experiments 
To study the effects of the gambler’s fallacy under laboratory conditions, we create 
earnings surprise by paying higher than expected dividends in treatment markets. The 
only feasible way to generate this surprise is to deceive subjects about the true chances of 
dividend payments. Deception in economic experiments is widely considered to be a 
taboo. The following discussion outlines why we consider our study to be a necessary 
exception and the steps we take to avoid negative effects on our subjects and fellow 
researchers.   
The gambler’s fallacy is the belief that random events are negatively autocorrelated and 
therefore representative of the population distribution even within a small number of 
observations. For investors, this belief can lead to biased asset allocation in the form of 
the well-documented disposition effect. Shefrin and Statman (1985) report the tendency 
of investors to sell assets after gains but hold assets after experiencing losses. The 
expectation of negative autocorrelation is one possible explanation for this seemingly 
irrational behaviour14.  
When investors update their expectations about future returns based on new information, 
the gambler’s fallacy may influence whether the market over- or underreacts to the news. 
Market participants may interpret better than expected information too cautiously; if they 
believe it must be followed by negative information within a relatively short timeframe. 
If many investors adjust their expectations gradually, the gambler’s fallacy might lead to 
momentum and reversal patterns in asset prices.  
The effects of the gambler’s fallacy on investor behaviour and asset prices are not the 
subject of many empirical or experimental studies. Empirical data on market prices and 
individual portfolio allocations can show effects of consistent with the gambler’s fallacy, 
but these data cannot identify the gambler’s fallacy as the cause of these effects. To 
investigate the phenomenon experimentally, we require a scenario in which subjects 
observe events that deviate from their expectations (i.e., events are better than- or worse 
than expected). To create such a scenario, we train our subjects to expect an average of 
                                            
14 An alternative and popular explanation for the disposition effect is Prospect Theory. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) report that subjects prefer taking additional risk to realizing even small losses but opt to 
realize gains over a risky alternative. 
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2.4 dividend payments per trial (as determined by a random number generator) and the, 
to induce an expectation of mean reversal, we pay four to six dividends per trial. 
Many, but not all, experimental economists consider the use of deception to be 
unacceptable. To test the predictions of economic theory, an experimenter needs to 
provide an environment in which subjects can make objective decisions. Experimental 
asset markets, for example, often rely on the assumption that subjects make decisions 
based on the future payoff and risk of the experimental asset. To make an objective 
decision, all subjects have to trust in the information provided by the experimenter. If 
subjects do not trust the information they may form their own, subjective expectations 
about risk and return and therefore, make decisions which appear to contradict economic 
theory. Conclusions from these decisions would be invalid. 
Some economists fear that the use of deception in experiments has a lasting and spreading 
effect on subject’s trust. Jamison, Karlan, and Schechter (2006) find that subjects who 
experience deception are less likely to return to future, unrelated experiments and can in 
some instances alter their behaviour. Ortmann and Hertwig (2002) examine multiple 
experimental studies from the psychology literature and find that subjects are less likely 
to trust the experimenter after they have experienced deception. 
Bonetti (1998) argues that the potential negative effects of deception are overstated, 
depend on the gravity of the deception (i.e., how severely the deception affects subjects), 
and can be minimized through careful debriefing.  
Cooper (2014) argues that deception should be allowed when the experimenter follows 
four rules. We comment on our efforts to comply with these rules as follows: 
1. The deception does not harm subjects beyond what is typical for an economic 
experiment without deception. 
In our markets with deception, we manipulate the dividend payouts to be higher 
than expected. Earnings are converted into Australian Dollars at the same 
exchange rate for all markets. In aggregate, then, subjects that are deceived receive 
higher compensation than those that are not deceived. 
2. The study would be prohibitively difficult to conduct without deception. 
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To examine the effects of the gambler’s fallacy we need to observe markets in 
which realised dividends are substantially different from expected dividends. 
Naturally obtaining a few markets with exceptionally unexpected dividend 
payments would require a prohibitably large number of experiments. Considering 
our hypothesis without the manipulation of payouts is not feasible on our, if not 
any researchers budget and schedule. 
3. Subjects are adequately debriefed after the fact about the presence of deception. 
A debriefing session for subjects was held after the results were obtained and 
analysed. 
4. The value of the study is sufficiently high to merit the potential costs associated 
with the use of deception.” (Cooper, 2014, p. 113) 
The gambler’s fallacy is a suspected culprit for inefficient asset allocation by 
individuals as well as inefficient market prices. The disposition effect can harm 
investors, and market inefficiencies such as momentum can lead to suboptimal 
capital allocation in the economy. Our motivation for this study is to investigate 
the effects of the gambler’s fallacy on asset allocation and risky asset prices. We 
believe that the potential value of this study merits the (relatively low) potential 
costs associated with the use of deception.  
4.7 Summary and Conclusion 
The gambler’s fallacy is the belief that random events are negatively autocorrelated and 
therefore are not random at all. People subject to the gambler’s fallacy expect even small 
samples from a theoretically infinite population to be representative of the population. If 
the belief in the population distribution, the base rate, is strong, these people expect mean 
reversion when they observe a sample with higher-than-expected or lower-than-expected 
outcomes. 
In studies on Finance, the gambler’s fallacy is used to explain the disposition effect, the 
tendency of investors to sell assets after gains but retain assets after losses. On a price 
level, it can explain short-term underreaction and medium-term overreaction to new 
information resulting in the much-documented phenomenon of short-term momentum 
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and medium to long-term reversals observed in markets. Our experimental study is, to 
our best knowledge, the first to examine the gambler’s fallacy in a double-auction market 
setting. By paying high dividends to subjects and, at the same time, communicating the 
base rate to create a strong base rate opinion, we deliberately trigger the gambler’s fallacy 
and study its effects on portfolio choice and asset prices in a second, lower earnings 
market. 
We find that subjects benefitting the most from the high dividends become sellers in the 
second market, while those not benefitting become buyers. This finding is in line with 
research by Xu and Harvey (2014), who observed similar behaviour in a sports betting 
environment. They report that punters reduce the odds of their bets after strings of wins 
and increase the odds after strings of losses. While the gambler’s fallacy can explain both 
these observations, our results are harder to interpret. Phase one winners are subjects who 
purchase the experimental asset in Treatment markets since dividends are manipulated in 
T1 markets and aggregate prices are not usually higher than the dividend payments. The 
gambler’s fallacy is sufficient to explain why they become net sellers in phase two. In the 
gambler’s fallacy, all samples are believed to represent the population base rate. Since 
the first part of the sample had higher-than-expected payouts, these subjects believe that 
the second part must be lower than expected, and hence, the sample mean is equal to the 
population mean. 
The behaviour of phase one net sellers, who are consequently the relative losers in 
Treatment markets, is more difficult to explain using the gambler’s fallacy. We report 
that market prices during the first half of T2 markets are suppressed. Under these 
circumstances, buying the asset is a rational decision. Bossaerts and Plott (2004) report 
similar price distortions. In an experimental study testing asset pricing models, they report 
anomalies during two of their markets caused by a series of ex-ante unexpected payouts. 
This study advances the knowledge in the fields of Behavioural Finance as well as 
Psychology. Our results confirm those of Xu and Harvey (2014), the first researchers to 
link gambler’s fallacy with the experience of gains and losses. Further, we show that these 
findings extend to simple financial assets and a double-auction setting. On an asset price 
level, our results are in line with the model of Rabin (2002). The belief in the law of small 
numbers will cause a short-term underreaction with prices below theoretical fundamental 
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values, and medium to long-term overreaction with prices above fundamental values after 
strings of better-than-expected earnings. 
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Chapter 5: The Effects of Mood on Risk-Taking 
5.1 Abstract 
We test how subject mood influences portfolio risk-taking and risky asset prices in 
laboratory asset markets by linking data from market experiments with survey data 
measuring mood. We find that those in a positive mood construct riskier portfolios than 
those in a negative mood. The higher the relative number of subjects in a positive mood 
in a market, the lower the risky asset prices are in this market. Our results are at odds with 
empirical work that uses mood proxies, such as the weather. We argue that weather is not 
a reliable indicator for investor mood. Our study contributes to the ongoing discussion 
about the effects of mood on risk-taking and risky asset prices in financial markets. 
5.2 Introduction 
How we feel has the power to determine how we interpret our environment and can 
influence how we make decisions. Psychology categorises feelings into emotions and 
moods. Emotions are described as object-specific and short-lived states, while moods are 
classified as diffuse and long-lasting affective states that are not object related and have 
the power to influence cognitive processes (Morris, 1989). Cognitive processes describe 
the way humans interpret new information and how this new information is connected to 
existing information in the brain (Jung, 1923). 
Participants in financial markets, such as investors, dealers or brokers, process new 
information on a regular basis. If mood influences the way market participants process 
information, mood can also influence decisions they make based on information. The 
decision to buy or sell a security, and therefore an entire portfolio, can be influenced by 
mood. If the moods of many market participants are influenced in the same direction—
for example, by the weather—mood can have the power to influence risky asset prices. 
Mood states influence the way we process information. People in a positive mood 
interpret the same information more positively (or less negatively) than people in a 
negative mood (Forgas, 1995; Isen & Patrick, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
The behavioural implications of mood, how people react to the information, are not clear 
and are debated among psychologists. Two perspectives exist on the effects of mood on 
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human behaviour. The first is that behaviour follows the cognitive process of information 
interpretation. For example, investors faced with new information about a stock interpret 
this information more positively when in a positive mood and more negatively when in a 
negative mood. Following this cognitive process, the investor in a good mood expects 
higher returns and/or requires lower returns on this stock, while the investor in a negative 
mood expects lower returns and/or requires higher returns. In addition, the former is 
willing to pay a higher price for the stock than the latter. 
The second perspective on the effects of mood on human behaviour is that people are 
hedonically oriented and therefore always seek positive mood (pleasure) and try to avoid 
and repair negative mood (pain). Using the same example as above, the investor in a 
positive mood is now aware that buying any risky asset bears the chance of incurring a 
financial loss. Such loss is painful and could destroy the positive mood. For this investor, 
any risky investment bears the downside of financial and mood loss, while the upside is 
limited to financial gain. The investor in a negative mood is aware that a financial gain 
can repair his mood. For this investor, any risky investment has the upside of financial 
gain and mood repair, while the downside is limited to financial loss. The investor in a 
positive mood now requires high returns per unit of risk (i.e., becomes more risk-averse) 
and is willing to pay lower prices, while the investor in a negative mood requires lower 
returns per unit of risk (i.e., becomes less risk-averse) and is willing to pay higher prices. 
The descriptive model stating that behaviour follows the cognitive process (the first 
perspective) is called the affect infusion model (henceforth AIM) (Forgas, 1995) and 
asserts that positive mood causes subjects to tolerate more risk because they overweight 
positive, and underweight negative, information. Negative mood causes them to tolerate 
less risk because they overweight negative, and underweight positive, information. The 
model stating that behaviour follows our hedonism is called the mood maintenance 
hypothesis (henceforth MMH) (Isen et al., 1988) and asserts that positive mood causes 
subjects to tolerate less risk because they fear the possibility of mood loss in case of a 
financial loss. Negative mood causes subjects to tolerate more risk because they seek the 
opportunity to repair their mood with a financial gain. 
Most studies in a financial context report higher abnormal returns for positive mood 
proxies, such as sunshine (Hirshleifer & Shumway, 2003) and lower abnormal returns for 
negative mood proxies, such as cloudiness (Goetzmann et al., 2015). These findings are 
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in line with the predictions of the AIM since increased (reduced) risk tolerance will result 
in lower (higher) required returns and higher (lower) stock prices. To date, Kliger and 
Levy (2003) is the only empirical study that reports a negative correlation between mood, 
proxied by weather, and risk tolerance, in line with the MMH. 
Isen et al. (1988) note that mood influences the assessment of probabilities as well as 
subjective utility from gains or losses in distinctly different ways. While positive mood 
is associated with overweighting the probabilities of positive outcomes of a gamble, 
simultaneously, subjects in a positive mood gain less utility when winning and lose more 
utility when losing. Those in a positive mood, at the same time, overestimate the winning 
probability of a gamble and fear the loss of their good mood should they lose the gamble. 
Subjects in a negative mood overestimate the probability of losing but take the gamble 
anyway because they have no utility to lose. 
According to Isen et al. (1988), this may explain the differing findings in experiments and 
market data. Subjects in experiments are often presented with prospects with known 
probabilities, and hence, their decisions are based on subjective utility considerations. 
Participants in financial markets are confronted with a greater number of possible 
outcomes and no fixed probabilities, and hence, mood-induced bias in probability 
judgements is more likely and can overshadow subjective utility effects. Empirical studies 
must rely on mood proxies, such as the weather, to estimate investor mood. However, the 
effects of, for example, weather on mood, are still debated in the Psychology literature. 
Thus, the question of the ways in which mood influences investor behaviour is yet to be 
answered beyond reasonable doubt. 
Both the MMH and the AIM have distinct, testable implications for portfolio selection 
and asset pricing. We contribute to the literature on asset pricing and cognitive 
psychology by testing the implications of self-reported mood on portfolio selection, 
trading and asset prices in a market setup with fixed probabilities. We analyse 866 survey 
responses on portfolio risk-taking and asset prices from 77 markets collected over 2 years. 
We conclude that mood has implications on individual risk-taking because survey 
responses do determine portfolio choice predicted by MMH. Subjects in a positive mood 
experience greater mood ‘losses’ than subjects in a negative mood, a prediction of Isen et 
al. (1988) when decisions are made on the basis of utility preservation. A higher 
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proportion of subjects with a positive mood leads to lower risky asset prices. This result 
is in line with the expectations of the MMH. 
While the effects of mood on stock prices and volatility are reported to be in line with the 
AIM in some empirical data, the potentially counteracting effects of mood on subjective 
utility cannot be studied in a market setting. Our experimental data show that some of the 
predictions of the MMH are correct in a setting in which subjective probabilities play a 
lesser role. Our findings help to explain why empirical studies fail to deliver consistent 
results. 
5.3 Literature Review 
Mood and emotions are terms often used interchangeably; however, these have distinctive 
and important differences. Both can be positive or negative and are at least partly 
influenced by outside factors, such as experiences or weather. Siemer (2005) describes 
emotions as object-specific states and moods as global and, to some extent, unintentional 
states. This view means that an emotion, while active, may influence reactions to similar 
or identical events in the future, whereas mood influences decisions in general. 
Johnson and Tversky (1983) manipulate the mood of experimental subjects by letting 
them read depressing, artificial newspaper articles before asking them to judge the 
likelihood of events. They find that those whose mood is manipulated by a negative news 
story will consider negative events to be far more likely than those whose mood is not 
manipulated. The survey asks subjects to judge the likelihood of events, related as well 
as unrelated, to the event in the newspaper article. If reading the article had influenced 
emotions instead of mood, subjects should have overweighted the probabilities for related 
events only. 
The findings that mood can be directionally influenced and affects human decisions on 
unrelated events makes it an interesting subject in the study of financial markets. The 
Psychology literature agrees that mood influences risk-taking behaviour, but it is divided 
into two competing hypotheses. The AIM of Forgas (1995) states that positive mood 
increases risk tolerance, while negative mood reduces it. According to the AIM, when 
making probability judgements, subjects in a positive mood overweight positive 
information, whereas subjects in a negative mood overweight negative information. The 
MMH states that negative mood increases risk tolerance, while positive mood reduces it. 
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Those in a negative mood have a desire to improve, whereas those in a positive mood 
have a desire to maintain their current state (Isen & Geva, 1987; Isen et al., 1988). Hence, 
subjects in a positive mood shy away from risky prospects to maintain the status quo, 
while those in a negative mood seek risks in the hope that a large gain will make them 
feel better. 
Most studies in the Finance literature support the AIM. Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) 
examine stock market index returns in 26 countries and find that returns are significantly 
higher on sunny days than on cloudy ones. Goetzmann et al. (2015) find similar results 
for institutional investors also using the weather as a proxy for mood. Institutional 
investors concentrate in close proximity to stock exchanges to gain advantages on trading 
speed, information access and more qualified personnel owing to increased competition 
(Hau, 2001). Private investors do not concentrate near stock exchanges. Therefore, 
institutional investors are exposed to similar weather conditions, and the results of 
Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) would also be caused by institutional investors, or 
better, the moods of their employees. 
Levy and Yagil (2011) examine the effects of air pollution on stock returns. They find 
that pollution levels are negatively correlated with stock returns. Arguing that a shorter 
work day and the prospect of a holiday will positively influence investor mood, Qadan 
and Kliger (2016) report positive, abnormal returns as well as reduced volatility on the 
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. Cao and Wei (2005) find negative correlation between stock 
returns and temperature. Edmans, Garcia and Norli (2007) use the results of sporting 
events as a proxy for mood and find negative, abnormal stock returns on the day after 
international soccer matches in the country whose team lost. Ehrmann and Jansen (2016) 
report that mood swings materialise in abnormal stock returns in real time. Using data 
from the FIFA World Cup 2010 and intraday trading data from cross-listed stocks, they 
find negative, abnormal returns for stocks in countries whose team is trailing in the soccer 
match. 
Kamstra, Kramer and Levy (2003) report the effects of seasonal affective disorder in 
stock markets, which is a psychological condition causing depressive symptoms when 
daylight time is reduced. Kamstra et al. show that reduced hours of daylight during winter 
lead to an increase in risk aversion and lower stock returns. 
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The most commonly used proxy for investor mood is weather. The effects of variables, 
such as hours of sunshine, cloud cover and temperatures, on mood are not clear. While 
all studies using the weather as a mood proxy infer a relationship between mood and 
weather, psychological studies do not consistently conclude on the direction or the 
existence of such a relationship. Some studies report that low levels of humidity (Sanders 
& Brizzolara, 1982), high levels of sunlight (Cunningham, 1979; Parrott & Sabini, 1990; 
Schwarz & Clore, 1983), high barometric pressure (Goldstein, 1972) and high 
temperature (Cunningham, 1979; Howarth & Hoffman, 1984) positively influence mood. 
Goldstein (1972) as well as Howarth and Hoffman (1984) note that the relationship 
between mood and temperature can become negative on very hot days. 
Clark and Watson (1988) and Watson (2000) find no relationship between mood and the 
weather. Watson (2000) analyses daily mood surveys of 487 students over the spring and 
autumn semesters. This largest study to date on the mood–weather relationship (20,818 
observations) finds no significant correlations between mood and sunshine, cloud cover, 
air pressure or humidity. Keller et al. (2005) argue that the effects of weather on mood 
vary depending on subjects’ exposure to weather. The majority of the population in 
industrialised countries spends 97% of time indoors and is therefore not exposed to 
weather (Woodcock & Custovic, 1998). Keller et al. (2005) control for time spent outside 
and find that mood only correlates with weather in spring, when subjects report an 
increase in outdoor activities. 
If time spent outside influences the sensitivity of mood to weather, then it would be 
surprising if weather variables have an influence on the mood of finance professionals. 
Wallstreetoasis.com (2014) compares the top 30 investment banks in New York City and 
reports average working hours between 68 hours and 89 hours per week. Professionals in 
these investment banks spend a very large portion, if not the entire day, indoors and are 
not exposed to the weather. Therefore, the findings of Keller et al. (2005) challenge the 
results of Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003), Goetzmann et al. (2015) and every other study 
that uses the weather as a proxy for (institutional) investor mood. 
The following studies report evidence in agreement with the MMH. Experimental studies 
by Isen and Patrick (1983) and Isen and Geva (1987) show that subjects with negative 
induced moods will select more risky prospects, while subjects with positive induced 
mood select lower-risk alternatives. Kliger and Levy (2003) use weather as a proxy for 
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mood and find that bad weather leads to increased risk tolerance. Contrary to Hirshleifer 
and Shumway, Kliger and Levy do not measure abnormal stock returns to arrive at their 
conclusion, but instead recover time- and state-dependent coefficients of risk aversion 
from call option prices. 
The mood proxies used in empirical studies, such as weather and sports results, have the 
advantage that large sets of market data can be used and mood changes can be estimated 
through outside factors. However, there is no consensus on the value of weather as a 
proxy for mood. Empirical studies often face issues when deriving abnormal returns from 
stock market data. By contrast, experimental studies generally have to use small datasets 
but have the advantage that a large number of factors can be measured and controlled in 
the laboratory. Mood does not have to be proxied from weather or sports results but can 
be measured using surveys. Further, price deviations from fundamental values can be 
measured accurately, since fundamental values are known. Our study provides evidence 
on the effects of mood on subjective utility in portfolio choice and asset pricing predicted 
by Isen et al. (1988). 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 explains our experimental 
procedure and formulates testable hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and the results 
from our analysis. Section 4 concludes this chapter. 
5.4 Procedure and Hypotheses 
This study connects two data sources: the results from a four-question mood survey and 
the data on asset holdings and prices, all collected as described in the previous two 
chapters (Tournaments and The Gambler’s Fallacy). We ask subjects to answer the 
following survey three times during our two-hour data collection. The survey is 
embedded into the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
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Currently I feel as though I am: 
In a bad mood −4 −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 In a good mood 
Angry   −4 −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 Cheerful 
Sleepy  −4 −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 Wide awake 
Calm    −4 −3 −2 −1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 Excited 
The survey measures mood on the four levels of affect recommended by Watson and 
Tellegen (1985). In two dimensions (high and low), we measure Positive Affect (Q1), 
Pleasantness (Q2), Engagement (Q3) and Negative Affect (Q4). Self-reported data, such 
as ours, can be biased. In our case, subjects may wish to present themselves to the 
experimenter as happier, more enthusiastic people than they are really. If survey 
responses are systematically biased, the conclusions of this study may be questionable. 
One way to reduce the chance of biased responses is employ larger, more complex 
surveys that obscure the intent of the researcher. Watson and Tellegen (1985) compare 
short surveys, such as ours, with longer, more complex surveys and find no evidence for 
an increase in biased responses. 
Subjects answer the first survey (M1) immediately before they start trading in the first of 
two asset markets. The second survey (M2) is conducted after the first but before the 
second market; the third survey (M3) after the second market. The setup allows us to 
measure the impact of mood on prices and portfolio choice as well as the impact of gains 
and losses on mood. We test the four predictions of the MMH (Isen & Geva, 1987): 
1. Subjects in a negative mood behave less risk-averse because they expect higher 
risk to lead to the higher gains necessary to improve their mood. 
2. Subjects in a positive mood behave more risk-averse because they intend to 
preserve their current mood. 
3. Positive mood is more sensitive to the experience of loss than to gains. Subjects 
in a positive mood who experience losses lose not only money but also their good 
mood. 
4. Negative mood is more sensitive to the experience of gains than to loss. Subjects 
in a negative mood who experience gains gain not only money but also mood. 
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Based on these predictions we formulate our testable hypotheses: 
H1: Subjects who report a negative mood ahead of a market hold larger numbers of the 
speculative asset X compared with subjects who report a positive mood. 
H2: In markets in which the aggregate mood of subjects is low or the number of subjects 
with negative mood is high, transaction prices are higher than in markets in which 
aggregate mood is high or the number of subjects with positive mood is high. 
H3: Subjects in a positive mood report greater mood reduction than those in a negative 
mood when losing. Subjects in a negative mood report greater mood improvement when 
winning compared with winning subjects in a positive mood. 
We test H1 by OLS regression: 
𝑦𝛥𝑋𝑖,𝑁 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑚1−4𝑖 + 𝑒         (1) 
where 𝑦𝛥𝑋𝑖,𝑁 is the average holdings of asset X of subject i per market minus the starting 
endowment of asset X (5 or 10, depending on market) relative to the number of asset X 
in the market. 
 𝑚1−4𝑖 is the self-reported mood. We report tests of all four levels of affect separately.  
We test H2 by OLS regression: 
𝑦𝑃𝑋𝑁 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑚𝑖<0 + 𝑒         (2) 
where 𝑦𝑃𝑋𝑁 is the median of the median price of asset X in period i minus its expected 
value and 𝑚𝑖<0 the percentage of subjects reporting a negative mood. We test H3 by OLS 
regression: 
𝑦𝛥𝑚1−4 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐷1 + 𝛽2𝐷2 + 𝛽3𝐷3 + 𝑒       (3) 
where 𝑦𝛥𝑚1−4 is the change in subject mood between the start and the end of the market. 
𝐷1 is a dichotomous variable equal to one when the subject’s mood before the market is 
positive; 𝐷2 is a dichotomous variable equal to one when the subject’s earnings are above 
market average. 𝐷3 is an interaction variable equal to one only when 𝐷1and 𝐷2 are both 
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equal to one; 𝐷3 then captures the mood change of subjects having a positive mood before 
the market starts who earn more than the market average. 
Since all variables in our model are dichotomous, regression (3) captures the following 
scenarios (a), (b), (c) and (d): 
a. 𝐷1 = 0; 𝐷2 = 0, in (3) results in the prediction for 𝑦𝛥𝑚1−4 
𝑦𝛥𝑚1−4̂ = (?̂?) 
The intercept would, if nonzero, indicate the mood changes of subjects with a 
negative pre-market mood (𝐷1 = 0) who earned less than the market average 
(𝐷2 = 0). 
b. 𝐷1 = 1; 𝐷2 = 0, in (3) results in the prediction for 𝑦𝛥𝑚1−4 
𝑦𝛥𝑚1−4̂ = (?̂? + 𝛽1̂) 
Coefficient 𝛽1 would, if nonzero, change intercept 𝛼. Scenario (b) describes the 
expected mood change of subjects who report a positive mood before the market 
starts and earn less than average. 
c. 𝐷1 = 0; 𝐷2 = 1, in (3) results in the prediction for 𝑦𝛥𝑚1−4 
𝑦𝛥𝑚1−4̂ = (?̂? + 𝛽2̂) 
Coefficient 𝛽2 would, if nonzero, change intercept 𝛼. Scenario (c) describes the 
expected mood change of subjects who report a negative mood before the market 
starts and earn more than average. 
d. 𝐷1 = 1; 𝐷2 = 1, consequently 𝐷3 = 1 in (3) results in the prediction for 𝑦𝛥𝑚1−4 
𝑦𝑢𝑡?̂?
= (?̂? + 𝛽1̂ + 𝛽2̂ + 𝛽3̂) 
Scenario (d) describes the mood change of subjects who report positive mood 
before the market starts and earn more than the market average. 
According to Isen et al. (1988) gains have a higher positive effect on subjects in a negative 
mood, while losses have a higher negative effect on subjects in a positive mood. 
Therefore, in regression (3), we expect α and 𝛽1to be smaller than zero, resulting in a 
negative mood change for scenarios (a) and (b). We expect 𝛽2and 𝛽3 to be positive and 
greater than the absolute value of α and 𝛽1, resulting in a positive mood change for 
scenarios (c) and (d). 
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5.5 Data Analysis 
5.5.1 Portfolio choice 
H1: Subjects who report a negative mood ahead of a market hold larger numbers of the 
speculative asset X compared with subjects who report positive mood. 
We test H1 by OLS regression: 
𝑦𝛥𝑋𝑖,𝑁 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑚1−4𝑖 + 𝑒         (1) 
where 𝑦𝛥𝑋𝑖,𝑁 is the average holdings of asset X of subject i per market minus the starting 
endowment of asset X (5 or 10, depending on market) relative to the number of asset X 
in the market. 
Table 5.1: Mood—Portfolio Choice; Regression (1) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
𝜶𝒎𝟏 
𝜶𝒎𝟐 
𝜶𝒎𝟑 
𝜶𝒎𝟒 
 
.078 
.078 
.077 
.078 
 
.002 
.002 
.002 
.002 
 
38.998 
38.995 
37.620 
38.823 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
 
𝒎𝟏 
𝒎𝟐 
𝒎𝟑 
𝒎𝟒 
.001 
.000 
.003 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.445 
.263 
2.083 
1.117 
.656 
.793 
.037 
.264 
Results of OLS regression (1) for the four levels of mood. 866 observations. 
The results of regression (1) show that mood does not affect portfolio choice except for 
the level of engagement (𝑚3 ). The positive coefficient for 𝑚3 (p <.05) implies an 
increase in asset X holdings of subjects reporting being more ‘wide awake’ and a decrease 
in relative asset holdings for those reporting being more ‘sleepy’. As we test the same 
hypothesis (H1) using multiple independent variables, we apply a Bonferroni correction 
and conclude that mood has no effect on portfolio choice under this more stringent 
criterion as 𝑝𝑚3 >
.05
4
 . To avoid the problem of multiple hypothesis testing we redesign 
the independent variables and test H1 as follows: 
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𝑦𝛥𝑋𝑖,𝑁 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐷1+𝛽2𝐷2 + 𝑒        (1.1) 
where 𝑦𝛥𝑋𝑖,𝑁 is the average holdings of asset X of subject i per market minus the starting 
endowment of asset X (5 or 10, depending on market) relative to the number of asset X 
in the market. We design the dichotomous variable 𝐷1 for subjects who report negative 
mood (< 0) in all four dimensions and 𝐷2 for subjects who report positive mood (>1) in 
all four dimensions. The intercept alpha in regression (1.1) captures the behaviour of 
subjects with mixed mood.  
Table 5.2: Mood—Portfolio Choice; Regression (1.1) 
 
Table 5.2- Regression (1.1): Effects of mood on asset holdings; 866 observations 
The results of regression (1.1) show that mood does affect portfolio choice. The positive 
coefficient for 𝐷𝟏 (p <.05) implies an increase in asset X holdings of subjects reporting 
negative moods in all four dimensions of the survey. Based on this result, we confirm our 
hypotheses (H1) that subjects who report a negative mood ahead of a market hold larger 
numbers of the speculative asset X compared with subjects who report positive mood or 
mixed mood. 
5.5.2 Market Effects 
We proceed our analysis with the price impact of mood. Since probabilities in our markets 
are known to subjects, we expect market prices to reflect the predictions of MMH: 
Negative mood entices subjects to have higher subjective expected utility from the 
speculative asset X compared with positive mood. Those with negative mood overvalue 
the speculative asset because the high, risky payoff has the potential to improve wealth 
and mood, while no payoff results in the loss of ‘only’ wealth. Subjects with positive 
mood gain less utility from a risky investment since they can lose wealth and mood but 
only gain wealth. 
Markets in which most subjects report negative mood should have price levels higher 
than markets in which most report positive mood. We test, by OLS regression, if the 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
𝜶 
𝑫𝟏 
𝑫𝟐 
-.0120 
.2421 
-.1220 
.0270 
.0846 
.0698 
-.4442 
2.8621 
-1.748 
.6570 
.0043 
.0808 
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proportion of subjects with negative mood in a market influences the average deviation 
of asset prices from their risk-neutral expected values: 
𝑦𝑃𝑋𝑁 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑚𝑖<0 + 𝑒         (2) 
where 𝑦𝑃𝑋𝑁 is the median of the median price of asset X in period i minus its expected 
value and 𝑚𝑖<0 the percentage of subjects reporting negative mood. 
Table 5.3: Mood—Market Effects; Regression (2) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
𝜶𝒎𝟏 
𝜶𝒎𝟐 
𝜶𝒎𝟑 
𝜶𝒎𝟒 
−13.131 
−12.134 
−11.841 
−17.632 
4.711 
5.120 
4.307 
4.712 
−2.787 
−2.370 
2.749 
−3.742 
.007 
.020 
.007 
.000 
𝒎𝟏 28.612 15.734 1.818 .073 
𝒎𝟐 25.153 17.918 1.404 .165 
𝒎𝟑 
𝒎𝟒 
32.493 
45.289 
19.047 
15.546 
1.706 
2.913 
.092 
.005 
Note: 77 observations 
Regression (2) allows the following observations: 
1. The intercepts of all four levels of mood are negative (all p <. 05). Coefficients of 
all intercepts represent market prices when no subject reports a negative mood on 
the respective level. Coefficients are in FRANCS, the experimental currency, and 
signal that markets that have all subjects reporting a positive mood produce prices 
that are on average below fundamental value. 
2. The coefficients of at least three levels of mood are positive (p < 0.1 for 
𝑚1 and 𝑚3, p < 0.05 for 𝑚4). The number of subjects reporting negative levels of 
pleasantness (𝑚2) does not affect market prices. The higher the number of 
subjects with negative answers in the categories Positive Affect (𝑚1), engagement 
(𝑚3) and negative affect (𝑚4), the higher the risky asset prices. 
The results of regression (2) show that subject mood has an effect on prices as predicted 
by Isen et al., (1988). When the number of subjects in a negative mood is high, median 
asset prices are predicted to be significantly higher. We note that only 𝑚4 is significant 
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below the .0125, the conservative cut off for statistical significance using a Bonferroni 
correction. Standard errors are high for all mood variables relative to their coefficients. 
We interpret this observation with caution. We test hypothesis H2 again using the 
following OLS regression (2.1):  
𝑦𝑃𝑋𝑁 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑀% + 𝑒         (2.1) 
Where 𝑀% is the number of subjects that report negative mood in all four dimensions per 
market in percent. 
Table 5.4: Mood—Market Effect; Regression (2.1) 
 
Table 5.4- Regression (2.1): Effect of negative mood on market prices; 77 observations; Adj. R-Square .083 
The result of regression 2.1 shows that the number of subjects in a negative mood 
increases the price of the risky asset. This observation confirms hypothesis (H2), subjects 
in negative mood demand more risky assets than subjects in a positive, or mixed mood. 
Asset prices reflect this demand and are higher when the number of subjects with negative 
mood is high.  
5.5.3 Effects of gains and losses on mood 
We test hypothesis (H3) by OLS regression: Subjects in a positive mood report greater 
mood reduction than those in a negative mood when losing. Subjects in a negative mood 
report greater mood improvement when winning compared with winning subjects in a 
positive mood. 
𝑦𝛥𝑚1−4 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐷1 + 𝛽2𝐷2 + 𝛽3𝐷3 + 𝑒       (3) 
where 𝑦𝛥𝑚1−4 is the change in subject mood between the start of the market and the end 
of the market. 𝐷1 is a dichotomous variable equal to one when the subject’s mood before 
the market is positive; 𝐷2 is a dichotomous equal to one when the subject’s earnings are 
above market average. 𝐷3 is an interaction variable equal to one only when 𝐷1and 𝐷2 are 
both equal to one. 𝐷3 then captures the mood change of subjects who have positive mood 
before the market starts and earn more than the market average. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
𝜶 
𝑴% 
-18.984 
41.103 
5.323 
14.831 
-3.566 
2.771 
.001 
.007 
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We expect that gains have a higher positive effect on subjects in a negative mood, while 
losses have a higher negative effect on those in a positive mood. Therefore, in regression 
(3) we expect α and 𝛽1to be smaller than zero, resulting in a negative mood change for 
those earning less than the average market earnings (losers) and greater negative mood 
for those reporting a positive mood before losing. We expect 𝛽2and 𝛽3 to be positive and 
greater than the absolute of α and 𝛽1, resulting in a positive mood change for subjects 
earning more than average (winners). When 𝛽1 is negative, the mood improvement is 
greatest for those reporting a negative mood before winning when |𝛽1| > 𝛽3 < 𝛽2; then 
α+𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 < 𝛼 + 𝛽2 
Table 5.5: Mood Swings; Regression (3) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
𝛼𝑚1 .4235 .1435 2.9518 .003 
𝛼𝑚2 .4327 .1264 3.4228 .001 
𝛼𝑚3 .7253 .1114 6.510 .000 
𝛼𝑚4 .4438 .1162 3.8191 .000 
𝐷1𝑚1 −1.026 .1640 −6.2577 .000 
𝐷1𝑚2 −1.045 .1720 −6.9795 .000 
𝐷1𝑚3 −.9708 .1429 −6.7930 .000 
𝐷1𝑚4 −1.078 .1671 −6.4501 .000 
𝐷2𝑚1 .4856 .1910 2.5417 .011 
𝐷2𝑚2 .3952 .1720 2.2968 .022 
𝐷2𝑚3 .4040 .1455 2.7759 .006 
𝐷2𝑚4 .4546 .1529 2.7935 .003 
𝐷3𝑚1 0.2011 0.2174 .9250 .3552 
𝐷3𝑚2 .2565 .2001 1.2761 .2022 
𝐷3𝑚3 −.1255 .1871 −.6710 .5024 
𝐷3𝑚4 −.1792 .2190 −.8179 .4136 
Regression (3): The intercept Alpha is positive and significant for all dimensions of mood 
(p <.05). The coefficient on D1, the dichotomous variable for positive pre-market mood 
is negative and significant for all dimensions of mood (p <.01). The coefficient on D2, 
the variable indicating above-average earnings is positive for all dimensions of mood (p 
<.05). The interaction variable D3, indicating additional mood change for subjects in a 
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positive mood who perform above average, is not significant for any of the mood 
dimensions. Subjects in a positive mood before the market but who earn less than their 
peers record a reduction in mood, while those who report a negative mood and earn above 
average experience an increase in mood. This result is consistent for all dimensions of 
mood. We reject the null hypothesis that earnings and pre-market mood have no impact 
on mood change in favour of the alternative hypothesis, H3, that gains have a higher 
positive effect on subjects in a negative mood before the market, while losses have a 
higher negative effect on subjects in a positive mood before the market starts. We device 
an alternative test for hypothesis (3) using OLS regression (3.1): 
𝑦𝛥𝑚 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐷1 + 𝛽2𝐷2 + 𝛽3𝐷3 + 𝑒       (3.1) 
Where 𝑦𝛥𝑚 is the change in mood across all four dimensions, 𝐷1is a dichotomous variable 
equal to one when all four dimensions of mood are positive before the market starts. 𝐷2 
is equal to one when subject earnings are amongst the highest 25% in a market, 𝐷3 is 
equal to one when earnings are amongst the lowest 25% in a market. The intercept α 
captures the mood reaction of subjects with negative or mixed mood and mid-range 
performance.  
Table 5.6: Mood Swings; Regression (3.1) 
 
Table 5.6- Regression (3.1): Effects of performance on mood; 866 observations; Adj. R-Square: .070 
Regression (3.1) confirms our observation from the previous test: Subjects in a positive 
mood report larger, more negative reactions to underperformance as compared to subjects 
in a negative- or mixed mood. All three hypotheses tests confirm the MMH. 
5.6 Additional Tests 
5.6.1 Weather effects 
Our findings in regression (1) disagree with studies supporting the AIM, such as 
Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) who report that positive mood proxied by sunshine leads 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
𝜶 
𝑫𝟏 
𝑫𝟐 
𝑫𝟑 
-.153 
-.337 
.577 
-.979 
.064 
.095 
.147 
.165 
2.405 
-3.556 
3.914 
-5.924 
.016 
.000 
.000 
.000 
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to more risk-taking behaviour. Next, we test if the weather on the day of the experiments 
influences the mood of our subjects. We deem this analysis necessary because Watson 
and Tellegen (1985) state that the four levels of mood should be independent of each 
other. If the weather influences the mood levels differently and significantly, it is 
necessary to control for such influences in our analysis. We download weather data for 
the Gold Coast from timeanddate.com, a free weather database that includes information 
on cloud cover, air pressure and temperature. We categorise cloud cover into four 
categories: sunny, broken clouds, overcast and rain. We then assign a dichotomous 
variable equal to one to the categories sunny and broken clouds and test if pleasant 
weather affects subject mood using OLS regression (4): 
𝑀𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑤𝐷𝑤 + 𝑒         (4) 
where 𝑀𝑖 is the self-reported mood of subject i prior to a market start and 𝐷𝑤 is the 
dichotomous variable for weather. 𝐷𝑤 is equal to one when the weather data states either 
sunny or broken clouds during the time of our experiment. 
Table 5.7: Mood—Effects of Weather; Regression (4) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
𝜶𝒎𝟏 
𝜶𝒎𝟐 
𝜶𝒎𝟑 
𝜶𝒎𝟒 
.021 
.027 
.258 
.105 
.062 
.061 
.063 
.075 
.343 
.448 
4.099 
1.395 
.731 
.654 
.000 
.163 
𝒎𝟏 −.047 .098 −.482 .630 
𝒎𝟐 −.059 .095 −.615 .538 
𝒎𝟑 
𝒎𝟒 
.179 
.064 
.099 
.118 
1.814 
.542 
.070 
.588 
Note: 866 observations. 
The results of regression (4) reveal that the weather does not influence the survey 
responses. We find that subjects generally report positive engagement (𝛼𝑚3 > 0, 𝑝 <
.05). Our findings confirm those of some in the Psychology literature who report no 
relationship between weather and mood. We note that the Gold Coast, where we conduct 
our experiments, has an average of 300 days of sunshine per year and sunny weather can 
be unpleasant to some people due to high temperatures.  
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5.6.2 Market Structure 
We report in Chapters 3 and 4 that treatments in both studies lead to changes in portfolio 
allocations and can lead to fewer subjects holding more risky assets compared with 
Control markets. We test for effects caused by differences in the experimental design with 
regression (1.2): 
𝑦𝛥𝑋𝑖,𝑁 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐷2+𝛽2 𝐷2 + 𝛽𝑀𝑇 + 𝑒       (1.2) 
where T is a dichotomous variable equal to one, when subjects trade in a Treatment 
market of either tournament or gambler’s fallacy type. All other variables are identical to 
those in regression (1.1). 
Table 5.8: Mood—Portfolio Choice; Regression (1.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
The result of regression (1.2) and regression (1.1) are virtually identical. Controlling for 
treatments in regression (1.2) does not alter the coefficients or significance levels for 
mood. We conclude that the results of regression (1.1) are not influenced by market types. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
The effects of mood on behaviour are still debated in the Psychology literature. Two 
competing theories, the mood maintenance hypothesis (MMH) and the affect infusion 
model (AIM), have emerged from experimental studies on the influence of mood on risk-
taking behaviour. The MMH predicts that positive (negative) mood causes more (less) 
risk-taking behaviour because subjects overweight positive (negative) information. The 
AIM predicts that positive (negative) mood causes less (more) risk-taking behaviour since 
subjects seek to preserve (repair) positive (negative) mood. We study the effects of mood 
on portfolio risk-taking as well as asset prices by combining data from laboratory asset 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-Value 
𝜶 
𝑫𝟏 
𝑫𝟐 
T 
-.0124 
.2421 
-.1220 
.0007 
.0406 
.0846 
.0698 
.0489 
-.3052 
2.8604 
-1.746 
.0142 
.7602 
.0043 
.0811 
.9886 
Table 5.8: Portfolio effects regression controlling for effects from treatment markets. 
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market experiments with survey data. Our survey measures four dimensions of mood. We 
report that negative mood entices subjects to increase holdings of the risky asset in their 
portfolios, while positive mood has no effect on portfolio risk in our study. Asset prices 
are significantly higher in markets with many subjects reporting a negative mood. Our 
results on the price level are significant for three mood dimensions as well as with an 
aggregate mood variable. Mood changes are a factor of mood state and the individual 
subject’s relative performance. We report that above-average performance causes greater 
mood improvements for subjects reporting a negative mood ahead of the market. Below-
average performance causes greater negative mood changes for subjects reporting a 
positive mood before the market. Our results confirm the predictions of the MMH in all 
tests except one: We cannot confirm that positive mood leads to a reduction in risk-taking. 
The observation that subjects in positive moods do not appear to lower portfolio risk is 
initially puzzling as these subjects face the greatest mood ‘loss’ when they underperform. 
The MMH (Isen & Geva, 1987) suggests that people (subjects) are concerned with 
preserving a positive mood and therefore take lower risks (than subjects in a negative 
mood). Student subjects are often very competitive during experiments (at least they were 
in ours) and receive rewards relative to their performance. It is likely that our subjects at 
least attempted to make decisions which are free from any emotional bias. It is also likely, 
that it is easier to suppress positive mood. Subjects in negative mood have the desire to 
change their current emotional state while subjects in a positive mood desire to maintain 
this state. If change requires more action than maintenance, then subjects in a positive 
mood could have an easier time ‘keeping their cool’ which would explain why we do not 
find evidence for active risk reduction for subjects who initially report positive moods. 
Our study contributes to the ongoing discussion on the effects of mood on behaviour. Our 
experimental assets are risky but with well-defined probabilities. Nygren, Isen, Taylor 
and Dulin (1996) suggest that more ambiguous probability distributions, for example 
those underlying stock returns, may change the effect of mood on behaviour. This 
hypothesis calls for further testing with a different experimental setup. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Inferences from Experiments to Population 
All subjects who participated in our experiments are students at Bond University. We do 
not randomly select them from the population of Bond University students but instead 
use volunteers. They may differ from the population of Bond University students owing 
to their interest in financial experiments or simply because they require the compensation 
we offer for their participation. We do not test whether our subjects are representative of 
the student population because we do not wish to draw any conclusions on the student 
population. 
All three studies in this dissertation aim to examine the behaviour of participants in 
financial markets—be it mutual fund managers, analysts or private investors. We do not 
have to test whether our sample is representative of participants in financial markets; we 
already know it cannot be. 
Some, if not all, advances in the behavioural sciences have their origins in experiments 
and observations of small, convenient samples. For example, prospect theory was first 
tested in an experiment with only 25 graduate students (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
The external validity of our findings cannot be tested within our data but will be 
determined by future replications and variations. We invite all researchers to test our 
hypotheses and publish their findings. 
6.2 Conclusion of the Dissertation 
Our first study examines risk-taking behaviour under tournament incentives and its effect 
on individual portfolios as well as market prices. On 38 market- and 412 subject-
observations, we examine the hypothesis that in Treatment markets, subjects trailing the 
competition will increase portfolio risk to maximise the probability of earning a bonus, 
while subjects ahead of the competition will reduce portfolio risk to secure their position. 
We further test the hypothesis that aggregate behaviour of individuals in treatments will 
lead to a shift in market prices. To improve the signal-to-noise ratio, we implement an 
extensive subject training routine that is unprecedented in the field. In addition to the 
training, we use instructions, framing and design alterations that are shown to reduce 
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subject confusion by Huber and Kirchler (2012). In a design with two risky assets, we 
can examine exchange rates instead of asset prices as a measure of treatment impact. 
Asset prices in experimental markets are prone to follow a bubble-crash pattern first 
observed by V. L. Smith et al. (1988). Since price bubbles may be caused by confused 
subjects (V. L. Smith, 2010), while exchange rates remain constant even if bubbles form 
(2000), we examine the price impact of tournament behaviour on changes in the exchange 
rate. 
Our findings confirm one of two predictions of the tournament theory: When 
compensation is rank-dependent, midyear underperformers will increase portfolio risk by 
more than their risk aversion predicts, to increase the likelihood of receiving the bonus 
(Brown et al., 1996). We do not find evidence for the second prediction that midyear 
outperformers will reduce risk to secure their position. When analysing the impact of 
tournaments on asset prices, we find no differences between Treatment and Control 
markets. The shifts in asset allocation we observe for individuals in treatments do not 
influence asset prices. These shifts do not necessarily result in an absolute increase in a 
subject’s holdings of the high-risk asset. Our model predicts that subjects with high risk-
aversion (low 𝑋1) will sell the high-risk asset during the second half of the market 
regardless of their rank or the bonus incentive. When these subjects fall behind in rank in 
a Treatment market, they will sell fewer high-risk assets than they would otherwise. Those 
with low risk-aversion (high 𝑋1) will buy the high-risk asset regardless of position and 
treatment but purchase more assets when they are behind in markets that pay a rank-
dependent bonus. The result is a decrease in supply and/or an increase in demand for the 
high-risk asset during the second half of Treatment markets. An explanation for the 
absence of a price impact could be that other subjects in the market will adjust their 
behaviour and act as market makers by offering to buy or sell the high-risk asset, 
depending on the situation. 
Our findings provide support for Brown et al.’s (1996) hypothesis that tournament 
incentives lead to risk-shifting behaviour among midyear underperforming fund 
managers. However, we do not seek to generalise our experimental results to any 
population that is different from our sample of student subjects. Risk aversion plays a 
dominant role in our findings. To our best knowledge, so far, no link between manager 
risk aversion and the risk of managed portfolios has been found. Menkhoff et al. (2006) 
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find evidence that risk aversion influences the type of funds young managers chose to 
work for—however, this is not related to changes in portfolio risk. Tournament behaviour 
represents a form of principal–agent conflict in which the appointed manager (agent) will 
choose to maximise own expected payoff to the potential detriment of clients. In our 
study, as in all experimental market studies we are aware of, subjects make decisions on 
their own behalf. The expected payoff in our treatment experiments mirrors that of a 
portfolio manager with limited downside risk and steep upside earnings potential. 
Whether risk-shifting behaviour of underperforming subjects under tournament 
incentives is reduced or increased in scenarios in which individual risk aversion is not the 
driving force of asset allocation decisions is a question we leave for future research. 
Our second study examines the gambler’s fallacy. The gambler’s fallacy is the belief, that 
random events are negatively autocorrelated and therefore are not random at all. People 
subject to the gambler’s fallacy expect even small samples from a theoretically infinite 
population to be representative of the population. Our experimental study is, to our best 
knowledge, the first to examine the gambler’s fallacy in a double-auction market setting. 
By paying high dividends to subjects and, at the same time, communicating the base rate 
to create a strong base rate opinion, we deliberately trigger the gambler’s fallacy and 
study its effects on portfolio choice and asset prices in a second, lower earnings market. 
We find that subjects benefitting the most from the high dividends become sellers in the 
second market, while those not benefitting will become buyers. This finding is in line 
with research by Xu and Harvey (2014) who observed similar behaviour in a sports 
betting environment. They report that punters reduce (increase) the odds of their bets after 
strings of win (losses). While the gambler’s fallacy can explain their observations, our 
results are harder to interpret. Phase one winners are, by design, subjects who bought the 
experimental asset in Treatment markets. The gambler’s fallacy is sufficient to explain 
why they become net sellers in phase two. In the gambler’s fallacy, all samples are 
believed to represent the population base rate. Since the first part of the sample had 
higher-than-expected payouts, these subjects believe that the second part must be lower 
than expected, and hence, the sample mean is equal to the population mean. 
The behaviour of phase one net sellers, who are consequently the relative losers in 
Treatment markets, is more difficult to explain using the gambler’s fallacy. We report 
that market prices during the first half of phase two Treatments are suppressed. Under 
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these circumstances, buying the asset is a rational decision. Bossaerts and Plott (2004) 
report similar price distortions. In an experimental study testing asset pricing models, they 
report anomalies during two of their markets caused by a series of ex-ante unexpected 
payouts. This study advances knowledge in the fields of Behavioural Finance as well as 
Psychology. Our results confirm those of Xu and Harvey (2014)—the first study to link 
gambler’s fallacy with the experience of gains and losses. Further, we show that these 
findings extend to simple financial assets and a double-auction setting. On an asset price 
level, our results are in line with the model of Rabin (2002). The belief in the law of small 
numbers will cause a short-term underreaction with prices below theoretical fundamental 
values, and medium- to long-term overreaction with prices above fundamental values 
after strings of better-than-expected earnings. 
Our third study examines the effects of mood misattribution bias on portfolio choice and 
market prices. Such bias can influence financial decisions when investors allow their 
feelings to interfere with the evaluation of risky prospects. When linking mood to risk-
taking, psychological research is divided into two competing hypotheses: the mood 
maintenance hypothesis (MMH) and the affect infusion model (AIM). While the MMH 
asserts that a positive mood reduces risk tolerance, the AIM maintains that a positive 
mood increases it. Most studies in a financial context report higher abnormal returns for 
positive mood proxies, such as sunshine (Hirshleifer & Shumway, 2003) and lower 
abnormal returns for negative mood proxies, such as cloudiness (Goetzmann et al., 2015). 
These findings are in line with the predictions of the AIM because increased (reduced) 
risk tolerance will result in lower (higher) required returns and higher (lower) stock 
prices. 
To date, Kliger and Levy (2003) are the only empirical study that reports a negative 
correlation between mood, proxied by weather, and risk tolerance in line with the MMH. 
Isen et al. (1988) note that mood influences the assessment of probabilities as well as 
subjective utility from gains or losses in distinctly different ways. While positive mood 
is associated with overweighting the probabilities of positive outcomes of a gamble, 
simultaneously, subjects in a positive mood gain less utility when winning and lose more 
utility when losing. Subjects in a positive mood, at the same time, overestimate the 
winning probability of a gamble and fear the loss of their good mood should they lose the 
gamble. Subjects in a negative mood overestimate the probability of losing but take the 
107 
gamble anyway since they have no utility to lose. According to Isen et al. (1988), this 
may explain the differing findings in experiments and market data. Subjects in 
experiments are often presented with prospects with known probabilities; hence, their 
decisions are based on subjective utility considerations. Empirical studies must rely on 
mood proxies, such as the weather, to estimate investor mood. However, the effects of, 
for example, weather on mood are still debated in the Psychology literature. Our test finds 
no relationship between the weather on the day of the experiment and mood survey 
responses. 
We conclude that mood has implications on individual risk-taking because survey 
responses do determine portfolio choice predicted by MMH. Subjects with positive mood 
experience greater mood ‘losses’ than subjects with negative mood, a prediction of Isen 
et al. (1988), when decisions are made on the basis of utility preservation. A higher 
proportion of subjects with negative mood leads to higher market prices. This result is in 
line with the expectations of the MMH. While the effects of mood on stock prices and 
volatility are reported to be in line with the AIM in some empirical data, the potentially 
counteracting effects of mood on subjective utility cannot be studied in a market setting. 
Our experimental data show that the predictions of the MMH are correct in a setting in 
which subjective probabilities play a lesser role. Our findings help to explain why 
empirical studies fail to deliver consistent results. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Instructions and Documents 
1.1 Instructions for Training Markets 
Welcome 
Dear Participant, 
Welcome to the first part of this experiment in the economics of market decision-making. 
This session will last no more than 2 hours and will include trading in different market 
scenarios, instructions in asset valuation and two short surveys. 
Your payment for this session does not depend on the outcome of your trading activity at 
all, and your primary focus in all trading exercises should be on mastering the market and 
the software. 
The experimenter will read out all instructions. Please listen carefully. 
If you have any questions or problems during this session, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will be with you shortly. 
During this session, you may speak to each other if necessary, but without disturbing the 
instructions or other participants. 
Please be advised that no food or drinks are allowed in the Macquarie Trading Room. 
About halfway through the session, we will have a short break for you to eat, drink or go 
to the bathroom. 
Please put your mobile phones on ‘silent’ or turn them off during this session. 
The experimenter will now read out to you the Explanatory Statement and the Informed 
Consent Form. 
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You will find copies of both documents on your desk. Once you have read the documents 
and if you agree to all statements, please sign them. The experimenter will then collect 
the signed papers. 
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1. Start Z-leaf: Please double-click on the ‘Z-leaf’ icon on your Desktop to start the 
programme. 
2. Type in your 3-digit Trader ID. You will find your Trader ID on the cover page 
of this document. The ID is necessary for the experimenter to connect your data 
from today with the data you will create in Session II. Click ‘OK’ to continue. 
3. How to use the Trading Screen: 
We will now introduce the market interface for the trading of one asset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Current 
Trading 
Period 
 
Once you start trading, a price chart will 
appear here. 
Time (in seconds) 
remaining in the current 
trading period 
Shows your Asset and 
Cash Holdings as well 
as the last transaction 
price. 
Order Submission 
This is where you enter buy 
&sell orders. 
Simply type in the price and 
the number of assets and 
click ‘submit sell order’ if 
you want to sell. 
Or ‘submit buy order’ if you 
want to buy. 
Shows transaction 
prices 
Accept offers 
Submitted orders from you 
and all others appear here. If 
you would like to accept an 
offer, simply click on it, type 
in the volume of assets that 
you would like to buy or sell 
at this price and then click 
buy or sell. 
Cancel offers 
You can cancel your own 
offers by clicking on the 
offer and then the ‘cancel’ 
button. 
This is the order 
history. 
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Mastering the software is a crucial part of today’s session and will be essential for your 
trading-success in Session II later in the semester. 
The trading of the next 6 minutes is dedicated to you mastering the trading screen. 
Your goals for the next 6 minutes: 
• submit at least one ‘buy order’ 
• submit at least one ‘sell order’ 
• accept at least one ‘buy offer’ 
• accept at least one ‘sell offer’ 
• cancel at least one of your orders 
Click every button you can find and see what happens. 
The software has several error-messages that notify you if something is missing or wrong. 
They are quite self-explanatory, but whenever you are stuck, please raise your hand. 
Tip: For now, trade only one asset at a time to avoid running out of money or assets before 
the time is up. 
Trading an Asset with a Holding Value 
The asset you have just traded expired worthless at the end of the 6-minute period. 
Because it did not generate any cash flows in the form of dividends, you would have lost 
all your invested money if you held the asset until the end of the period. 
We will now trade an asset over 6 periods. After periods 1, 2, 3 and 4, the asset will pay 
a dividend of 50 FRANCS. FRANCS are the experimental currency that we will use 
throughout the entire experiment. No dividend will be paid for periods 5 and 6, and after 
period 6, the asset will expire worthless. 
It may help if you imagine that you are trading the stock of a depletable goldmine. 
After every period, the mine sells its gold and distributes the earnings to its shareholders. 
The last gold will be mined in period 4. After that, the mine will be depleted (empty) but 
trading will continue for 2 more periods. 
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Because the asset will be paying a dividend, we can now calculate the sum of the 
remaining future cash flows for every period, which we call the Holding Value of the 
Asset. 
Period Sum of remaining cash flows in 
FRANCS 
1 200 
2 150 
3 100 
4 50 
5 0 
6 0 
The Holding Value is zero in periods 5 and 6 because there will be no more payment after 
period 4. 
As a graph, this would be something like this: 
 
What does the Holding Value of the Asset Mean? 
The Holding Value is the amount of cash you will receive if you hold the asset until the 
end of the last period. With its help, you are able to determine whether buying an asset at 
its current market price is a good idea or not. 
For example: 
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During period 2, you receive the offer to buy the above asset for a price that is 2 times 
higher than the Holding Value. By knowing the Holding Value of the Asset, you can 
determine the amount of dividends that you will receive if you hold the asset until the end 
of the last trading period. Comparing the offer with the assets’ Holding Value will then 
tell you if the transaction would result in a profit or a loss for you. 
You will now trade for 6 periods of 2 minutes each. In between every period, the 
experimenter will assign the 50 FRANCS dividend per asset. 
You will then see a summary screen before the next period starts. 
It looks something like this: 
 
Your dividends are credited to a separate account called ‘accumulated dividends’. 
Dividends will NOT increase your cash balance. 
Risky Dividend 
We will now learn how you compute the value of a dividend that is risky, meaning that 
there is more than one value possible. 
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In the case of risky dividends, we can calculate the average or expected value of each 
dividend payment if we know the outcome distribution (i.e., the probabilities of the 
possible outcomes occurring). 
When there are two possible dividend-outcomes, X and Y, the average dividend is 
calculated as follows: 
(Probability of Dividend X × Amount of Dividend X) + (Probability of Dividend Y × 
Amount of Dividend Y) 
An example: 
The stock of a depletable goldmine will pay 
• a $100 Dividend/Period when they find gold 
• a $0 Dividend/Period when they do not find gold 
The probability of finding gold is 50% in any given period. 
The probability of not finding gold is also 50%. 
The average or expected dividend/period will be 
(50% × $100) + (50% × $0) = $50 + $0 = $50 
Note that the actual outcome may be quite different from the average outcome! 
What implications does risk have on the Holding Value of the Asset? 
When dividends are risky, we can only compute the average or expected Holding Value 
of the Asset. 
The Expected Holding Value is the average amount of cash you will receive if you hold 
the asset until the end of the last period if the experiment was repeated a thousand times 
or more. 
Because we do not repeat the experiment this often, the amount of cash that you will 
actually receive from holding the asset until the end of the last trading period is very 
likely to be different (could be lower or higher) from the Expected Holding Value. 
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Knowing the Expected Holding Value for any given period will still be advantageous 
because it can at least give you an implication for the amount of cash that you can expect 
from holding the asset until the end of the last trading period. 
We will soon trade exactly this asset over 8 periods: 
Dividend Probability of occurring 
FRANCS 100 50% 
FRANCS 0 50% 
Similar to the last asset, we are able to determine the sum of the future dividends. Because 
these dividends are risky, we call this value the Expected Holding Value of the Asset. 
Period Sum of expected dividends 
1 400 
2 350 
3 300 
4 250 
5 200 
6 150 
7 100 
8 50 
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Whether you will receive the high dividend (FRANCS 100) or the low dividend 
(FRANCS 0) will be determined by the roll of a 10-sided die after each period. The die 
roll can be observed by all participants on the screen. The die roll guarantees randomness. 
EVEN numbers (0, 2, 4, 6, 8) will pay FRANCS 100 dividend 
ODD numbers (1, 3, 5, 7, 9) will pay FRANCS 0 dividend. 
There are as many EVEN numbers as there are ODD numbers, so the die roll represents 
the 50\50 probability distribution. 
You will now start trading this asset for 8 periods of 2 minutes each. 
Another risky asset 
Let’s now try an asset with a different dividend distribution and a different number of 
periods: 
Dividend Probability 
FRANCS 90 20% 
FRANCS 15 80% 
Remember that you can calculate the expected value of each dividend payment like this: 
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(Probability of Dividend X × Amount of Dividend X) + (Probability of Dividend Y × 
Amount of Dividend Y) 
For this asset: (20% × FRANCS 90) + (80% × FRANCS 15) = 18 + 12 = 30 (FRANCS) 
Also remember that the Expected Holding Value in any given period equals 
Expected value of each dividend payment × periods remaining 
Similar to all assets that you will be trading in this experiment, this asset will expire 
worthless after the last dividend payment has been made. 
Again, it may help you to imagine that this is the share of a depletable gold mine. 
The miners may find a lot of gold with a probability of 20% (and then pay you 90 
FRANCS) or a lower amount of gold with a probability of 80% (and then pay you 15 
FRANCS). 
You will trade this asset for 5 periods of 2minutes each. After each period, the die will 
decide your dividend payment. 
Die outcome: 3 or 7 will pay FRANCS 90 
All other numbers will pay FRANCS 15 
This represents exactly the probabilities in the table above. 
5-Minute break 
Take a breath. 
The experimenter will now write a time on the whiteboard. Please be back by then. 
Markets with 2 risky assets 
So far, you have operated in a market with only one asset. We will soon start trading in a 
market with 2 risky assets. The assets’ names will be Asset X and Asset Y. 
In all Session II experiments, you will be trading 2 assets simultaneously. 
This is your trading interface for a two-asset market: 
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We will soon start trading 2 assets simultaneously. 
The information you will need: 
Asset X 
Dividend FRANCS 200 Probability 10%  
Dividend FRANCS 0 Probability 90% 
Average or Expected Dividend per period 
 (200 × 10%) + (0 × 90%) 
FRANCS 20 
Asset Y 
Dividend FRANCS 30 Probability 50% 
Dividend FRANCS 10 Probability 50% 
Average or Expected Dividend per period 
 (30 × 50%) + (10 × 50%) 
FRANCS 20 
The market will consist of 10 periods of 2 minutes each. 
After each period, the experimenter will roll the die twice. 
Die roll 1 determines the dividend for Asset X 
Outcome: Number 8 pays dividend FRANCS 200. 
Outcome: All remaining numbers (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9) pay dividend FRANCS 0. 
Die roll 2 determines the dividend for Asset Y 
Outcome: EVEN numbers (0, 2, 4, 6, 8) pay dividend FRANCS 30. 
Outcome: ODD numbers (1, 3, 5, 7, 9) pay dividend FRANCS 10. 
Notice that both assets have identical Expected Dividends and hence will have identical 
Expected Holding Values in any given period. 
Because of the differences in dividends and probabilities, the realised Dividends as well 
as the realised Holding Values will clearly not be identical. 
Try to imagine that you are trading the stocks of two different depletable gold mines. 
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Mine X will not find any gold during a period with the probability of 90% and therefore 
will not pay a dividend. If they find gold (10% probability), then it will be a lot and they 
will pay all shareholders FRANCS 200. 
Mine Y will find a low amount of gold with a probability of 50% and then pay its 
shareholders FRANCS 10. With a probability of 50%, they will find a medium amount 
of gold and then pay a dividend of FRANCS 30. 
Both mines will close after the last dividend draw at the end of the last trading period. 
Survey 1 
Let’s do something different: 
The experimenter will now open a survey. Please answer all questions truthfully because 
they are very important for this research project. 
This survey contains general questions about risk-taking. There are no wrong answers. 
The first question asks you for your Trader ID. You find your Trader ID on the cover 
page of this document. 
Survey 2 
The following survey is supposed to test your knowledge about some of things we have 
learned today. There is only one correct answer for each question. Please try your best! 
UFFFFF, almost DONE for today! 
You will soon collect your well-earned payment for today! 
It consists of $20 in cash and a promissory note valued at $20. The promissory note will 
be exchanged into$20 cash as soon as you return for the second part of this experiment 
(as soon as you walk in!). 
PLEASE do not lose your promissory note since this would create complications for the 
experimenter and could lead to a delayed payment of your second $20!!! 
What will happen next? 
On Friday of week 3 (26 September) we will run the last of the Part I sessions. 
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On the same day (by 4 p.m.), you will receive an email containing a new EVENTBRITE 
link. The email will be send to the address that you used to sign up for today’s session. 
You will then be able to sign up for as many Part II sessions as you like. Part II sessions 
will be held on Wednesdays and Fridays of weeks 4, 5 and 6 as well as weeks 8, 9 and 
(maybe) 10. 
The invitation email as well as the new EVENTBRITE link will contain more information 
and times. 
Note that the space for each individual Part II session will be limited (to either 12 or 24, 
depending on the week). Some spots may sell out quickly. 
Thank you all very much for being here today! I hope you had some fun, and I can’t 
wait to see you for the next part!!!! 
Please line up now to receive your payment (Cash + Promissory note). You will have 
to sign a receipt. Do not turn off your computer! We will do that for you. 
1.2 Instructions for Tournament Control Markets 
Welcome 
Dear Participant, 
Welcome to the second part of this experiment in the economics of market decision-
making. 
This session will last no more than 2 hours and will include trading and surveys. 
Your payment for this session does depend on the outcome of your trading activity! 
The details of your compensation will be explained later. 
The experimenter will read out all instructions. Please listen carefully. 
If you have any questions or problems during this session, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will be with you shortly. 
During this session you may NOT speak to each other. 
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Please be advised that no food or drinks are allowed in the Macquarie Trading Room. 
About halfway through the session, we will have a short break for you to eat, drink or go 
to the bathroom. 
Please put your mobile phones on ‘silent’ or turn them off during this session. 
PLEASE HAVE YOUR 3-Digit Trader ID ready. If you do not know your Trader ID, 
please raise your hand now! 
Schedule for today’s session 
1. Warm-up 
2. First Survey 
3. First Market 
4. Second Survey 
5. Break 
6. Second Market 
7. Third Survey 
8. Payment 
How will you be compensated today? 
At the end of the session, you will be paid the Australian dollar equivalent of your market 
earnings from both paid markets. 
Your market earnings are your cash balance + your accumulated dividends AT THE 
END OF THE LAST TRADING PERIOD of the market. 
The Exchange rate: Your market earnings are in FRANCS. We will convert FRANCS 
to Australian Dollars at the rate of FRANCS 260 = $1AU 
At this rate, the expected (or average) $AU-earnings per market are $18/participant 
(rounded). 
We will play two identical markets, so that makes $36 (rounded). 
There is also a Show-Up fee of $5, which is paid to all participants irrespective of their 
performance, and it represents the minimum compensation you can receive today. 
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Remember: All but the Show-Up fee is variable! That means your earnings could be 
less or more than $41 ($36+$5) but never less than $5. 
Rounding: 
We will round off all final payments to the nearest $5. We will round up from > 1. 
That is, if your final earnings, including the Show-Up fee, are $16.50, you will receive 
$20. 
If your final earnings, including the Show-Up fee, are $31, you will receive $30. 
Payment: 
Payments will be made in envelopes and in random order. You do not have to tell anyone 
about your earnings if you don’t want to. 
Warm-up 
Please start Z-leaf by clicking on the desktop icon. 
During the next 4 minutes, you can trade two assets (Asset X and Asset Y). 
Try out all the different functions that you learned during your training. 
Note that this part of the experiment is unrelated to your compensation. 
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First Survey 
Please fill in the following survey. Please answer all questions carefully and truthfully 
because they are a very important part of this research. There are no right or wrong 
answers in any of today’s surveys. 
Market 
You will soon start trading for 12 periods of 2.5 minutes each. 
You will trade the two assets, Asset X and Asset Y. All prices and transactions are stated 
in the experimental currency ‘FRANCS’. 
Each Asset X has the following characteristics: 
Dividend FRANCS 100 With Probability 20% 
Dividend FRANCS 0 With Probability 80% 
Each Asset Y has the following characteristics: 
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Dividend FRANCS 30 With Probability 50% 
Dividend FRANCS 10 With Probability 50% 
Individual Information: 
These will be your endowments for the trading part: They are not necessarily all equal, 
but they are equally fair (promise!!!). 
Your Cash 2400 
Asset X 5 
Asset Y 5 
Note that both assets (X & Y) have identical expected dividends of FRANCS 20/Period. 
Hence their average, or expected, Holding Values will be identical too: 
During Period Expected Holding Values per asset (X 
or Y) in FRANCS  
1 240 
2 220 
3 200 
4 180 
5 160 
6 140 
7 120 
8 100 
9 80 
10 60 
11 40 
12 20 
End of market 0 
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Expected Values Graph 
 
Remember that there is a dividend draw at the end of the last period (period 12). After the 
last dividend draw, the market closes and all assets expire. 
It may help if you imagine that you are trading the stocks of two different depletable gold 
mines: 
Mine X (Asset X) will not find any gold during a period with the probability of 80% and 
therefore not pay a dividend. If they find gold (20% probability), then it will be a lot and 
they will pay all shareholders FRANCS 100 per share. 
Mine Y (Asset Y) will find a low amount of gold with a probability of 50% and then pay 
its shareholders FRANCS 10 per share. With a probability of 50% they will find a 
medium amount of gold and then pay a dividend of FRANCS 30 per share. 
Both mines will close after the last dividend draw at the end of the last trading period. 
Before the dividend draw, you will be asked to answer some short questions about Asset 
X and Asset Y. Please answer carefully since this is also very important for this research. 
Dividend Draw: 
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After all participants have completed the survey, the experimenter will roll a 10-sided die 
twice. 
The first die roll will determine the dividend for ASSET X: 
Numbers 4 or 7: FRANCS 100 dividend for each Asset X 
All other numbers: FRANCS 0 dividend for each Asset X 
The second die roll will determine the dividend for ASSET Y: 
EVEN numbers (0, 2,4, 6, 8): FRANCS 30 dividend for each Asset Y 
ODD numbers (1, 3, 5, 7, 9): FRANCS 10 dividend for each Asset Y 
As the die is 10-sided and has as many even numbers as odd numbers, the die roll 
represents the probabilities given in the table above. 
Summary screen between periods 
After the dividend draw, a summary screen appears that will tell you: 
Last Transaction Price ASSET X: last price of Asset X 
Last Transaction Price ASSET Y: last price of Asset Y 
Dividends per share ASSET X: result of the die roll 
Dividends per share ASSET Y: result of the die roll 
Your Shareholdings (Assets X and Y): self-explaining 
Total Dividends (displayed for X and Y): self-explaining 
Total Cash: current cash balance 
Accumulated Dividends: what you have accumulated in your Dividend-Account so far 
Rank Indicator: Based on: your cash-balance, accumulated dividends and asset holdings 
valued at Expected Holding Values gives you a feel for how you are 
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doing. Note that your rank (in today’s session) is not directly related to 
your compensation. 
Final Period Summary Screen 
After the last trading period, you will see a screen that shows you: 
Total Cash + Accumulated Dividends in FRANCS: The basis of your compensation 
Your Rank: Final rank based on Cash+ Accumulated Dividends (again, today that’s not 
directly related to your pay) 
Your earnings from today’s session in AU$: what you’ve just earned (rounded) 
Please write down your AU$-earnings after each market, so you are able to double-check 
your payment at the end of the session. 
Second Survey 
This survey is much like the first one. Please describe any ‘oopsies’ (i.e., ‘accidentally 
sold when I wanted to buy’) as precisely as possible, including, if possible, the period 
they happened in and the price. 
Break 
Don’t go too far, we still have lots of fun ahead of us! 
Second Market 
We will now repeat the Market. Everything stays the same; you start with your initial 
endowment. 
Third Survey 
Some questions from Survey One and Two are repeated. 
We will gather some more information about you; that will help us with the data analysis 
and will be treated with confidentiality, of course. 
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Some questions are regarding your experience of today and may enable us to improve 
these types of experiments in the future. 
Now you will receive your pay 
Remember, that’s the Show-Up fee plus your earnings from market one plus your 
earnings from market two, ROUNDED as explained in the beginning. Count your money 
BEFORE you sign the receipt—otherwise, it means you accept whatever is in the 
envelope. 
Thank you for participating today! I hope to see you soon! 
1.3 Instructions for Tournament Treatment Markets 
Welcome 
Dear Participant, 
Welcome to the second part of this experiment in the economics of market decision-
making. 
This session will last no more than 2 hours and will include trading in 2 identical markets 
and answering surveys. 
Your payment for this session does depend on the outcome of your trading activity and 
your rank at the conclusion of each market. 
The details of your compensation will be explained later. 
The experimenter will read out all instructions. Please listen carefully. 
If you have any questions or problems during this session, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will be with you shortly. 
During this session you may NOT speak to each other. 
Please be advised that no food or drinks are allowed in the Macquarie Trading Room. 
About halfway through the session, we will have a short break for you to eat, drink or go 
to the bathroom. 
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Please put your mobile phones on ‘silent’ or turn them off during this session. 
PLEASE HAVE YOUR 3-Digit Trader ID ready. If you do not know your Trader ID, 
please raise your hand now! 
Schedule for today’s session 
1. Warm-up 
2. First Survey 
3. First Market 
4. Second Survey 
5. Break 
6. Second Market 
7. Third Survey 
8. Payment 
How will you be compensated today? 
At the end of the session, you will be paid the Australian dollar equivalent of your market 
earnings from both paid markets. 
Your market earnings are your cash balance + your accumulated dividends AT THE 
END OF THE LAST TRADING PERIOD of each market plus a rank-dependent 
bonus. 
The Exchange rate: Your market earnings are in FRANCS. We will convert FRANCS 
to Australian Dollars at the rate of FRANCS 320 = $1AU 
At this rate, the expected (or average) $AU-earnings per market are $18/participant 
(rounded). 
We will play two identical markets, so that makes $36 (rounded). 
There is also a Show-Up fee of $5, which is paid to all participants irrespective of their 
performance, and it represents the minimum compensation you can receive today. 
Rank-dependent bonus: The top half of the traders in your group 
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(All traders ranked better than 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝
2
) will receive a bonus 
payment of 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
2
 at the conclusion of each market. The bonus 
payment is converted into AU$ at the same rate that is stated above. The rest of the traders 
will receive a bonus of 0. The best rank is 1, followed by 2 and so on. 
The experimenter will write the number of traders in your group and the paying ranks on 
the whiteboard before the first market starts. 
Remember: All but the Show-Up fee is variable! That means your earnings could be 
less or more than $41 ($36+$5) but never less than $5. 
Rounding: 
We will round off all final payments to the nearest $5. We will round up from > $1. 
That is, if your final earnings, including the Show-Up fee, are $16.50, you will receive 
$20. 
If your final earnings, including the Show-Up fee, are $30.95 you will receive $30. 
Payment: 
Payments will be made in envelopes and in random order. You do not have to tell anyone 
about your earnings if you don’t want to. 
Warm-up 
Please start Z-leaf by clicking on the desktop icon. 
During the next 4 minutes, you can trade two assets (Asset X and Asset Y). 
Try out all the different functions that you learned during your training. 
Note that this part of the experiment is unrelated to your compensation. 
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First Survey 
Please fill in the following survey. Please answer all questions carefully and truthfully 
because they are a very important part of this research. There are no right or wrong 
answers in any of today’s surveys. 
Market 
You will soon start trading for 12 periods of 2.5 minutes each. 
You will trade the two assets, Asset X and Asset Y. All prices and transactions are stated 
in the experimental currency ‘FRANCS’. 
Each Asset X has the following characteristics: 
Dividend FRANCS 100 With Probability 20% 
Dividend FRANCS 0 With Probability 80% 
Each Asset Y has the following characteristics: 
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Dividend FRANCS 30 With Probability 50% 
Dividend FRANCS 10 With Probability 50% 
Individual Information: 
This will be your endowments for the trading part: They are not necessarily all equal, but 
they are equally fair (promise!!!). 
Your Cash 2400 
Asset X 5 
Asset Y 5 
Note that both assets (X & Y) have identical expected dividends of FRANCS 20/Period. 
Hence their average, or expected, Holding Values will be identical too: 
During Period Expected Holding Values per asset (X 
or Y) in FRANCS  
1 240 
2 220 
3 200 
4 180 
5 160 
6 140 
7 120 
8 100 
9 80 
10 60 
11 40 
12 20 
End of market 0 
134 
Graph
 
Remember that there is a dividend draw at the end of the last period (period 12). After the 
last dividend draw the market closes and all assets expire. 
It may help if you imagine that you are trading the stocks of two different depletable gold 
mines: 
Mine X (Asset X) will not find any gold during a period with the probability of 80% and 
therefore will not pay a dividend. If they find gold (20% probability), then it will be a lot 
and they will pay all shareholders FRANCS 100 per share. 
Mine Y (Asset Y) will find a low amount of gold with a probability of 50% and then pay 
its shareholders FRANCS 10 per share. With a probability of 50%, they will find a 
medium amount of gold and then pay a dividend of FRANCS 30 per share. 
Both mines will close after the last dividend draw at the end of the last trading period. 
Before the dividend draw, you will be asked to answer some short questions about Asset 
X and Asset Y. Please answer carefully because this is also very important for this 
research. 
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Dividend Draw: 
After all participants have completed the survey, the experimenter will roll a 10-sided die 
twice. 
The first die roll will determine the dividend for ASSET X: 
Numbers 4 or 7: FRANCS 100 dividend for each Asset X 
All other numbers: FRANCS 0 dividend for each Asset X 
The second die roll will determine the dividend for ASSET Y: 
EVEN numbers (0, 2, 4, 6, 8): FRANCS 30 dividend for each Asset Y 
ODD numbers (1, 3, 5, 7, 9): FRANCS 10 dividend for each Asset Y 
As the die is 10-sided and has as many even numbers as odd numbers, the die roll 
represents the probabilities given in the table above. 
Summary screen between periods 
After the dividend draw, a summary screen appears that will tell you: 
Last Transaction Price ASSET X: last price of Asset X 
Last Transaction Price ASSET Y: last price of Asset Y 
Dividends per share ASSET X: result of the die roll 
Dividends per share ASSET Y: result of the die roll 
Your Shareholdings (Assets X and Y): self-explaining 
Total Dividends (displayed for X and Y): self-explaining 
Total Cash: current cash balance 
Accumulated Dividends: what you have accumulated in your Dividend-Account so far 
Rank Indicator: Based on: your cash-balance, accumulated dividends and your asset 
holdings valued at Expected Holding Values gives you a feel for how 
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you are doing. Note that your rank is directly related to your 
compensation. The bonus is paid/not paid on the FINAL Rank, that’s 
the rank in the Final Period Summary Screen. 
Final Period Summary Screen 
After the last trading period, you will see a screen that shows you: 
Total Cash + Accumulated Dividends in FRANCS: the basis of your compensation 
Your Rank: final rank based on Cash+ Accumulated Dividends 
Your Bonus: (Total Cash + Accumulated Dividends) × 0.5 if your rank < 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝
2
 
Your earnings from today’s session in AU$: what you’ve just earned (rounded) 
Please write down your AU$-earnings after each market, so you are able to double-check 
your payment at the end of the session. 
Second Survey 
This survey is much like the first one. Please describe any ‘oopsies’ (i.e., ‘accidentally 
sold when I wanted to buy’) as precisely as possible, including, if possible, the period 
they happened in and the price. 
Break 
Don’t go too far, we still have lots of fun ahead of us! 
Second Market 
We will now repeat the Market. Everything stays the same; you start with your initial 
endowment. 
Third Survey 
Some questions from Surveys One and Two are repeated. 
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We will gather some more information about you; that will help us with the data analysis 
and will be treated with confidentiality, of course. 
Some questions are regarding your experience of today and may enable us to improve 
these types of experiments in the future. 
Now you will receive your pay 
Remember, that’s the Show-Up fee plus your earnings from market one plus your 
earnings from market two ROUNDED as explained in the beginning. Count your money 
BEFORE you sign the receipt—otherwise, it means you accept whatever is in the 
envelope. 
Thank you for participating today! I hope to see you soon! 
 
1.4 Experiment description used for online recruitment 
PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU SIGN UP!!! 
Sign-up procedures: 
You are allowed to register for as many of the above dates as you like. As markets will 
be limited to 15 traders, tickets for some dates may “sell out”. 
You will have to be on time: Once a session has started it is not possible to add traders! 
All sessions will be held in Room 06-04-07 
IMPORTANT: Sign-up closes 12 hours before the start-time of the session. If not enough 
participants are registered to run the market, some events may be CANCELLED. In this 
case you will receive an email, so it is important to check your mailbox the night before 
each event. 
If you are registered for a session and you can’t make it, please let me know ASAP (or 
cancel your ticket) so someone else can take your spot. NOT showing up for a session 
you registered for without letting me know may lead to the cancellation of ALL your 
tickets. 
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Use the SAME email that you used to sign up for the training! 
If you have not been to any of the training-sessions you cannot register here. 
 Things to think about for your next trading sessions: 
The first time you come in for a trading session, please present your promissory note 
immediately when you come in the door so we can pay you that money first. That $20 
represents the balance of your compensation for the training session and is not related to 
compensation for the trading sessions. 
You will also need to bring your 3-digit ID (on the cover of your instructions). If you 
cannot remeber your ID please contact me, I'll email it to you. 
The compensation for the trading sessions is not fixed, it is performance based. The 
average expected compensation for the entire group is $20 per person per hour, but your 
individual realised compensation will reflect how effectively you trade. You could earn 
as much as $100 for the session or as little as $5 (you will never owe us money though). 
To help you trade most effectively, you may want to look back over the training session 
instructions before the trading session. If you have lost your copy please send me an email 
(jburger@bond.edu.au) and you will get a new one. Your actual payment will be based 
on the sum of your cash balance and your accumulated dividends after trading closes for 
each trial during the session. (Remember, your trading and balances will be in 
experimental francs; we will tell you the francs to Australian dollar “exchange rate” at 
the start of the session. Your balances will be converted and you will be paid in Australian 
dollars.) The terminal value, that is, the value after the close of trading, of any assets you 
have left will be explained in the instructions; in our training sessions the terminal value, 
as determined by the roll of the die, was sometimes zero and other times a fixed dividend. 
Note that, unless specified in the instructions, the transaction prices do not influence the 
terminal value of the asset. 
Thanks again for your help with this project. We hope you enjoy the trading sessions and 
sign up for lots of them!  
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1.5 Instructions: Gambler’s Fallacy Markets 
Dear Participant, 
Welcome to the second part of this experiment in the economics of market decision-
making. This session will last no more than 2 hours and will include trading and surveys. 
Your payment for this session does depend on the outcome of your trading activity! 
The details of your compensation will be explained later. 
The experimenter will read out all instructions. Please listen carefully. If you have any 
questions or problems during this session please raise your hand and the experimenter 
will be with you shortly. 
During this session you may NOT speak to each other. 
Please be advised that no food or drinks are allowed in the Trading Room. About half 
way through the session we will have a short break for you to eat, drink or go to the 
bathroom. 
Please switch your mobile phones on “silent” or turn them off during this session. 
PLEASE HAVE YOU 3-Digit Trader ID ready. If you do not know your Trader-ID please 
raise your hand now! 
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Schedule for today’s session 
 
Warm up 
First Survey 
First Market 
Second Survey 
Break 
Second Market 
Third Survey 
Payment 
How will you be compensated today? 
At the end of the session, you will be paid the Australian Dollar equivalent of your market 
earnings from both paid markets. 
Your market earnings are your cash-balance + your accumulated dividends AT THE END 
OF THE LAST TRADING PERIOD of each market. 
The Exchange rate: Your market earnings are in FRANCS. We will convert FRANCS to 
Australian Dollars at a rate of: FRANCS 260 = $1AU 
At this rate, the expected (or average) $AU-earnings per market are $18/participant 
(rounded). 
We will play two identical, independent markets, so that makes $36 (rounded). 
There is also a Show-Up fee of $5 which is paid to all participants irrespective of their 
performance and represents the minimum compensation you can receive today. 
Remember: All but the Show-Up fee is variable! That means your earnings could be less 
or more than $41 ($36+$5) but never less than $5. 
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Rounding: 
We will round all final payments to the nearest $5. We will round up from >$1.50  
I.e. your final earnings including the Show-Up fee are $16.60, you will receive $20. 
Your final earning including the Show-Up fee are $31.50, you will receive $30. 
 
Payment: 
Payments will be made in envelopes and in random order. You do not have to tell anyone 
about your earnings if you don’t want to. 
Warm up 
Please start Z-leaf by clicking on the desktop icon. 
During the next 4 minutes you can trade one asset. 
Try out all the different functions that you learned during your training. 
Note that this part of the experiment is unrelated to your compensation. 
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First Survey 
Please fill in the following survey. Please answer all questions carefully and truthfully as 
they are a very important part of this research. There are no right or wrong answers in any 
of today’s surveys. 
Market 
You will soon start trading for 12 periods, 2.5 minutes each.  
You will trade one asset. All prices and transactions are stated in the experimental 
currency “FRANCS”. 
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Each Asset has the following characteristics: 
Dividend FRANCS 100 With Probability 20% 
Dividend FRANCS 0 With Probability 80% 
Individual Information: 
This will be your endowments for the trading part: They are not necessarily all equal, but 
they are equally fair. 
Your Cash 2400 
Asset  10 
 
Note each asset has an expected dividend of FRANCS 20/Period. 
Hence its average, or expected, Holding Values will be: 
During Period Expected Holding Values per asset in 
FRANCS  
1 240 
2 220 
3 200 
4 180 
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5 160 
6 140 
7 120 
8 100 
9 80 
10 60 
11 40 
12 20 
END OF MARKET 0 
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Graph
 
Remember that there is a dividend draw at the end of the last period (period 12). After the 
last dividend draw the market stops and all assets expire. 
I may help if you imagine that you are trading the stocks of a depletable gold mine: 
The Mine   will not find any gold during a period with the probability of 80% and therefore 
not pay a dividend. If they find gold (20% probability) then it will be a lot and they will 
pay all shareholders FRANCS 100 per share. The mine will close after the last dividend-
draw at the end of the last trading period. 
Before the dividend draw you will be asked to answer some short questions about the 
Asset. Please answer carefully as this is also very important for this research. 
Dividend Draw: 
The dividend is drawn by a random number generator according to the probabilities stated 
above. The outcome of the draw will be displayed on your screen. 
 
0
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Summary Screen between periods 
After the dividend draw appears a summary screen that will tell you: 
Last Transaction Price: Last price of the Asset 
Dividends per share: result of the random number generator 
Your Shareholdings (Assets): self-explaining 
Total Dividends: self-explaining 
Total Cash: current cash balance 
Accumulated Dividends: what you have accumulated in your Dividend-Account so far 
Rank Indicator:  Based on: your cash-balance, accumulated dividends and asset 
holdings valued at Expected Holding Values gives you a feel for how you are doing. Note 
that your rank (in today’s session) is not directly related to your compensation. 
 
Final Period Summary Screen 
After the last trading period, you will see a screen that shows you: 
Total Cash + Accumulated Dividends in FRANCS: The basis of your compensation 
Your Rank: Final rank based on Cash+ Accumulated Dividends (again, today that’s not 
directly related to your pay) 
Your earnings from today’s session in AUD: what you’ve just earned (rounded) 
Please write down your AUD-earnings after each market, so you are able to double-check 
your payment at the end of the session. 
Second Survey 
This survey is much like the first one. Please describe any “oopsies” (i.e. “accidentally 
sold when I wanted to buy”) as precisely as possible, including, if possible, the period 
they happened in and the price. 
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Break 
Don’t go too far, we still have lots of fun ahead of us! 
 
Second Market 
We will now repeat the Market. Everything stays the same; you start with your initial 
endowment. 
 
Third Survey 
Some questions from Survey One and Two are repeated. 
We also gather some more info about you; that will help us with the data analysis and 
treated with confidentiality, of course. 
Some more questions regard your experience of today and may enable us to improve these 
types of experiments in the future. 
 
Now you will receive your pay 
Remember, that’s the Show-Up fee plus your earnings from market one plus your 
earnings from market two ROUNDED as explained in the beginning. Count your money 
BEFORE you have signed the receipt, otherwise you accept whatever is in the envelope. 
 
 
Thank you for participating today! I hope to see you again soon! 
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1.6 Explanatory Statement and Informed Consent 
Explanatory Statement and Informed Consent Form 
Date: August 2014 
Project Title: Risk-Taking Behaviour in a Two-Asset Experiment Under 
Tournament Incentives with Well-Trained Participants 
BUHREC protocol number: RO 1484 
Associate Professor Julia Henker, CFA 
Faculty of Business 
Telephone number: (07) 5595 2048 
Email: jhenker@bond.edu.au 
 
Johannes Burger 
Faculty of Business 
Telephone Number: (07)????????? 
Email: jburger@bond.edu.au 
The goal of our research is to observe and analyse the development of risky asset prices 
in a controlled laboratory environment, including the process by which stock prices 
evolve, and especially the information that leads to stock price crashes. The effects of a 
stock price crash on investors and economies are profound, but there is currently no 
satisfactory theory of the factors that signal the turning point in prices. We are 
investigating factors that moderate stock price deviation from fundamental value. 
Participants sought for this study are University students and staff, aged 18 and above, 
who are willing to participate in a simulated stock market in the Macquarie Trading 
Room. The experiment will require FOUR HOURS on two separate days. On the first 
day, participants will learn how to use the software and play different games that will 
gradually increase in complexity. Payment for the first day is $40. Half of this payment 
will be handed to participants in cash after the first session. The second half will be paid 
at the beginning of the second session. 
In the second session, each player will be endowed with the experiment risky asset and 
experiment cash. During successive trading rounds, players will have the opportunity to 
buy and sell shares and hold extra cash in the cash account. To provide an incentive for 
players to behave as realistically as possible, at the conclusion of the experiment, players 
will be paid the Australian dollar equivalent of the value of their portfolio and a bonus 
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under certain circumstances. The equivalent rate will be described at the start of the 
experiment. Payments will be strictly positive; there is no possibility that a player could 
owe anything at conclusion of the game. 
Participants will be assigned a unique ID to ensure anonymity during the experiment and 
at conclusion of the trial. No performance and/or portfolio value identifiable by 
participant will be made public during or at the conclusion of the experiment. No findings 
that could identify any individual participant will be published. Any identifying 
information necessary, for example, to award payments and track repeat participants, will 
be accessed separately from the trading files, will be accessible only to the researchers, 
and will be destroyed as soon as it is no longer required. The research data that must, 
according to University regulations, be stored for five years will not include any 
identifying information. 
Participation is voluntary. Participants are not obliged to participate and may withdraw at 
any time without penalty or explanation 
If you experience any stress or discomfort during or following the experiment, please 
seek support from counsellors at the Bond University Counselling Service located at the 
Bond University Staff and Student Medical Clinic. 
Your participation in this study is greatly appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
 
Julia Henker & Johannes Burger 
Investigator: Julia Henker, CFA    Signature______________ 
Faculty of Business 
Telephone Number: (07) 5595 2048 
Email: jhenker@bond.edu.au 
Investigator: Johannes Burger    Signature______________ 
Faculty of Business 
Telephone Number: (07) 5595 2048 
Email: jburger@bond.edu.au 
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Should you have any concerns with regard to the conduct or nature of this 
research, please feel free to contact: 
Senior Research Ethics Officer 
Bond University Human Research Ethics Committee 
c/o BURCS 
Bond University 
QLD 4229 
 
Tel: 07 5595 4194 
Fax: 07 5595 1120 
Email: buhrec@bond.edu.au 
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Participant Consent Form 
I agree to take part in the above Bond University research project. I have read and 
understood the Explanatory Statement. 
I understand that: 
• This study has been approved by the Bond University Human Research and Ethics 
Committee (BUHREC) in accordance with the National Health and Medical 
Research council guidelines. 
• My participation is voluntary, I am not obliged to participate, and I may withdraw 
freely at any time without penalty or explanation. If I chose to withdraw prior to 
the conclusion of the experiment, the payment will be fixed. 
• If I experience any stress or discomfort during or following the experiment, I can 
seek support from counsellors at the Bond University Counselling Service located 
at the Bond University Staff and Student Medical Clinic. 
• All data will be de-identified. Any identifying information necessary, for 
example, to award payments and track repeat participants, will be stored 
separately from the trading files, will be accessible only to the principal 
researchers, and will be destroyed as soon as it is no longer required. 
Name (please 
print)_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Signature________________________________________________Date__________ 
Should you have any concerns with regard to the conduct or nature of this 
research, please feel free to contact: 
Senior Research Ethics Officer 
Bond University Human Research Ethics Committee 
c/o BURCS 
Bond University 
QLD 4229 
 
Tel: 07 5595 4194 
Fax: 07 5595 1120 
Email: buhrec@bond.edu.au 
  
152 
1.7 Promissory Note 
 
Promissory note 
Instructions: This document will be handed to you after you participate in the Part I 
session of the experiment that you have agreed to take part in. Please take this document 
with you and bring it back for the Part II session. 
Date: 17.09.2014    Name of the experimenter: Johannes Burger 
I hereby promise to pay $20 cash to 
Name of participant: ____________________________ Trade ID participant: 
__________________ 
In exchange for this document as soon as the abovementioned participant arrives for the 
first 
Part II session that she/he will register for. 
Date: __/__/___ Signature of experimenter: _________________________________ 
       Johannes Burger  
Receipt: 
Instructions: Please do not fill this part until you have received payment for this 
promissory note. 
Date: ____________________________ Name of participant: 
___________________________ 
Trade ID: ____________________ 
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I hereby confirm that I have received a cash payment of $20 in exchange for this document 
as a payment for my participation in an experiment conducted on the __/__/____. 
_____________________ 
Signature of Participant 
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1.8 Example Recruitment Poster 
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Appendix 2: Instruments 
2.1 Risk Attitude Survey by Grable and Lytton 
1. In general, how would your best friend describe you as a risk taker? 
a. A real gambler 
b. Willing to take risks after completing adequate research 
c. Cautious 
d. A real risk avoider 
2. You are on a TV game show and can choose one of the following. Which would 
you take? 
a. $1,000 in cash 
b. A 50% chance at winning $5,000 
c. A 25% chance at winning $10,000 
d. A 5% chance at winning $100,000 
3. You have just finished saving for a ‘once-in-a-lifetime’ vacation. Three weeks 
before you plan to leave, you lose your job. You would: 
a. Cancel the vacation 
b. Take a much more modest vacation 
c. Go as scheduled, reasoning that you need the time to prepare for a job 
search 
d. Extend your vacation, because this might be your last chance to go first-
class 
4. How would you respond to the following statement? ‘It’s hard for me to pass up 
a bargain.’ 
a. Very true 
b. Sometimes true 
c. Not at all true 
5. If you unexpectedly received $20,000 to invest, what would you do? 
a. Deposit it in a bank account, money market account or an insured CD 
b. Invest it in safe high-quality bonds or bond mutual funds 
c. Invest it in stocks or stock mutual funds 
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6. In terms of experience, how comfortable are you investing in stocks or stock 
mutual funds? 
a. Not at all comfortable 
b. Somewhat comfortable 
c. Very comfortable 
7. Which situation would make you the happiest? 
a. You win $50,000 in a publisher’s contest 
b. You inherit $50,000 from a rich relative 
c. You earn $50,000 by risking $1,000 in the options market 
d. Any of the above—after all, you’re happy with the $50,000 
8. When you think of the word ‘risk’, which of the following words comes to mind 
first? 
a. Loss 
b. Uncertainty 
c. Opportunity 
d. Thrill 
9. You inherit a mortgage-free house worth $80,000. The house is in a nice 
neighbourhood, and you believe that it should increase in value faster than 
inflation. Unfortunately, the house needs repairs. If rented today, the house would 
bring in $600 monthly, but if updates and repairs were made, the house would rent 
for $800 per month. To finance the repairs, you’ll need to take out a mortgage on 
the property. You would: 
a. Sell the house 
b. Rent the house as is 
c. Remodel and update the house, and then rent it 
10. In your opinion, is it more important to be protected from rising consumer prices 
(inflation) or to maintain the safety of your money from loss or theft? 
a. Much more important to secure the safety of my money 
b. Much more important to be protected from rising prices (inflation) 
11. You’ve just taken a job at a small fast-growing company. After your first year, 
you are offered the following bonus choices. Which one would you choose? 
a. A five-year employment contract 
b. A $25,000 bonus 
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c. Stock in the company currently worth $25,000, with the hope of selling 
out later at a large profit 
12. Some experts are predicting prices of assets, such as gold, jewels, collectibles, and 
real estate (hard assets), to increase in value; bond prices may fall. However, 
experts tend to agree that government bonds are relatively safe. Most of your 
investment assets are now in high-interest government bonds. What would you 
do? 
a. Hold the bonds 
b. Sell the bonds, put half the proceeds into money market accounts, and the 
other half into hard assets 
c. Sell the bonds and put the total proceeds into hard assets 
d. Sell the bonds, put all the money into hard assets and borrow additional 
money to buy more 
13. Assume you are going to buy a home in the next few weeks. Your strategy would 
probably be: 
a. To buy an affordable house such that you can make monthly payments 
comfortably 
b. To stretch a bit financially to buy the house you really want 
c. To buy the most expensive house you can qualify for 
d. To borrow money from friends and relatives so you can qualify for a 
bigger mortgage 
14. Given the best and worst case returns of the four investment choices below, which 
would you prefer? 
a. $200 gain best case; $0 gain/loss worst case 
b. $800 gain best case; $200 loss worst case 
c. $2,600 gain best case; $800 loss worst case 
d. $4,800 gain best case; $2,400 loss worst case 
15. Assume that you are applying for a mortgage. Interest rates have been coming 
down over the past few months. There’s the possibility that this trend will 
continue. But some economists are predicting rates will increase. You have the 
option of locking in your mortgage interest rate or letting it float. If you lock in, 
you will obtain the current rate even if interest rates go up. If the rates go down, 
you’ll have to settle for the higher locked-in rate. You plan to live in the house for 
at least three years. What would you do? 
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a. Definitely lock in the interest rate 
b. Probably lock in the interest rate 
c. Probably let the interest rate float 
d. Definitely let the interest rate float 
16. In addition to whatever you own, you have been given $1,000. You are now asked 
to choose between: 
a. A sure gain of $500 
b. A 50% chance to gain $1,000 and a 50% chance to gain nothing 
17. In addition to whatever you own, you have been given $2,000. You are now asked 
to choose between: 
a. A sure loss of $500 
b. A 50% chance to lose $1,000 and a 50% chance to lose nothing 
18. Suppose a relative left you an inheritance of $100,000, stipulating in the will that 
you invest ALL the money in ONE of the following choices. Which one would 
you select? 
a. A savings account or money market mutual fund 
b. A mutual fund that owns stocks and bonds 
c. A portfolio of 15 common stocks 
d. Commodities like gold, silver and oil 
19. If you had to invest $20,000, which of the following investment choices would 
you find most appealing? 
a. 60% in low-risk investments; 30% in medium-risk investments; 10% in 
high-risk investments 
b. 30% in low-risk investments; 40% in medium-risk investments; 30% in 
high-risk investments 
c. 10% in low-risk investments; 40% in medium-risk investments; 50% in 
high-risk investments 
20. Your trusted friend and neighbour, an experienced geologist, is putting together a 
group of investors to fund an exploratory gold-mining venture. The venture could 
pay back 50 to 100 times the investment if successful. If the mine is a bust, the 
entire investment is worthless. Your friend estimates the chance of success is only 
20%. If you had the money, how much would you invest? 
a. Nothing 
b. One month’s salary 
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c. Three month’s salary 
d. Six month’s salary 
2.2 Financial Literacy 
Your Trader ID:_______________ 
1) An asset has the following dividend characteristics: 
$20 with p = 0.5 or $40 with p = 0.5 
What is the expected value of the dividend? 
a) $20 
b) $40 
c) $30 
d) None of the above 
2) An asset has the following dividend characteristics: 
$100 with p = 0.1 or $0 with p = 0.9 
What is the expected value of the dividend? 
a) $100 
b) $50 
c) $15 
d)  None of the above 
3) An asset has the following dividend characteristics: 
$100 with p = 0.1 or $0 with p = 0.9 per period and a lifetime of 10 periods. 
What is the expected value of the asset at the beginning of period one? 
a) $100 
b) $90 
c) $200 
d) $120 
4) An asset has the following dividend characteristics: 
$100 with p = 0.1 or $0 with p = 0.9 per period and a lifetime of 10 periods. 
What is the expected value of the asset at the beginning of period six? 
a) $100 
b) $50 
c) $60 
d) $40 
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5) An asset has the following dividend characteristics: 
$100 with p = 0.1 or $0 with p = 0.9 per period and a lifetime of 10 periods. 
What is the expected value of the asset at the beginning of period 10? 
a) $100 
b) $0 
c) $10 
d) $20 
6) An asset has the following dividend characteristics: 
$100 with p = 0.1 or $0 with p = 0.9 per period and a lifetime of 10 periods. 
In periods one, two and three, the dividend paid was $100. The expected value of the 
dividend in period four is 
a) $100 
b) $0 
c) $50 
d) $10 
7) An asset has the following dividend characteristics: 
$100 with p = 0.1 or $0 with p = 0.9 per period and a lifetime of 10 periods. 
In periods one, two and three, the dividend paid was $100. The expected value of the 
asset at the beginning of period four is 
a) $100 
b) $70 
c) $60 
d) None of the above 
8) An asset has the following dividend characteristics: 
$100 with p = 0.1 or $0 with p = 0.9 per period and a lifetime of 10 periods. 
In period seven, the market price of one asset is $55. 
a) The market price is above the sum of the expected dividends 
b) The market price is below the sum of the expected dividends 
c) The market price is equal to the sum of the expected dividends 
9) An asset has the following dividend characteristics: 
$100 with p = 0.1 or $0 with p = 0.9 per period and a lifetime of 10 periods. 
The expected value of the asset will 
a) Stay constant over the lifetime of the asset. 
b) Vary with supply and demand of the market. 
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c) Decline to $10 during period nine. 
d) None of the above. 
10) You compare the following two assets: 
Asset 1: $100 with p = 0.2 or $0 with p = 0.8 
Asset 2: $80 with p = 0.1 or $10 with p = 0.9 
Both assets have a lifetime of 10 periods. 
Which of the following statements is true? 
a) The expected value of Asset 1 is higher than the expected value of Asset 2. 
b) The expected value of Asset 2 is higher than the expected value of Asset 1. 
c) The expected values of Asset 1 and Asset 2 are equal. 
d) Differences in dividends and probabilities make the comparison of expected 
values impossible. 
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